Perez v. Abbott

Decision Date02 May 2017
Docket NumberSA-11-CV-360.
Citation253 F.Supp.3d 864
Parties Shannon PEREZ, et al. v. Greg ABBOTT, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

David R. Richards, Richards Rodriguez & Skeith, LLP, Richard Edwin Gray, III, Gray & Becker, P.C., Austin, TX, Luis Roberto Vera, Jr., Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera & Associates, P.C., Ernest I. Herrera, Nina Perales, Nina Perales, Marisa Bono, MALDEF [Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund], San Antonio, TX, Denise Hulett, Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Sacramento, CA, for Shannon Perez, et al.

Adam N. Bitter, Angela V. Colmenero, Michael B. Neill, Scott A. Keller, Summer R. Lee, William T. Deane, Jennifer Settle Jackson, Office of the Attorney General, Matthew Hamilton Frederick, Office of the Attorney General Office of the Solicitor General, David Mattax, Texas Department of Insurance Commissioner of Insurance, Austin, TX, Luis Roberto Vera, Jr., Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera & Associates, P.C., San Antonio, TX, Jonathan F. Mitchell, James Otis Law Group, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Greg Abbott, et al.

Jessica Ring Amunson, Michael B. DeSanctis, Paul M. Smith, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, J. Gerald Hebert, J. Gerald Hebert, P.C., Alexandria, VA, Jesse Gaines, Attorney at Law, Fort Worth, TX, Donald H. Flanary, III, Flanary Law Firm, Gerald Harris Goldstein, Attorney at Law, San Antonio, TX.

Before Circuit Judge SMITH, Chief District Judge GARCIA, and District Judge RODRIGUEZ

AMENDED ORDER*

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ, District Judge and ORLANDO L. GARCIA, District Judge:

This Order addresses Plaintiffs' claims against the plan for the United States House of Representatives ("congressional plan" or "Plan C185") enacted by the Texas Legislature in 2011, following a full trial on the claims.1 Plaintiffs mount both statewide claims2 and regional claims, specifically in the South/West Texas area, Dallas–Fort Worth area, and Houston area, under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3

Before turning to the merits, the Court will again explain why the 2011 plan claims are not moot and a determination on the merits of those claims is required. This Court thoroughly explained its reasoning in its September 6, 2013 Order (docket no. 886). Specifically, in rejecting Defendants' argument that the 2011 plans posed no threat and any order on those plans could provide no effectual relief, the Court reasoned: (1) it was Defendants' burden to prove mootness; (2) Defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the conduct alleged to violate § 2 and the Constitution with regard to the 2011 plans could not reasonably be expected to recur; (3) the fact that a challenged law is amended does not alone moot the underlying claim unless the law has been sufficiently altered so as to present a substantially different controversy; (4) the 2013 plans are heavily derived from the 2011 plans, and Plaintiffs contend that many of the alleged violations of the VRA and the Constitution initially enacted in 2011 persist in the 2013 plans, though some perhaps to a lesser degree; (5) although the new plans may disadvantage Plaintiffs to a lesser degree, they disadvantage them in the same fundamental way such that Plaintiffs are still suffering injury from the 2011 plans, even if they are technically repealed; (6) there is no indication that the Legislature would not engage in the same conduct that Plaintiffs assert violated their rights in upcoming redistricting cycles; (7) because Texas refused to concede the illegality of any conduct, a dispute remains over the legality of the challenged practices and there is no assurance that the conduct will not recur, and Plaintiffs maintain a personal stake in the controversy; and (8) there remains the possibility of declaratory and equitable relief under § 3(c) for some claims. All three members of this Court agreed with this reasoning.

However, after the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Davis v. Abbott , 781 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2015), in which the Court stated that the 2011 Senate Plan lawsuit had become moot, Defendants again argued that the 2011 House and congressional plan claims were moot. Docket no. 1310. Defendants argued that the Fifth Circuit's mootness conclusion was necessary to its decision that Texas waived its opportunity to seek vacatur of this Court's interim-relief orders in light of Shelby County v. Holder , and that the Fifth Circuit's holding "bears directly on this Court's jurisdiction over claims against the Texas Legislature's 2011 House and congressional redistricting plans." Docket no. 1310 at 23–24. "At the very least," Defendants argued, " Davis implies that the Plaintiffs' claims are moot if they challenge districts that were, like Senate District 10, modified by the Court and later adopted in modified form by the Legislature." Id. at 25. However, Davis v. Abbott does not change the Court's conclusion that most of the 2011 plan claims are not moot.

