Pepsi Cola Company v. Waddell, 6706.
| Citation | 304 A.2d 630 |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 6706.,6706. |
| Parties | PEPSI COLA COMPANY, Appellant, v. Henry J. WADDELL, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
Austin F. Canfield, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Before GALLAGHER, PAIR and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.
This appeal is from a jury verdict against appellant in the amount of $12,500 for injuries allegedly resulting from a collision between appellant's vehicle and the vehicle operated by appellee.
Appellant company urges on appeal primarily that the trial judge committed error in allowing the case to go to the jury.1 It contends that the evidence produced at trial was so deficient in essentials as to require the jury to speculate as to how the accident occurred. Appellant argues that the testimony proffered by the appellee did not demonstrate a scintilla of evidence of negligence on the part of the appellant. After a review of the record we agree and accordingly reverse.
The evidence presented at trial accepted in the light most favorable to the appellee (plaintiff below) reveals that appellee was proceeding west on H Street, N. E., approaching the intersection with Seventh Street. H Street has two westbound lanes in addition to a westbound curb parking lane and one eastbound lane.
There are several differences in the testimony of the drivers of the car and truck as to precisely what occurred at this point. According to appellee, he proceeded through the intersection at Seventh Street in the center lane (the farthest left westbound lane) and passed appellant's truck which was double-parked just across the intersection in the westbound lane nearest to the parking lane. As appellee passed appellant's truck he heard a noise and thought he had been hit by a following car. He stopped his vehicle in the center lane just beyond the truck and exited his car on the passenger side to inspect the damage. He found some debris from a previous accident, and concluded his vehicle had not been hit. Appellee then proceeded to get back into his car through the passenger door. He said that as he opened the door it was hit in "the middle" by the appellant's truck, as it started to move in a westbound direction. The force was sufficient to cave in the door in a concave fashion severing one-half of appellee's right index finger. He did not testify as to where his finger was placed when the accident occurred. Neither did appellee tender any testimony as to what part of the truck hit the door, whether it was the bumper or the outside corner of the van. Nor does he contend that the door had been open for some time before it was hit, but rather it was struck as he opened it. It is impossible to arrive at a logical conclusion from the foregoing testimony as to what act of negligence caused the injury. In the course of this testimony the following exchange occurred:
Whereupon cross-examination of the witness began.
Adding to the confusion, and left unexplained by the appellee, is his admission, when called as a witness for the defense, that his right rear door was also damaged in the accident, as reflected in his repair bill, and required three hours of labor to fix. Despite this testimony he also said at this point that there was only one impact, not two.
The incongruity of his entire testimony in view of the two damaged doors is highlighted by a part of his deposition which was read into the record as follows:
"Question: Was any part of your body struck ?
Answer: Not one part. This is the amazing thing. I'm standing almost directly in front of the door.
Question: Where was your right hand at that time ?
Answer: I just opened the door — and those doors are very heavy, sir, and to keep them from swinging back too far I caught it, and I opened it with this hand [indicating] and I know that it's heavy, and it was swinged back very hard. I put my hand up like this on the top of it to stop it from swinging back, swinging all the way back — " [Tr. at 96.]
The fact that two doors were damaged would seem to corroborate the testimony of the truck driver that there were two impacts. The first when appellee's car got hung up on the truck's left rear bumper while trying to turn out and around the truck, and the second when the front door apparently was opened from the inside as the truck driver was proceeding a few feet forward in order to untangle the two vehicles and the left rear bumper of the truck struck the open...
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McFarland v. George Washington University, 03-CV-633.
...or causation a directed verdict is properly granted." Jimenez v. Hawk, 683 A.2d 457, 461 (D.C.1996) (citing Pepsi Cola Co. v. Waddell, 304 A.2d 630, 632 (D.C.1973)). Here, Mr. McFarland's alternative theory of causation is the nebulous hypothesis that "someone" took action to prevent him fr......
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Jimenez v. Hawk
...evidence invites the jury to speculate as to negligence or causation a directed verdict is properly granted. Pepsi Cola Co. v. Waddell, 304 A.2d 630, 632 (D.C.1973). See also Corley, supra, 402 A.2d at 1263 ("motions for a directed verdict deprive plaintiff of a determination of the facts b......
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St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. James G. Davis Const. Corp., 9031.
...evidence invites the jury to speculate as to negligence or causation a directed verdict is properly granted. Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Waddell, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 630, 632 (1973). The only evidence of the immediate cause of the fire was that it had been set either deliberately or negligently by som......