Peppers v. Biggam
| Decision Date | 25 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-1012-MJR-PMF |
| Parties | ROSHANDA PEPPERS, Plaintiff, v. CHARLIE BIGGAM, ADAM POLLET, and the ILLINOIS DEPT. OF COMMERCE and ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Roshanda Peppers worked for the St. Clair County Intergovernmental Grants Department, having been hired as a Program Assistant in early March 2011. On September 14, 2015, Peppers filed a pro se complaint in this Court alleging that she was retaliated against and harassed on the job from January 2013 through early June 2013. The complaint alleges that the retaliation/harassment took the form of written reprimand, ten-day suspension without pay, demotion, and threat of termination. Documents attached to the complaint - including a charge that Peppers filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) - indicate that the protected activity which allegedly sparked the retaliation was Peppers' December 2011 filing of a disability discrimination complaint or grievance regarding her boss at the Grants Department, Dr. Debra Moore (Doc. 2, p. 5).
That complaint/grievance was lodged with the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO) and allegedly mailed to three individuals at the DCEO - Charles Biggam, Adam Pollet, and Kevin Bell. In that complaint/grievance, Peppers reported to the DCEO on activities in the Grants Department (where Moore was the boss and Peppers worked), activities that Peppers believed constituted disability discrimination, violated state policy, and were "fraud, misfeasance, nonfeasance or malfeasance" (Doc. 2, p. 5). An investigation of the Grants Department by the U.S. Department of Labor ultimately followed (the complaint alleges that the "Conciliation Agreement" was being finalized when Peppers filed this suit in September 2015, see Doc. 2, p. 5, p. 12).
In her federal civil rights complaint filed here, Peppers references the retaliation at the hands of Debra Moore and the Grants Department but she names as Defendants the DCEO, Biggam, and Pollet. She complains that neither Biggam (General Counsel of the DCEO) nor Pollet (Director of the DCEO) responded to her reports of the improper activities at the Grants Department, despite multiple requests by her. More specifically, Peppers alleges that she reported to the DCEO the inappropriate activities transpiring at the Grants Department, she suffered retaliation at the Grants Department from January to June 2013 for reporting to the DCEO, she told the DCEO about the retaliation, she has not received any response from the DCEO, and "they have continued to allow St. Clair County to retaliate against me for opposing unlawful discrimination" (Doc. 2, p. 5). St. Clair County is not a named Defendant in this suit.
Peppers filed a retaliation charge against the DCEO with the IDHR and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in late June or early July 2014. She attached to her complaint in this Court that charge plus a right-to-sue notice issued thereon by the EEOC in June 2015 (Doc. 2, pp. 7-12).1 On threshold review of the complaint in September 2015 (when granting Peppers' in forma pauperis motion), the undersigned noted that it was hard to discern the precise contours of the claim Peppers presents in this lawsuit. She used a form designated and typically used for civil rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 () but appeared to be trying to state a claim of retaliation via Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. ( the EEOC right-to-sue notice and claiming retaliation in violation of federal law).2 She seeks compensatory and punitive damages in an amount of "any/all available" (Doc. 2, p. 6).
Construing the complaint as presenting claims under Title VII or § 1983, the Court enjoys subject matter jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331. Now before the Court is the dismissal motion filed by the DCEO, Biggam, and Pollet (collectively, Defendants). For the reasons stated below, the Court partially grants and partially denies Defendants' motion to dismiss.
B. Analysis
Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and they ask for dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 12, p. 1, p. 10).3 Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint, not the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must state a claim that is facially plausible. Id., citing Vinson v. Vermilion County, Il., 776 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 2015). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations to avoid Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, it must contain "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Accord Foster v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 806 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2015) ().
A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must "go beyond mere labels and conclusions" and contain "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." G&S Holdings, LLC v. Continental Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 537-38 (7th Cir. 2012).
In assessing a complaint or count under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in her favor.'" Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148 (2010), quoting Tamayo v. Blagoyevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, the undersigned bears in mind that the pleadings of pro se litigants like Peppers are not held to the same stringent standard as pleadings drafted by formally-trained lawyers and should be liberally construed. See, e.g., Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. Cross, 801 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2015). And the Supreme Court has reminded that federal pleading rules call for a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, but "they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., -- U.S. -- , 135 S. Ct. 346, 346-47 (2014).
On threshold review of the complaint, the undersigned pointed out the lack of clarity as to Peppers' claims and the legal theory on which they rest. Generously construed, Peppers alleges that three Defendants (one listed in the style of the complaint and two in the body) were notified by her of the retaliation she was suffering at the hands of the County Grants Department and took no action to intervene. In her response to the dismissal motion, Plaintiff endeavors to flesh out her claims a bit more, explaining that the named Defendants "allowed adverse action to be taken against her" and breached a duty they owed to her to enforce the DCEO retaliation policy (Doc. 22, p. 3).
With the briefs supporting and opposing dismissal, both sides submitted materials "outside the pleadings." As a general rule, Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be decided strictly on the pleadings and materials attached to the pleadings, plus documents referred to in the complaint and central to the plaintiff's claim or subject to proper judicial notice. If matters outside the pleadings are considered, the dismissal motion must be converted to a summary judgment motion under Rule 56, with notice furnished and additional briefing permitted. See, e.g., Rogers v. Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir. 2015), citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012); Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 751 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
The Court does not need to convert the pending dismissal motion here. The materials submitted by Peppers include the emails she alleges she sent to Biggam and Pollet plus correspondence regarding the Department of Labor's investigation of theGrants Department. In the context of the pending dismissal motion, the Court assumes as true all well-pled facts in the complaint, including the fact that Peppers contacted Biggam and Pollet about what she discovered was happening at the Grants Department and that an investigation of the Grants Department did occur (including whether Debra Moore retaliated against Peppers for reporting disability discrimination).
The Court does not consider, and does not need to consider, the materials attached to Plaintiff's response at Doc. 22. Moore is not named as a Defendant herein, and the question before this Court is not whether Moore retaliated against Peppers. The fact of Peppers' reporting the events to the DCEO is relevant, but the Court assumes as true this well-pled fact in Peppers' complaint without reference to the extraneous materials.
Defendants submitted a document the Court can consider on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion - the IDHR findings on the charge Peppers filed. As noted above, Peppers had attached to her complaint the IDHR charge and the right-to-sue notice which specifically references the IDHR findings, just not the findings themselves (the middle piece of the three-piece agency process - charge, findings,...
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