PERCY WILSON MORTG. AND FINANCE CORP. v. McCurdy, Adv. No. 3-82-0201
Decision Date | 25 June 1982 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 3-82-00638,3-82-00538 and 3-82-0036.,3-82-0174 and 3-82-0115,Adv. No. 3-82-0201 |
Citation | 21 BR 535 |
Parties | PERCY WILSON MORTGAGE AND FINANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Tillie J. McCURDY, George W. Ledford, Trustee, Defendants. In the Matter of Tillie J. McCURDY, Debtor. CITIZENS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF DAYTON, Plaintiff, v. Anna M. MURRAY, George W. Ledford, Trustee, Defendants. In the Matter of Anna M. MURRAY, Debtor. Carl R. GROOMS, Plaintiff, v. Fonnie Louise KOMES f.n.a. Fonnie Louise Grooms, George W. Ledford, Trustee, Defendants. In the Matter of Fonnie Louise KOMES, Debtor. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Ohio |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Jeffrey V. Laurito, Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiff Percy Wilson Mortgage Corp.
Jeffrey P. Albert, Dayton, Ohio, for debtor/defendant Tillie J. McCurdy.
Clifton E. Plattenburg, Jr., Dayton, Ohio, for debtor/defendant Anna M. Murray.
John Curp, Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiff Citizens Federal Loan Corp.
Ronald H. Finkleman, Don Imhoff, Jr., Middletown, Ohio, for plaintiff Carl Grooms.
James F. Cannon, Dayton, Ohio, for debtor/defendant Fonnie L. Komes.
George W. Ledford, Englewood, Ohio, Trustee/defendant for Chapter 13.
PERCY WILSON MORTGAGE AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. MCCURDY:
CITIZENS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF DAYTON vs. MURRAY:
The factual situation is complicated because the total balance on the mortgage to Citizens is $25,723.49, secured by three parcels of real estate, of which only one is subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. If the stay is not lifted, the practical effect would be to limit legal action to the collateral on two parcels. The Debtor's residence is valued at between $18,000.00 and $20,000.00.
CARL R. GROOMS vs. FONNIE LOUISE KOMES:
These three cases exhibit three variables in fact patterns involving requests for relief from the automatic stay to permit secured creditors to proceed with foreclosure actions to sell the residence real estate of the Debtors.
The adversarial proceedings were combined to dispose of the issues in light of this Court's decision in First Inv. Co. v. Custer, et al., 18 B.R. 842, 8 B.C.D. 1067 (Bkrtcy. 1982), and an apparent misunderstanding and misinterpretation of that decision. First, it should be emphasized that the rationale of Custer is not intended to be at variance with that of In Re Soderlund, 18 B.R. 12, B.L.D. ¶ 68,605 (D.C.1981), as to the law of acceleration of obligations as between a debtor-mortgagor and the mortgagee under Ohio law. The thrust of Custer is to recognize the effect of Ohio law as found in Soderlund in a Chapter 13 context, but to preserve and protect monetary values existing for the benefit of all of the parties interested in the debtors' estates, particularly other creditors, which is not presented in Soderlund. An accelerated mortgage remains a security interest, and nothing else, entitled to adequate protection.
The Chapter 13 jurisdiction recognizes the acceleration, as between the parties to the original mortgage contract, but protection may be provided by the court to all of the parties by confirming a proposed plan which effectuates the interest and purposes of the Congress, whether by statute or in equity, despite the contractual acceleration.
To this extent, each proposed plan must be scrutinized as to statutory requirements, especially its feasibility.
One important factor to consider is the amount and duration of pre-accelerated defaults in mortgage contract payments. Stated differently was the acceleration precipitated for the purpose of an artificial liquidation of a debtor's home? Or, is there a serious delinquency which cannot be feasibly cured during the term of a Chapter 13 administration?
Another factor is the extent and length of...
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