Peppers v. Cobb Cnty.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–10866,15–10866 |
| Parties | Jeff Peppers, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Cobb County, Georgia, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Matthew C. Billips, Orr Brown & Billips, LLP, Meredith J. Carter, Billips & Benjamin, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Mark A. Adelman, Deborah L. Dance, Cobb County Attorney's Office, Marietta, GA, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and ROGERS,* Circuit Judges.
MARCUS
, Circuit Judge:
Jeff Peppers, a retired criminal investigator with the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, commenced this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Cobb County, Georgia under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex after he learned that a less-experienced female in the office was earning a substantially higher salary for the same job. Although the District Attorney and Cobb County are indisputably distinct legal entities, each created separately by state law, Peppers claims that they acted as “joint employers” because the County was responsible for approving the District Attorney's budget and paying Peppers's salary and benefits. Rejecting this argument, the district court granted final summary judgment to Cobb County.
After thorough review and having taken oral argument, we affirm the judgment of the district court. As we see it, the County is a legally separate and distinct entity that did not control the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship between the office of the District Attorney and its criminal investigators, nor did it act as a joint employer with the District Attorney. Because its role as paymaster is wholly insufficient to establish that Cobb County was Peppers's employer, he could not sue the County under the federal anti-discrimination laws.
Jeff Peppers, a male formerly employed as an investigator in the District Attorney's Office, sued Cobb County, Georgia in 2013 under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2
(“Title VII”), and 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 215 (“Equal Pay Act”).1 In his complaint, Peppers alleged that the County employed him as a criminal investigator in the District Attorney's Office for a number of years. On April 18, 2011, he claimed he was promoted from Criminal Investigator to Assistant Chief Criminal Investigator. Peppers said that his salary should have been increased when he was promoted, but it was not. Peppers brought his concerns regarding his salary to the Chief Criminal Investigator, who, he claimed, admitted that Peppers was not being paid what he should have been, and that a female employee, Christine Nerbonne, was paid a substantially higher salary, despite his superior qualifications, experience, and higher rank within the department. Indeed, while Peppers was paid $55,459.54, Nerbonne was paid $72,384.00.
Peppers charged that the County denied him compensation to which he was entitled, and paid him less than similarly situated female employees on account of his gender, and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also asserted that because of his gender, the County paid him substantially less than female employees who were employed in jobs requiring equal work, skill, effort, and responsibility, in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Peppers sought relief in the form of a recovery of the difference in compensation between what he received and what higher-paid female employees received, as well as an equal amount of liquidated damages.
A review of this summary judgment record revealed the following undisputed facts. Cobb County had no involvement in Peppers's recruitment, his hiring, the establishment of his job responsibilities, the regulation of his work environment, or his supervision. All of these core functions were performed by the District Attorney. Nor did the County set compensation for the District Attorney's employees—those were set by the District Attorney himself. But Peppers was actually paid by Cobb County, his compensation came from Cobb County funds, and his employment benefits were the same as those available to Cobb County employees. Cobb County also approved the annual operating budget of the District Attorney's Office, which included individual employee salaries. All of this occurred in accordance with Georgia law, which provides:
Personnel employed by the district attorney pursuant to this Code section shall serve at the pleasure of the district attorney and shall be compensated by the county or counties comprising the judicial circuit, the manner and amount of compensation to be paid to be fixed either by local Act or by the district attorney with the approval of the county or counties comprising the judicial circuit.
Ga. Code Ann. § 15–18–20(b)
. Investigators are included among the personnel employed pursuant to that section of Georgia's code. Ga. Code Ann. § 15–18–20(a) ().
During discovery, Anthony Hagler, the human resources director for Cobb County, was deposed twice—once on his own behalf and once as a representative for Cobb County pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)
. When asked if employees, such as Peppers, working in the District Attorney's Office were considered County employees, Hagler stated several times that they were on the County payroll, and considered County employees. In each such instance, however, Hagler made clear that he considered County employment to be synonymous with appearing on the County's payroll. Hagler also said that the County reported to the Georgia Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that individuals working in the District Attorney's Office were County employees. Moreover, the District Attorney's employees were covered by the County's worker compensation plan, and unemployment compensation policy. The employees' salaries were paid out of Cobb County's general funds.
Hagler's testimony was clear throughout that, as far as he and the County were concerned, the County's involvement with the District Attorney's employees was limited to providing the budget and benefits. The County played no role in hiring, supervising, firing, establishing pay, or setting the duties and responsibilities of the prosecutor's employees. As Hagler explained in a separately filed declaration after his deposition, the County's limited involvement with the District Attorney's criminal investigators included cutting their paychecks, ensuring that criminal investigators received proper benefits under the County's employee benefits and retirement program, and distributing annual pay raises when requested and approved by the District Attorney and authorized by the County. Notably, Cobb County played no role in Peppers's recruitment or hiring, creating his job title, establishing his job responsibilities and pay, regulating his work environment, or supervising him.
Indeed, the District Attorney's Office was a legal entity separate from the County. See Ga. Const. art. VI, § 8, ¶ I(a) (); Ga. Const. art. IX, § 9, ¶ I (). The County was responsible only for approving the District Attorney's annual budget.
Former District Attorney Patrick Head confirmed in a deposition the nature of the criminal investigators' relationship to the District Attorney. According to Head, he had total control over employee hiring, firing, and compensation, within the overall budgetary boundaries set by the County, although he believed that he needed County approval to create new positions or give someone a raise. Moreover, as he explained the system, he had the authority to set salaries—with approval of the County—but disagreed with any suggestion that the County had the authority to set salaries by itself. Rather, the County's power extended no further than approving or disapproving the salaries that he set as the District Attorney. As for Investigator Christine Nerbonne in particular, he recalled contacting the County Manager's office to get approval for her to be hired because he wanted this hiring to be recognized as a lateral transfer. This would enable Nerbonne to receive the same compensation she had been receiving in another position as a Cobb County employee. The current District Attorney, Vic Reynolds, reiterated Head's understanding of the plenary authority of the District Attorney over the hiring, supervising, and firing of the Office's personnel.
On this record, both parties moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge, to whom the case was referred, issued a Report and Recommendation that the County's motion for summary judgment should be granted, and Peppers's partial motion denied because no reasonable jury could find that the County was Peppers's “employer” for purposes of either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. Peppers unsuccessfully filed objections with the district court. Most importantly, the district court concluded that Hagler's testimony that Peppers was an employee on the County payroll could not be taken as an admission by the County that it was Peppers's employer for the purposes of Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation as its own, granted the County's summary judgment, and denied Peppers's cross-motion for summary judgment.
This timely appeal followed.
We review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment, taking all of the facts in the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the...
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