Davis v. Abbott was not a decision about mootness; it concerned whether the plaintiffs in the 2011 Senate Plan case were prevailing parties entitled to fees and costs. It did not announce a new rule of law or change the legal landscape concerning mootness. Thus, the only basis upon which it could change this Court's prior conclusions and bind this Court on mootness is if it is factually indistinguishable from this case. But it is not.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the case against the 2011 Senate Plan was not consolidated with the House and congressional plans, and it remained a separate case (5:11–CV–00788). It also involved a very limited set of claims, unlike the House and congressional plan cases. At the interim remedy stage, the proposed compromise plan4 approved by this Court under the applicable standard set forth in Perez v. Perry resolved all of the plaintiffs' claims. See docket no. 190 (final judgment noting that Plan S172 "restored [Senate] district 10 to near benchmark configuration and remedied the constitutional infirmities being asserted"). Plaintiffs agreed that the interim Plan S172 did not violate the VRA or the Constitution. Thus, when the Legislature adopted that plan in 2013, no plaintiff was complaining that infirmities remained in the plan or alleged that they were still suffering injury from the repealed 2011 plan, and no plaintiff sought to amend their pleadings to pursue § 3(c) relief. When the Fifth Circuit decided that the 2011 plan claims were moot, it was therefore operating under substantially different facts, and it was not addressing the House or congressional plan claims when it referred to "the lawsuit" becoming moot.

In this case, in contrast, numerous alleged infirmities from the 2011 plans remained in the interim plans that Plaintiffs contended were continuing to injure them. Unlike in the Senate plan, many asserted VRA and constitutional infirmities were not remedied in the interim plans, and thus the injuries were alleged to persist in the 2013 plans. Thus, there was not only a possibility that Defendants would continue to engage in conduct that Plaintiffs claimed violated the VRA or the Constitution, Defendants were continuing to engage in exactly such conduct when they adopted the interim plans in 2013. The fact that this Court finds that mapdrawers acted with an impermissible intent to dilute minority voting strength or otherwise violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that Plaintiffs are still being harmed by the lines drawn as the direct product of these violations demonstrates that many of Plaintiffs' claims against the 2011 plans are not moot. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that they continue to be harmed by violations of the VRA and Fourteenth Amendment in CD23, CD27, and CD35. The configurations of CD35 and CD27 remain unchanged in Plan C235, and whether the harms found regarding CD23 continue in Plan C235 remains to be decided.

While Defendants undoubtedly would prefer that we address those infirmities only in the context of the 2013 legislative session and the plans adopted therein, doing so would potentially deprive Plaintiffs of a remedy tied to that 2011 injury—the § 3(c) remedy. Confining the analysis to the 2013 plan claims would significantly impact the intent analysis for Plaintiffs' intentional vote dilution claims given the involvement of a different Legislature and Defendants' assertion that they could have no such discriminatory intent by simply adopting the Court's interim plans. Plaintiffs should not have to jump through additional hoops to prove that the 2011 mapdrawers' intent carried forward to the 2013 Legislature when Plaintiffs' fundamental claims are that the 2011 mapdrawers acted with discriminatory intent, Plaintiffs are still being harmed by the districts drawn with that intent, and Plaintiffs have potential relief available under § 3(c) for that harm. Nothing in Davis v. Abbott requires a contrary conclusion.

While it is possible that Davis implies "at the very least," that the remedied claims are moot, the Court still finds Davis distinguishable based on the possibility of § 3(c) relief for certain claims.5 Because Plaintiffs are still seeking relief under § 3(c) for certain claims, the Court holds they are not moot even where the districts were altered. As discussed below, however, the Court does agree that the remedied § 2 results claims are moot.

I. South/West Texas claims

Plaintiffs contend that § 2 requires that there be seven (and some Plaintiffs argue eight) Latino opportunity districts in the combined areas referred to as South/West Texas. Plaintiffs also contend that Nueces County Hispanics have a § 2 right and should be included in one of those minority opportunity districts, and most Plaintiffs contend that Travis County should not be included. Plaintiffs (other than the Task Force Plaintiffs) contend that CD35, the new HCVAP-majority district that connects portions of Austin and San Antonio, is not a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Thomas v. Bryant
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • September 3, 2019
    ...voting strength was too weak in a district despite being a numerical majority. LULAC was such a case. See also Perez v. Abbott , 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 879–90 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (three-judge court) (finding, in a ruling that state defendants did not appeal, that the 2011 version of Texas Congre......
  • Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. State
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • August 25, 2017
    ...Amendment, the level of proof of dilutive effects required in a § 2 intentional vote dilution claim is less clear. Perez v. Abbott, 253 F.Supp.3d 864, 942–43, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 1787454, at *53 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2017) (footnotes omitted). Demonstrative of this observation by the Pere......
  • Thomas v. Bryant
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • March 22, 2019
    ...and Moore in a single-member district vote dilution case). So did a recent three-judge panel in this circuit. See Perez v. Abbott , 253 F.Supp.3d 864, 879–90 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (rejecting Defendants’ position when finding vote dilution in a congressional district with a Hispanic voting-age po......
  • League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • May 4, 2022
    ...heard last decade by a different three-judge court within this district. Notably, the district was not at issue in Perez v. Abbott , 253 F. Supp. 3d 864 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (three-judge court). That decision concerned Texas's federal congressional map rather than its state senate map. See id. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT