Perez v. CRST Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-CV-23-CJW-KEM,18-CV-23-CJW-KEM |
| Citation | 355 F.Supp.3d 765 |
| Parties | Jesus PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. CRST INTERNATIONAL, INC.; CRST Expedited, Inc. ; Does 1-100, Inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Michael J. Carroll, Coppola McConville Coppola Carroll Hockenberg & Scalise, West Des Moines, IA, Christopher Martin Lee, Pro Hac Vice, Jessica Sun Choi, Pro Hac Vice, Alexander Krakow & Glick LLP, Santa Monica, CA, Michael S. Morrison, Pro Hac Vice, Alexander Krakow & Glick LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Nicolas Orihuela, Pro Hac Vice, Hurwitz Orihuela and Hayes LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
Kevin J. Visser, Nicholas Petersen, Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Adam J. Eakman, Pro Hac Vice, James H. Hanson, Pro Hac Vice, R. Jay Taylor, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson and Feary PC, Indianapolis, IN, Charles Andrewscavage, Pro Hac Vice, Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson and Feary PC, Chicago, IL, Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr., Megan Emslie Ross, Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson and Feary LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for a determination of the applicable body of law. (Docs. 69, 70). The parties timely filed resistances to the opposing party's motion. (Docs. 73, 74; see also Doc. 67 () ). For the following reasons, the Court finds that Iowa law is to govern this case.
Defendant CRST Expedited is a trucking company based out of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and defendant CRST International is an affiliated company.1 (Doc. 70-1, at 8). Plaintiff formerly worked as part of a two-person, long-haul truck driving team for defendants, first as an "employee," then later as an "independent contractor." (Doc. 75, at 3, 8-9). Although plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement with defendants, plaintiff now argues that he was misclassified as an independent contractor and, instead, should have been classified as an employee. (Doc. 75, at 12-13). The independent contractor agreement that plaintiff signed included both a forum selection clause and a choice of law provision. (Doc. 70-2, at 30).
The operative complaint in this case was initially filed in the Superior Court of California, and plaintiff brought ten claims "on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and the general public."2 (Doc. 75, at 2). All of the claims are based on California law: 1) misclassification of employee as independent contractor, CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 ; 2) failure to pay meal and rest period compensation, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.7, 512 ; 3) failure to pay compensation for all hours worked and minimum wage violations, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 216, 1194, 1194.2, 1197 ; 4) failure to provide accurate itemized statements, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226, 226.2 ; 5) waiting time penalties, CAL. LAB. CODE , § 203 ; 6) failure to pay all wages by the appropriate pay period, CAL. LAB. CODE § 204 ; 7) failure to reimburse business expenses, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 ; 8) failure to pay minimum wage and rest and recovery period compensation separate from any piece-rate compensation, CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.2 ; 9) Private Attorneys General Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698, et. seq. ; and 10) unfair business practices, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et. seq. (See Doc. 75).
Defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California and asserted diversity jurisdiction as the basis for the federal court's jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Defendants subsequently filed a motion to transfer venue. (Doc. 31). The Central District of California found that the forum selection clause contained in the independent contractor agreement was valid and enforceable and, based on the forum selection clause, transferred the case to this Court. (Doc. 35).
The parties agree that this case presents the potential for a conflict of laws issue. Specifically, plaintiff contends that California law governs, and defendants contend that Iowa law governs. Plaintiff asserts that the parties are in agreement that the choice of law clause in the independent contractor agreement is inapplicable to this case (Doc. 69, at 11 n.1), and defendants do not argue for application of the choice of law provision (see Doc. 70-1, at 17 () ). At the parties' request, the Court set a briefing schedule for the parties to follow in briefing the conflict of laws issue. (Doc. 67). The parties timely filed their briefs in accordance with that schedule.
To determine which body of law applies to a dispute, a court must apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487, 496-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). This holds true even when, pursuant to a valid forum selection clause, a case is transferred to a district other than the one in which it was originally filed.
Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex. , 571 U.S. 49, 64-66, 134 S.Ct. 568, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013). When confronted with a potential conflict of laws issue, the first step is to determine whether there is a "true conflict" between the different bodies of law that could govern. Phillips v. Marist Soc'y of Wash. Province , 80 F.3d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1996). If there is no difference in the relevant laws of the different states, the conflict is a false conflict that need not be resolved. Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Can. Ltd. , 965 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1992) ; see also Leonards v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. , 279 F.3d 611, 612 (8th Cir. 2002) ().
In tort cases, Iowa applies the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws ' "most significant relationship" test in considering conflict of laws issues. Veasley v. CRST Int'l, Inc. , 553 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Iowa 1996). The Restatement provides as follows:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 . Section 6 of the Restatement , as referred to in Section 145, reads as follows:
In plaintiff's opening brief, plaintiff asserts "that it is too early to determine the precise conduct [that] is subject to California law." (Doc. 69, at 9). Plaintiff asserts that "the Court should merely decide whether California's laws generally apply to California residents for work performed in California or conduct giving rise to liability [that] occurred in California ...." (Id. ). Aside from stating that discovery is ongoing, plaintiff does not explain why he thinks the conflict of laws issue is not ripe, and plaintiff cites no authority in support of his position. The Court declines to accept plaintiff's invitation to determine "whether California's laws generally apply to California residents for work performed in California or conduct giving rise to liability [that] occurred in California." (Id. ). The question plaintiff posits is not the inquiry the Court must confront in assessing which body of law applies to this case. The simplified issue plaintiff presents does not take into consideration all that the law requires, and to answer only the question plaintiff offers would require the Court to adopt an alternative standard to deciding conflict of laws issues. The Court will not, therefore, address the conflict of laws issue in the manner plaintiff requests.
Further, the Court finds that the controversy regarding the applicable body of law is ripe for judicial review. The doctrine of ripeness is designed "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 807-08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Ripeness requir[es] [a court] to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Texas v. United States , 523 U.S. 296, 300-01, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (...
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Perez v. CRST Int'l, Inc.
...2018, the Court determined that Iowa law, not California law, applies to plaintiff's claims (Doc. 77, at 20). Perez v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 3d 765 (N.D. Iowa 2018). Roughly six weeks later, the parties informed the Court that this case had settled (see Doc. 78), and the parties su......