Perez v. Blue Mountain Farms

• Decision Date: 09 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. CV–13–5081–RMP.,CV–13–5081–RMP.
• Citation: 961 F.Supp.2d 1164
• Parties: Thomas E. PEREZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. BLUE MOUNTAIN FARMS, Blue Mountain Farms Packing, Ryan Brock, Shirley Lott, and John and Jane Does I through XX, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington

961 F.Supp.2d 1164

Thomas E. PEREZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff,

v.BLUE MOUNTAIN FARMS, Blue Mountain Farms Packing, Ryan Brock, Shirley Lott, and John and Jane Does I through XX, Defendants.

No. CV–13–5081–RMP.

United States District Court,

E.D. Washington.

Aug. 9, 2013.

Evan H. Nordby, Bruce Lee Brown, U.S. Department of Labor, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), which the Court is treating as a motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 2. The Court has reviewed the motion and supporting declaration, the response and supporting declarations, the supplemental memorandum and supporting declarations, the supplemental response, the reply, and the declarations filed concurrently with the reply. Telephonic argument on the TRO issue was held on July 26, 2013. Telephonic argument on the preliminary injunction issue was held on August 7, 2013. The Court is fully informed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) of the United States Department of Labor (“Department”). Defendants are two business entities and the two natural persons who own those business entities. Defendants are engaged in the practice of blueberry farming. On Tuesday, July 23, 2013, investigators from the Wage and Hour Division of the Department traveled to Defendants' blueberry packing shed in Walla Walla County, Washington. ECF Nos. 5 at 2, 13 at 6. The parties disagree over the nature and extent of cooperation between the parties on July 23. Compare ECF No. 5 at 3–4 with ECF No. 13 at 6–8. However, it is uncontested that on July 24, 2013, Defendants barred access to the investigators and threatened to call local law enforcement if the investigators did not leave the property. ECF No. 5 at 4.

On July 25, 2013, the Secretary filed the present action and contemporaneously moved the Court for a TRO, seeking to enjoin Defendants from barring entry to their fields and packing shed. ECF Nos. 1, 2. Defendants, without being formally served, opposed the TRO. A telephonic hearing was held on July 26, 2013. ECF No. 8. At the hearing, the Court denied the motion for TRO on the grounds that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 had not been met. ECF No. 9. However, in the interest of expedience, the Court converted the motion to a motion for preliminary injunction and allowed supplemental filings on an expedited schedule. The converted motion is now ripe before this Court.

DISCUSSION

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” ¹Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Id. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365. “In each case, courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987)). “ ‘In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.’ ” Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982)).

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Secretary's case against the Defendants appears very straightforward. By statute, the Secretary is empowered to “investigate, and in connection therewith, enter and inspect such places (including housing and vehicles) and such records (and make transcriptions thereof), question such persons and gather such information to determine compliance” with the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”). 29 U.S.C. § 1862(a). Individuals violate MSPA when they “unlawfully resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any official of the Department of Labor assigned to perform an investigation, inspection, or law enforcement function pursuant to [MSPA] during the performance of such duties.” 29 U.S.C. § 1862(c). Violations of the MSPA can give rise to criminal sanctions, 29 U.S.C. § 1851, or injunctive relief, 29 U.S.C. § 1852(a). The Secretary argues that by barring investigators from Defendants' blueberry fields and threatening to call local law enforcement, Defendants have violated the act by unlawfully impeding the Department's investigation.

Defendants oppose the Secretary's argument in two ways: (1) by asserting that they never unlawfully impeded the Secretary's investigation; and (2) by arguing that the right to access contained in § 1862(a) is unconstitutional. These arguments were the same arguments raised in McLaughlin v. Elsberry, Inc., 868 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.1988). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit faced a similar situation in which a farmer barred the Department of Labor from accessing his workers without a search warrant. Id. at 1527. The Secretary filed an action seeking injunctive relief. Id. The defendant opposed the injunction on two grounds: (1) “because its resistance to the [Department]'s entry onto its fields was not forcible, it did not amount to unlawful resistance” under 29 U.S.C. § 1862(c), and (2) because entry onto the defendant's fields without a warrant would violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1527, 1529. The Elsberry court declined to address the defendant's first argument on the grounds that, even if taken as true, it did not preclude the Department from seeking relief in support of its power to investigate under 29 U.S.C. § 1862(a). Id. at 1529. The Elsberry court then proceeded to address the Fourth Amendment issue.

As the court in Elsberry noted, the Secretary may seek to vindicate the Department's investigatory power even without a finding of a violation of the MSPA. Id. The relief sought by the Secretary in this case is the enforcement of its statutory right to enter Defendants' fields and packing shed under 29 U.S.C. § 1862(a). The right of entry is not conditioned on a finding of a violation. See§ 1862(a). Accordingly, as with the court in Elsberry, this Court need not address the issue of violation but will address whether the Fourth Amendment restricts the right to enter and investigate under § 1862(a).

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The Fourth Amendment requires that searches be reasonable and searches made without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable unless an exception applies. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). One of those exceptions is the so-called “open field” exception. By its own text, the Fourth Amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an open field falls outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–04, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). In addition, the Supreme Court has applied the open field exception to farms. E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984).

Defendants argue that this case is distinguishable from cases in which the open field exception has been applied because open field cases traditionally involve only limited incursions of short duration to investigate the growing of drugs or distilling of spirits while the present case involves a longer and broader incursion. ECF No. 18 at 13. However, the logic of the open field exception is that entry into an open field does not constitute a search and therefore does not come within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178–180, 104 S.Ct. 1735. The Court is aware of no authority, and none has been cited by Defendants, converting an incursion into an open field into a search based on the duration of that incursion. But cf. United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 964, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (Alijo, J., concurring). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants' attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from those cases in which the open field exception has been applied.

Defendants next argue that even if the Government may enter open fields without a warrant, public policy supports imposing limitations on the Government's access when in the fields. However, because entry into an open field has not been recognized as a search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment is simply not invoked by Government incursions into open fields. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment cannot serve as the source of any limit to the discretion of authorities upon entering an open field. As a result, the Fourth Amendment imposes no limitations on the Secretary's statutory authority to investigate wage and hour claims in an open field.

In the Secretary's original motion, the Secretary sought both entry to Defendants' fields and “other places where [Defendants] opt to employ workers covered by the [MSPA].” ECF No. 2 at 6. While an open field is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, structures, including commercial structures, fall within the Fourth Amendment's ambit. United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986))....