Peppett v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.

Decision Date18 April 1899
Citation78 N.W. 900,119 Mich. 640
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesPEPPETT v. MICHIGAN CENT. R. CO.

Error to circuit court, Jackson county; Erastus Peck, Judge.

Action by Sarah F. Peppett, as administratrix, against the Michigan Central Railroad Company, to recover damages for the death of her husband. From a judgment entered on a verdict directed for defendant, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

A disinterested witness marked the outer rail at a curve, where the wheels of the engine left the track, with a chisel, on a flange, and testified that the same rail was there 10 days before the trial, with his mark on it. Four other witnesses testified that the rail had not been taken out. The state mechanical engineer and the superintendent of another road testified that they had seen the marked rail several days after the wreck, and that it was a safe one. The only contradictory evidence was that of two witnesses, who testified, from mere recollection and opinion, that they saw the marks on the rail immediately after the accident, but did not see the marks a few days afterwards, and that they believed the rail had been changed. Held not a serious conflict of evidence, so as to require the question whether the rail had been removed to be submitted to the jury.

Plaintiff's counsel state her case as follows "George Peppett, the plaintiff's intestate, was, on the 13th day of September, 1895, a locomotive engineer in the defendant's employ. He was running passenger engine No. 507, pulling the train known as the 'North Shore Limited,' one of the fastest trains on the road. He left the city of Jackson at 10:30 o'clock in the morning of September 13th, and was due at Marshall, 32 miles distant, at 11:20. The train was not scheduled to stop at Marshall, and, while running around a curve inside the city limits, the engine left the track at a point a few feet west of Maple street. At the time of the derailment the train was moving at the rate of about 35 miles an hour. After leaving the rails, the engine ran on the ties for about 350 feet, when she left the ties, and, running in a southerly direction, across the right of way, tipped over in Marshall avenue, pinning the engineer under the cab, and causing his death. The track between Maple street and Marshall avenue runs east and west, in a curve of 2~>>15'. The point where the truck wheels first left the rail is in the sharpest part of the curve, and the south rails formed the inside of the curve."

The declaration contains eight counts, alleging several grounds of negligence. Two only are now insisted upon, viz. defective center castings, and a defective rail. The able circuit judge, in directing a verdict, gave his reasons in the following language upon the two grounds now insisted upon:

"The plaintiff claims that the evidence would justify the jury in finding the following conditions as the basis of the alleged negligence: that the center castings, male and female, of the engine in question, where they connect together between the engine and truck, had become so worn as to be elliptical or oblong instead of round, as they should have been, and that the outer rail where the derailment occurred was worn.
"In disposing of the case by peremptory instructions to the jury, it is the duty of the court to adopt that view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff; to consider that the jury might believe the testimony which makes most in the plaintiff's favor, and disbelieve all that which would make or tend to sustain the position of the defendant. Taking that view of the case, it must be said that the jury might be justified in finding that the following conditions existed: First. That the center castings were worn so as to become oblong of

elliptical where they came together. Second. That the center castings were not jacked up for inspection, or inspected while separated, except when the engine was jacked up for some other purpose than inspection; that there was no inspection of them except when the engine was jacked up and the parts were separated, except such inspection as the engineer might make when he took the engine out for his trip or returned with it.

"Assuming these conditions to exist, we are confronted by the next element of the plaintiff's case, which is this: Would the jury be justified in finding from the evidence that any or all of these conditions constituted negligence on the part of the defendant?

"Now whether the condition of the center castings and of the worn rail was a negligent condition-a condition which the defendant allowed in violation of its duty-is to be determined from the evidence in the case. At the threshold of that inquiry is presented the question: What is proper evidence that the center castings or worn rail was in an unsafe and dangerous condition?

"My views with reference to this question, as applicable to both the worn rail and the center castings, will be sufficiently explained by a reference to the outer rail-the worn rail-only. It is certain that every railroad rail commences to wear as soon as its use for railroad purposes begins, and continues the wear as long as that use continues. It might be possible that any one could tell that a rail just put down was not so worn as to be unsafe and dangerous, or that any one could say that a rail nearly worn out, or just hanging together, was unsafe and dangerous; but, in my judgment, no person having only the common intelligence of mankind could say, so as to make it evidence, that a rail in the condition limited on the one hand by the testimony of the plaintiff, and on the other by the testimony of the defendant, was unsafe and dangerous or not. I know I could not. I am confident that as intelligent jurors as you are could not; nor could any man, however intelligent he may be in a general way, tell with any great certainty or confidence in his judgment. I am, therefore convinced that information upon that subject-evidence which should actuate us in reaching conclusions-can only be sought from people who do know it, who have some unusual intelligence and judgment upon the subject, by reason of experience or special training. It is my judgment, therefore, that the only evidence in the case which it is proper for the jury to consider upon that subject is the opinions of trained men in that field.

