Perez v. City of Fresno
| Decision Date | 17 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-CV-0127 AWI EPG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ANTHONY PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF FRESNO, et al., Defendants |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE (DOC. NO 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 153, 157)
This case stems from a fatal encounter between decedent Joseph Perez (“Perez”) and members of the City of Fresno Police Department, the County of Fresno Sheriff's Department, and American Ambulance. In their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the Plaintiffs, who are Perez's family and successors in interest, allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Monell liability, as well as state law claims for battery negligence, gross negligence, and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. The claims are alleged against the “the City Defendants, ” who are the City of Fresno (“the City”) and police officers James Rosetti (“Rosetti”), Sean Calvert (“Calvert”), and Chris Martinez (“Martinez”) (collectively the “City Officers”), the “County Defendants, ” who are the County of Fresno (“the County”), and sheriff deputies Braithan Stoltenberg (“Stoltenberg”), Robert McEwen (“McEwen”), Karlson Manasan (“Manasan”), and Jimmy Robnett (“Robnett”) (collectively the “County Deputies”), and the “AA Defendants, ” who are American Ambulance (“AA”) and AA paramedic Morgan Anderson (“Anderson”). Currently before the Court are three motions for summary judgment, one by the City Defendants, one by the County Defendants, and one by the AA Defendants. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the individual Defendants qualified immunity, grant summary judgment in favor of the City and the County with respect to the Monell claima, and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
Summary judgment is proper when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations (if any) pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009). A dispute is “genuine” as to a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010).
Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See James River Ins. Co. v. Herbert Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2008); Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. The opposing party cannot “‘rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading' but must instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008).
The opposing party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2010). While a “justifiable inference” need not be the most likely or the most persuasive inference, a “justifiable inference” must still be rational or reasonable. See Narayan, 616 F.3d at 899. Summary judgment may not be granted “where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2015). Inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2008). “A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply because a litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). The parties have the obligation to particularly identify material facts, and the court is not required to scour the record in search of a genuine disputed material fact. Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). Further, a “motion for summary judgment may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is ‘merely colorable' or ‘is not significantly probative.'” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND[1]
On May 17, 2017, City police officers Rosetti, Calvert and Martinez encountered Perez at 10:30 a.m. CiJF No. 1; CoJF No. 1. The City Officers had not been dispatched regarding Perez. CiJF No. 2; CoJF No. 2. When the City Officers first encountered Perez, he was standing in the right lane of Palm Ave. in Fresno, but was walking in and out of the roadway waiving his arms and yelling what sounded like “help” in the direction of the officers. See CiSF No. 2; CoSF No. 2; PSF No. 1; Martinez Depo. 11:20-12:4. Perez was a little over 6' tall and weighed 241 lbs. See Doc. No. 152-2 at ECF p. 220. The City Officers had no information that Perez had committed a crime. See PSF No. 3. Martinez spoke to Perez, but what Perez “was saying wasn't really making any sense.” See PSF No. 4. Perez was talking to himself and believed that people were chasing and hitting him. See CiSF No. 3; Calvert Depo. 54:20-24. Nevertheless, Perez was cooperative with the City Officers. See PSF No. 6. Perez was asked to sit down, and he sat down on the curb. See Martinez Depo. 25:18-26:8, 27:12-14, 28:21-25. After three to five minutes, Martinez handcuffed Perez while Perez was sitting on the curb. See CiSF No. 6; CoSF No. 3; PSF No. 5; Martinez Depo. 27:12-14. Martinez testified that he decided to handcuff Perez because Perez was kicking his feet out and rocking back and forth and looked like he was trying to get up, there was traffic in the area, and Rosetti was standing in front of Perez and Rosetti could have been in danger from the traffic if Perez got up suddenly. See Martinez Depo. 25:18-27:11; see also CiSF No. 6. Perez was cooperative during the handcuffing process. See Calvert Depo. 21:3-7. Martinez patted Perez down after the handcuffing and no weapons were found. See PSF No. 8.
The County Sheriff's Office received a call for service regarding a Hispanic male that was acting erratic, sprinting through the street, screaming, and hiding in bushes. CiSF No. 1; CoSF No. 1.[2] Stoltenberg and McEwen responded to the call and arrived on the scene at the same time. CoJF No. 3. McEwen and Stoltenberg saw Perez handcuffed and seated on a curb with Rosetti, Calvert, and Martinez present. See CoJF No. 4; PSF No. 21.
Rosetti told Stoltenberg that City police officers would be taking over the scene and that EMS had been called.[3] See Stoltenberg Depo. 27:13-19; AASF No. 10. The City Officers and County Deputies all believed that Perez was under the influence of a controlled substance. CiJF No. 3; CoJF No. 5. Perez was saying things to people who were not there, made statements like , kicked at people who weren't there while he was talking, and was flicking his hands rapidly while they were cuffed behind his back. See CoSF No. 6;[4] McEwen Depo. 21:8-16, 77:4-11. Although Perez was still cooperative, McEwen stood directly in front of Perez to prevent him from standing up and possibly running into traffic. See CiSF No. 8; Doc. No. 150-1 at 5-6; Doc. No. 164 at 7. A bystander briefly saw Perez sitting on the curb and described Perez as “sitting there looking around” and “looked either delusional or something was wrong with him, ” while the law enforcement officers were talking near him. See Ramirez Depo. 12:10-23.
Approximately five minutes after the City...
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