Pepper v. Litton, No. 39

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtDOUGLAS
Citation84 L.Ed. 281,60 S.Ct. 238,308 U.S. 295
PartiesPEPPER v. LITTON
Decision Date04 December 1939
Docket NumberNo. 39

308 U.S. 295
60 S.Ct. 238
84 L.Ed. 281
PEPPER

v.

LITTON.

No. 39.
Argued Nov. 9, 10, 1939.
Decided Dec. 4, 1939.

Page 296

Mr. M. M Heuser, of Norton, Va., for petitioner.

Mr. Henry Roberts, of Bristol, Va., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question of the power of the bankruptcy court to disallow either as a secured or as a general or unsecured claim a judgment obtained by the dominant and controlling stockholder of the bankrupt corporation on alleged salary claims. The judgment of the District Court disallowing the claim was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 4 Cir., 100 F.2d 830. We granted certiorari because of an apparent restriction imposed by that decision on the power of the bankruptcy court to disallow or to subordinate such claims in exercise of its broad equitable powers. 307 U.S. 620, 59 S.Ct. 1042, 83 L.Ed. 1499.

The findings of the District Court, amply supported by the evidence, reveal a scheme to defraud creditors reminiscent of some of the evils with which 13 Eliz. c. 5 was designed to cope. But for the use of a so-called-

Page 297

'one-man' or family corporation, Dixie Splint Coal Company, of which respondent was the dominant and controlling stockholder, that scheme followed an ancient pattern.

In 1931 Pepper, the petitioner, brought suit in a state court in Virginia against Dixie Splint Coal Company and Litton, the respondent, for an accounting of royalties due Pepper under a lease.1 While this suit was pending and in anticipation that Pepper would recover, Litton caused Dixie Splint Coal Company to confess a judgment in Litton's favor in the amount of $33,468.89, representing alleged accumulated salary claims dating back at least five years. This was done by P. H. Smith, secretary and treasurer of Dixie Splint Coal Company, who, according to the District Court, was 'an employee of Litton and subservient to the latter's will.' This was on June 2, 1933. Execution was issued on this judgment the same day but no return was made thereon, Litton waiting 'quietly until the outcome of the Pepper suit was definitely known'. On February 19, 1934, Pepper obtained a judgment against Dixie Splint Coal Company for $9,000. On motion of the company, execution on the judgment was suspended for ninety days to permit an appeal. But defendant in that suit did not appeal.2 Instead, on March 19, 1934, while execution on the Pepper judgment was suspended, Litton caused an execution to issue on his confessed judgment and levy to be made thereunder. Yet Litton 'had no intention of trying to satisfy his confessed judgment' against his corporation 'unless and until it became necessary to do so'; he was using it 'only as a shield against the Pepper debt'. Thus, when execution and levy were made March 19, 1934, no steps were

Page 298

taken for over two months towards a sale of the property on which levy had been made. On May 31, 1934, Pepper caused an execution to issue on her judgment, and levy was made June 2, 1934. On this latter date the sheriff 'who seems to have been cooperating with Litton' advertised the property for sale under the Litton levy made in the previous March. On June 14, 1934, the sale was held and Litton became the purchaser of the property sold at the sum of $3,200.

The next step in the 'planned and fraudulent scheme' was the formation by Litton of 'another of his one-man corporations', Dixie Beaver Coal Company, to which Litton transferred the property he had acquired at the execution sale at a valuation of $20,135.36 to be paid for in stock of the new company.3

On September 4, 1934, the third step in Litton's scheme was taken. On that date Dixie Splint Coal Company, pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors, passed June 16, 1934, (two days after the Litton execution sale) filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. This step, according to the findings below, was 'plainly for the sole purpose of avoiding payment of the Pepper debt'. The bankrupt at that time had $4,500 on bank deposit and $12,000 in accounts receivable, most of which was good. The cash on deposit was then more than sufficient to pay all creditors with the exception of Pepper. And Litton caused the voluntary petition to be filed 'feeling confident that his confessed judgment would cover and consume' the remaining assets. Adjudication followed on September 7, 1934.

