Perez v. Com.
Citation | 580 S.E.2d 507,40 Va. App. 648 |
Decision Date | 20 May 2003 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0180-02-4. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | Jorge Isaac Samudio PEREZ, s/k/a Jorge Samudio-Perez v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Christopher C. Finch (Pelton, Balland, Young, Demesky, Baskin & O'Malie, P.C., on brief), Arlington, for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: ELDER, ANNUNZIATA and AGEE,1 JJ.
A jury convicted Samudio-Perez of rape and sentenced him to serve six years in the penitentiary.2 On appeal, he contends the trial judge erred in denying his midtrial motion for a mistrial arising from a juror's prior relationship with one of the detectives assigned to the case. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On appeal, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below, together with all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Ortega v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 779, 786, 525 S.E.2d 623, 627 (2000). Viewed accordingly, the evidence shows that Walter Sorto was called as a prospective juror for Samudio-Perez's trial in October 2001. The prosecutor asked the prospective jurors if any of them or a family member had been the victim of a sexual assault. Sorto told the court his nephew had assaulted his daughter four years earlier. After the prosecution informed Sorto the case did not involve sexual assault within a family, Sorto indicated he could be fair to both sides. Defense counsel did not ask Sorto any questions and did not move to strike him for cause. The court impaneled the jury, including Sorto, and counsel gave opening statements. After a short recess, the judge discovered that a detective in the case, David E. Moore, had investigated the case involving Sorto's daughter.3 Sorto had not recognized Detective Moore during opening statements. The judge brought Sorto into the courtroom and counsel questioned him about his relationship with Detective Moore:
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on Sorto's prior relationship with Detective Moore.4 The judge denied the motion, stating "I just can't conclude that he's got any kind of a bias or pre-disposition one way or another."
During the investigation, Detective Moore was not the lead investigator on the case, however, he interviewed Samudio-Perez because he speaks Spanish, Samudio-Perez's native language. Detective Moore did not record Samudio-Perez's statements and relied only on his notes from the interview for his testimony. Detective Moore testified that Samudio-Perez made an incriminating statement to him, specifically noting Samudio-Perez's admission that the sexual encounter between Samudio-Perez and the victim occurred without her consent. On direct examination, Samudio-Perez denied making the incriminating statement to Detective Moore and stated Moore suggested he write a letter to the victim. Samudio-Perez wrote the letter, which also incriminated him.
Samudio-Perez's appeal comes to us on a denial of a motion for a mistrial. Upon familiar principles, we will not reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial unless a manifest probability exists that the trial court's ruling was prejudicial. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 12, 17, 486 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1997) (citation omitted).5 We turn now to the substantive issues presented.
Under the standard of review set forth above, the party moving for mistrial, in this case, Samudio-Perez, has the burden of establishing a manifest probability of prejudice. See Taylor, 25 Va.App. at 17,486 S.E.2d at 110. To determine if a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial was prejudicial, when a juror's conduct is at issue, we must look to the juror's possible bias. The existence of an individual juror's possible bias or partiality is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 480, 331 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1985),cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099, 106 S.Ct. 1503, 89 L.Ed.2d 903 (1986). Additionally, "[i]t is well settled that the credibility of witnesses [and] the weight accorded witnesses' testimony . . . are matters that are within the province of the fact finder." Brown v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 171, 192, 487 S.E.2d 248, 258 (1997) (citing Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 107, 341 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1986)).
The trial court was in the best position to consider Sorto's response to counsel's questions and resolved the issue of possible bias in favor of Sorto and the Commonwealth. Sorto repeatedly informed the court he was able to address the issues impartially and stated he would not favor Detective Moore's testimony over another witness' testimony. Furthermore, Sorto stated he could not determine if Detective Moore had conducted himself professionally in the case at bar until he considered the evidence. After further questioning of Sorto by counsel, the trial judge made a finding of fact that Sorto could be a fair and impartial juror, stating she could not conclude "[Sorto]'s got any kind of a bias or pre-disposition one way or another." Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find there was no "manifest probability" that the denial of a mistrial was prejudicial to Samudio-Perez. See Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999).
Samudio-Perez further argues that, if we find Sorto could have been stricken for cause, then the denial of the motion for a mistrial should be reversed. In determining a juror's possible bias, we may consider whether the juror could have been stricken for cause. See Taylor, 25 Va.App. at 18, 486 S.E.2d at 111. When there are no grounds to strike a juror for cause, the juror's presence on the jury will not affect the essential fairness of a trial and, therefore, we cannot find that prejudice exists. See id.
In the case at bar, as we have noted, the trial court found as fact that Sorto was a fair and unbiased juror. Thus, no ground for a strike for cause was established. Moreover, Sorto's relationship with Moore does not establish a per se disqualification of Sorto as a juror under Virginia law. See Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 135, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984) ( ). We have long held that a juror's relationship to a witness does not require his dismissal per se. See Lilly, 255 Va. at 569-70, 499 S.E.2d at 531. In Lilly, the Supreme Court evaluated the propriety of seating a juror who had a prior relationship with a police officer witness and...
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