"Now, looking at the testimony of the men who have been witnesses here, who have shown an equipment or qualification to give us information upon that subject, I am clearly of the opinion that the jury would not be justified in finding either that the rail was unsafe and dangerous, or that the center casting was unsafe and dangerous, and therefore that the evidence fails to prove, in either of these respects, that the defendant has violated any duty, and is negligent.

"With reference to the question of inspection of the castings: There was by the evidence, and beyond dispute, an inspection of these castings by men who appeared by the evidence to have been competent inspectors, at the time they were separated and the engine jacked up. There was no inspection at any other time except that made by the engineers who ran them. I understand the plaintiff's contention to be that if the jury should find that these castings were so worn on the 13th of September, 1895, as to permit of side motion or shucking of an inch, or any similar or lesser amount, that that condition must have existed at the time of the last inspection, August 28th, some two weeks before the accident; and that the jury would be justified in finding that the defendant at that time knew, by notice to its employ�s and inspectors, that the center castings were so worn as to permit of shucking to a considerable degree,-an inch or less,-and that, therefore, the jury would be justified in finding that, with knowledge of this fact, the defendant sent Mr. Peppett out with this engine to his death. Now, I cannot adopt that view, or permit the jury to, under the evidence in this case. In my judgment, the evidence would not justify you in reaching that conclusion; and being of that opinion, and clearly so, it is my duty to so instruct you.

"Now, gentlemen, the view I have taken and expressed of the evidence with reference to these four different bases of negligence makes it unnecessary to discuss them further, and I come now to other necessary elements of the plaintiff's case. And that is whether the conditions named, if assumed to be proved, are shown by the evidence to have been the cause of the derailment. And with reference to that subject I instruct you that the evidence does not, in my opinion, justify you in finding or reaching that conclusion with reference to any one of them.

"I call your attention now, gentlemen, to another feature of the case, which is, in my opinion, decisive of the plaintiff's rights, when viewed with reference to certain of these claimed bases of negligence. The plaintiff was, and for many years had been, an engineer on the Michigan Central Railroad. He was intrusted with its most important service in that field, the running of engines that drew its passenger trains, and thus held the lives of many people in his hands,-a trust which nobody who has testified in the case here has ventured to say he did not faithfully fulfill, and which we must presume he faithfully fulfilled. He had had wide experience; had been many years running from the same roundhouse; had taken his engine and returned it to the same place; was familiar with the defendant's method of conducting its business, so far as the business related to the inspection and the oiling and the running of its engines. A part of his duties was to inspect the engine himself before he took it out upon the tracks to make his run and when he returned...

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5 cases
  • McDonald v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1903
    ... ... inspection, and that the defect was easily discernible, ... counsel citing Brennan v. R. R. Co., 93 Mich. 156, ... 53 N.W. 358; Enright v. R. R. Co., 93 Mich. 412, 53 ... N.W. 536; Whalen v. M. C. R. R. Co., 114 Mich. 524, ... 72 N.W. 323; Peppett v. M. C. R. R., 119 Mich. 641, ... 78 N.W. 900. An examination of these cases will show they are ... easily distinguishable from the one at bar. In the first case ... plaintiff knew of the dangers which it was claimed ... constituted negligence, and he also violated a rule of the ... company ... ...
  • Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hayes
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • January 19, 1907
    ...Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Driscoll (Ill.) 52 N. E. 921; N. W. R. Co. v. Emmert, 83 Va. 640, 3 S. E. 145; Peppett v. Mich., etc., R. Co., 119 Mich. 640, 78 N. W. 900. It was one of the contentions of the defendant below that the plaintiff below was guilty of negligence which proximately co......
  • Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hayes
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • January 19, 1907
    ... ... v. Driscoll (Ill.) 52 N.E. 921; N.W. R. Co. v ... Emmert, 83 Va. 640, 3 S.E. 145; Peppett v. Mich., ... etc., R. Co., 119 Mich. 640, 78 N.W. 900 ...          It was ... one of ... ...
  • Reason v. Jones
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 18, 1899
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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