Page 299

Litton's next step in his scheme to defeat the Pepper claim was to purchase wage claims against the bankrupt and to cause 'in some manner' other claims to be withdrawn. This was done, according to the District Court, so that Pepper might be made to appear as the only general creditor—a situation designed to give Litton a decided technical advantage, as we shall see.

On June 13, 1934, Pepper had instituted suit in the Virginia state court to have the Litton judgment declared void. On June 15, 1934, the day following the sale under the Litton execution, the sheriff instituted an interpleader action joining Litton, Pepper and the Clinchfield Coal Corporation and alleging, inter alia, that that corporation had a prior lien on all the property sold for a debt of $2,153. Litton and Pepper both answered admitting the prior lien of the corporation, Pepper answering 'without prejudice to her rights' asserted in the chancery cause to have the Litton judgment set aside. On July 18, 1934, an order in the interpleader suit was entered directing payment of $2,153.00 to the Clinchfield Coal Corporation.

Thereafter the trustee, with the authority of the bankruptcy court, moved in the state court to set aside the judgment and to quash the execution thereof on the ground that the judgment was void since it had not been confessed in the manner required by the Virginia statute.4

Page 300

The court concluded that the Litton judgment was void but denied the motion on the grounds that the trustee was estopped to challenge it. The court held that Pepper in the interpleader suit had treated the fund derived from the execution sale under the Litton judgment as valid and consequently had elected to recognize the validity of the judgment. Since Litton had acquired, or caused to have withdrawn, all the remaining claims against the

Page 301

estate, the trustee in this suit was representing only Pepper. Therefore, since Pepper was estopped, so was the trustee. On appeal that judgment was affirmed on those grounds. Smith v. Litton, 167 Va. 263, 188 S.E. 214.

Thereafter the question of the allowance of the Litton judgment came before the bankruptcy court on exceptions previously made by Pepper. That court concluded that the decision by the state court that the trustee was estopped to attack the Litton judgment there, did not prevent the bankruptcy court from considering its validity. It therefore reviewed all the facts and concluded (1) that Litton and the Dixie Splint Coal Company had made a 'deliberate and carefully planned attempt' to avoid 'the payment of a just debt'; (2) that Litton and the Dixie Splint Coal Company were 'in reality the same'; and (3) that the alleged salary claims underlying the Litton judgment did not represent an 'honest debt' of the bankrupt corporation, being merely bookkeeping entries for the double purpose of lessening income taxes and of enabling Litton to appear as a creditor of the corporation in case it became financially involved. 5 Accordingly, the

Page 302

District Court disallowed the Litton claim either as a secured or unsecured claim and directed the trustee to recover for the benefit of the estate the property or its value which Litton purchased at the execution sale on June 14, 1934. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that judgment holding that the decision in the state court was res judicata in the bankruptcy proceedings.

We think that the Circuit Court of Appeals was in error in reversing the judgment of the District Court.

In the first place, res judicata did not prevent the District Court from examining into the Litton judgment and disallowing or subordinating it as a claim. When that claim was attacked in the bankruptcy court Litton did not show that the proceeding in the state court was anything more than a proceeding under Virginia practice to set aside the judgment in his favor on the ground that it was irregular or void upon its face. He failed to show that the judgment in the state court was conclusive in his favor on the validity or priority of the underlying claim, as respects the other creditors of the bankrupt corporation—a duty which was incumbent on him. On the pleadings in the state court the validity of the underlying claim was not in issue. Nor was there presented to the state court the question of whether or not the Litton judgment might be subordinated to the claims of other

Page 303

creditors upon equitable principles. The motion on which that proceeding was based challenged the Litton judgment on one ground only, viz., that it was void ab initio because it was not confessed by Dixie Splint Coal Company in the manner required by the Virginia statute and because P. H. Smith did not have either an implied or express power to confess it. In other words, in the state court, under the pleadings and practice, the only decree which was asked or could be given in the plaintiff's favor was for cancellation of the judgment as a record obligation of the bankrupt. It is therefore plain that the issue which the bankruptcy court later considered was not an issue in the trial of the cause in the state court and could not be adjudicated there.6 Hence, the failure on the part of Litton to establish that the state judgment was res judicata plus his submission of his judgment to the bankruptcy court for allowance (as a preferred claim to the extent that it was secured by the alleged lien and as a common claim as respects the deficiency) plainly left the bankruptcy court with full authority to follow the...

