Perella v. The General Council of Assemblies of God
| Decision Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | C. A. PC-2013-6552 |
| Parties | LUDOVICO PERELLA, MARY PERELLA, NICOLE FERRARA, individually and as guardian and next friend of KELSEY FERRARA, a minor, and MICHAEL FERRARA v. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND DISTRICT OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, INC., RADIANT CHRISTIAN ASSEMBY OF GOD, INC. JOHN DOE and JOHN DOE CORPORATION, ALIAS |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
COURT Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Amato A. DeLuca, Esq.
For Defendant: Kathleen M. Guilfoyle, Esq.; John R. Mahoney Esq.; Rajaram Suryanarayan, Esq.
DECISION
Defendants Radiant Christian Assembly of God, Inc. (Radiant Christian) and Southern New England District of the Assemblies of God, Inc. (Southern New England District) moved for this Court to apply the substantive law of the country of Bangladesh in the instant action. Ludovico Perella and Mary Perella (Plaintiffs) object to Defendants' motion to apply foreign law.
On December 31, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging that Ludovico Perella (Ludovico), [1] a resident of Bristol, Rhode Island, suffered injuries in a car crash while on a mission trip in Bangladesh. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 22.[2] Mary Perella (Mary), also a resident of Bristol, Rhode Island and the wife of Ludovico, has brought a loss of consortium claim. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendants are Radiant Christian, the Rhode Island church that planned the mission trip (Comp. ¶ 14); the General Council of the Assemblies of God (General Council), a Missouri Corporation (Compl. ¶ 6); and Southern New England District, a Massachusetts corporation (Compl. ¶ 7). Radiant Christian is part of the Southern New England District and both fall under the governance of the General Council. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 13, 14.
In 2011, Radiant Christian's minister, Larry Mangone (Pastor Mangone), planned a missionary trip to Dhaka, Bangladesh. Radiant Christian's Mot. Apply Bangladeshi Law (Mem.) 5. He did so by coordinating the logistics of the trip with Larry Smith (Smith), the director of the A.G. Mission.[3] Plaintiffs' daughter is a member of Radiant Christian who planned to go on the mission and Ludovico decided to accompany her. Pls.' Mem. 3. In order to prepare for the trip, Ludovico met with Pastor Mangone to learn about the trip and the obligations of the participants. Id. During this trip, the missionaries stayed in lodging provided by A.G. Mission and were provided with transportation to missionary sites by A.G. Mission. Radiant Christian's Mem. 5. The trip cost $2, 000 for each participant. Pls.' Mem. 3.
While on the mission trip in Bangladesh, Ludovico was driven to various locations in a vehicle that was purchased by the General Council and then registered in Smith's name. Pls.' Mem. 6. The vehicle was driven by Sushanto, Smith's personal driver. Radiant Christian's Mem. 5. On August 18, 2011, Sushanto was driving Ludovico and others back from a visit to an orphanage when Sushanto collided into the rear end of a truck that was pulled over on the side of the road. Id. at 6. As a result of the accident, Ludovico sustained severe injuries to his spinal cord and back. Pls.' Mem. 7.
The Complaint includes claims of vicarious liability, corporate negligence/direct liability, and loss of consortium. Under vicarious liability, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants had substantial control over each other as well as Pastor Mangone, Smith, and Sushanto and are liable for Plaintiffs' injuries. Compl. 6, 10, 14-15. Under the claim of corporate negligence/direct liability, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care to Plaintiffs "by implementing policies, practices and/or procedures which jeopardized the safety of individuals including the Plaintiffs and/or by not ensuring that its policies, practice and/or procedures were properly followed." Compl. 4-5, 9, 17.
Radiant Christian has moved to apply Bangladeshi law. Southern New England District also moved to apply Bangladeshi law and relies upon Radiant Christian's memorandum.
When presented with a Conflicts of Law question, the Court must first determine if a "true conflict" exists between the laws of the two states in question. See Nat'l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., Inc., 942 A.2d 968, 973-74 (R.I. 2008). A "true conflict" exists when each state retains an interest in the application of its contradictory laws. Peavey Co. v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1992).
If a "true conflict" is found, the Court must apply an interest-weighing approach with respect to choice-of-law questions. Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Warren Elec. Corp., 24 A.3d 514, 525 n.17 (R.I. 2011). When applying the "interest-weighing approach," the Court "'look[s] at the particular . . . facts and determine[s] therefrom the rights and liabilities of the parties in accordance with the law of the state that bears the most significant relationship to the events and the parties."' Id. at 534 (quoting Cribb. v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997)) (emphasis in original).
The interest-weighing approach mandates an examination of these five factors: (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the better rule of law. Najarian v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 768 A.2d 1253, 1255 (R.I. 2001). In addition, in a case sounding in tort, the Court must consider four more factors: "(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 326-27, 252 A.2d 176, 179 (1969).
Before the Court examines the choice-of-law question, it must first determine if there is a "true conflict" between Rhode Island Law and Bangladeshi law. See Nat'l Refrigeration, Inc., 942 A.2d at 973-74. Under Bangladeshi law, [4] the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1983 (MVO) allows for the recovery of damages sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Radiant Christian's Ex. G. Section 128 of the MVO provides that a claim for compensation is to be made before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Id. As for the statute of limitations, Section 128(3) of the MVO states that:
"[n]o application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time." Radiant Christian's Ex. H.
Additionally, under the MVO an injured party can only file an application for compensation against the driver, owner, or insurer of the offending vehicle. See Ex. G. The term "owner" under the MVO is defined as "where the person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement, and the person holding power of attorney." Radiant Christian's Ex. H. Finally, there is no comparative negligence law in Bangladesh. Radiant Christian's Ex. G.
Based on the foregoing, there is an obvious conflict of laws between Rhode Island and Bangladesh with respect to liability for motor vehicle accidents. Rhode Island has (1) a longer statute of limitations, (2) a broader definition of "owner," and (3) a comparative negligence standard for tort law.
However, this case involves much more than analyzing negligence on a road in Bangladesh. Plaintiffs have not even sued Sushanto or Smith (the purported owner of the vehicle). Rather, claims for vicarious liability, corporate negligence, and loss of consortium have been asserted. Because there has been no submission on what the law of Bangladesh is on these subjects, the Court will assume there is a conflict.
To determine which law to apply, the Court first turns to the relevant factors of contact in this case. First, it is undisputed that the auto accident that injured Plaintiffs occurred in Bangladesh. This factor favors Bangladesh.
The parties contest if the conduct causing Ludovico's injury occurred in Rhode Island or Bangladesh. Plaintiffs argue that much of the conduct causing the injury occurred in Rhode Island because the trip was planned in Rhode Island. While it is true that Pastor Mangone was in Rhode Island when he communicated with Smith to plan the mission trip, this fact is inconsequential because the true conduct which caused Plaintiffs' injuries was the alleged negligent driving of Sushanto. This factor also favors Bangladesh. Both factors (a) and (b) point to the application of Bangladesh law however, "the place of the accident is but one of the significant factors to be considered in weighing of the multiple factor concept." See Brown, 105 R.I. 322 at 326, 252 A.2d at 179.
The place of incorporation for all three Defendants is within the United States; the General Council is incorporated in Mississippi, Southern New England District is incorporated in Massachusetts, and Radiant Christian is incorporated in Rhode Island. Plaintiffs are both Rhode Island...
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