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1853 practice notes
  • 32 195 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Company of New York 8212 220, No. 70
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 22, 1972
    ...and intimate no opinion. But, if true, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo gives no immunity.4 We said in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245, 246, 84 L.Ed. 281, that 'the bankruptcy court in passing on allowance of claims sits as a court of equity' and we ......
  • Boston and Maine Corp., In re, No. 83-1086
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • September 30, 1983
    ...it must be remembered that the district court, in passing on the allowance of claims, sits as a court of equity. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939); see Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219, 61 S.Ct. 904, 907, 85 L.Ed. 1293 (19......
  • In re Sasson, No. 03-16364.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • September 13, 2005
    ...determination. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240, 54 S.Ct. 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230 (1934); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939) ("[F]or many purposes courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceed......
  • In re Compton Corp., No. CA4-86-647-K.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Northern District of Texas
    • August 9, 1988
    ...Cong. & Admin.News at 5963, 6298. Indeed it is axiomatic that a bankruptcy court is in itself a court of equity. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939); In re Beck Industries, Inc., 605 F.2d 624 (2d Cir.1979). Finally, consistent with the legislative history d......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1842 cases
  • 32 195 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Company of New York 8212 220, No. 70
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 22, 1972
    ...and intimate no opinion. But, if true, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo gives no immunity.4 We said in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245, 246, 84 L.Ed. 281, that 'the bankruptcy court in passing on allowance of claims sits as a court of equity' and we ......
  • Boston and Maine Corp., In re, No. 83-1086
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • September 30, 1983
    ...it must be remembered that the district court, in passing on the allowance of claims, sits as a court of equity. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939); see Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219, 61 S.Ct. 904, 907, 85 L.Ed. 1293 (19......
  • In re Sasson, No. 03-16364.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • September 13, 2005
    ...determination. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240, 54 S.Ct. 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230 (1934); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939) ("[F]or many purposes courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceed......
  • In re Compton Corp., No. CA4-86-647-K.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Northern District of Texas
    • August 9, 1988
    ...Cong. & Admin.News at 5963, 6298. Indeed it is axiomatic that a bankruptcy court is in itself a court of equity. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939); In re Beck Industries, Inc., 605 F.2d 624 (2d Cir.1979). Finally, consistent with the legislative history d......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 firm's commentaries
  • Confirmation Denied: Chapter 11 Plan Did Not Satisfy New Value Exception To Absolute Priority Rule Without Market Testing
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • April 5, 2022
    ...It emanates from the bankruptcy court's power to ignore the form of a transaction and give effect to its substance. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939). However, because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly empower a bankruptcy court to recharacterize debt as equity, some court......
  • Business Restructuring Review | March–April 2022
    • United States
    • JD Supra United States
    • March 31, 2022
    ...It emanates from the bank-ruptcy court’s power to ignore the form of a transaction and give effect to its substance. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939). However, because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly empower a bankruptcy court to recharacterize debt as equity, some cour......
2 books & journal articles
  • Section 7 of the Clayton Act and “Control” in Bank Holding Company Regulation
    • United States
    • Antitrust Bulletin Nbr. 18-4, December 1973
    • December 1, 1973
    ...are, of course, an equitable basisforfastening fiduciary responsibilities, Chenery Corp. v. S.E.C., 318 U.S.80 (1943); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), even in a holdingcompany context, Woodson v. McAUi.ster, 119 F.2d 924, 925-27 (5thCir. 1941), rehearing denied 121 F.2d 126, 128-29 (......
  • Redesigning Education Finance: How Student Loans Outgrew the debt Paradigm
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal Nbr. 109-1, October 2020
    • October 1, 2020
    ...N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511 (McKinney 2020) (principal and interest payments on usurious loan unenforceable); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305–06 (1939) (recognizing availability of equitable disallowance in bankruptcy (citing Lesser v. Gray, 236 U.S. 70, 74 (1915))). 188. See, e.g., 34......

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