Perez v. Dilworth
| Decision Date | 23 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-2162(VLB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | OMETRIUS PEREZ, Petitioner, v. WARDEN DILWORTH, ET AL., Respondents. |
The petitioner, Ometrius Perez ("Perez"), incarcerated and pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his state convictions for robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree and larceny in the second degree. For the reasons that follow, the Court will not review these claims because those claims are procedurally defaulted and will deny the remaining claims.
On April 21, 1994, the State of Connecticut issued a warrant for the arrest of Perez for having committed the offenses of robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree and larceny in the first degree on April 16, 1994 in West Redding, Connecticut. State v. Perez, 78 Conn. App. 610, 614-15, 828 A.2d 626, 633 (2003). On a subsequent date, the State of New York arrested Perez for unrelated crimes occurring in that state. Id. On October 16, 1995, the State of Connecticut sought temporary custody of Perez through the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Id. A pretransfer hearing was then held in the Dutchess County Supreme Court in New York at the request of Perez. After the hearing, a judge granted the State of Connecticut's request for the temporary removal of Perez to face charges in Connecticut. Id.
On May 21, 1996, Connecticut State Police detectives executed the warrant for the arrest of Perez and transported him from the Green Haven Correctional Facility in Stormville, New York to the Troop A state police barracks in Southbury, Connecticut. Id. On May 22, 1996, in State v. Perez, Case No. DBD-CR96-95711-S, a judge in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Danbury arraigned Perez on one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-134 (a)(2), one count of burglary in the first degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-101(a)(1) and one count of larceny in the first degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-119 and 53a-122 (a)(1). See Resp'ts' Mem. Opp'n Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus, App. B, ECF No. 18-2, at 4.
On August 12, 1996, Perez moved to suppress statements that he made to the two Connecticut State Police detectives who transported him from New York to Connecticut on May 21, 1996. Id. at 16-17. On October 24, 1996, a judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress. See id., App. DD, ECF No. 18-41. On November 8, 1996, the judge issued a memorandum of decision denying the motion. See id. at App. B, ECF No. 18-2, at 18-29.
On that same date, the jury found Perez guilty of one count of robbery in the first degree and one count of burglary in the first degree, not guilty as to the count of larceny in the first degree and guilty as to the lesser included offense oflarceny in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-123. Id. at 15. On December 20, 1996, a judge sentenced Perez to a total effective sentence of thirty-five years of imprisonment to run consecutively to the sentence that Perez was serving in the State of New York. Id.
Perez appealed his conviction on eight grounds.1 He argued that:
(1)the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the statements he made while being transported from New York to Connecticut, (2) the police improperly questioned him without the presence of counsel, and the court improperly found that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to being questioned, (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, (4) the defendant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial, (5) his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when the court prohibited him from orally communicating with his attorney, (6) his fifth amendment right against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, (7) the court improperly instructed the jury and (8) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree.
Perez, 78 Conn. App. at 612-13, 828 A.2d at 632.
On August 12, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id. at 646, 828 A.2d 626 at 650. On September 8, 2004, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied the petition for certification to review the decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court. See State v. Perez, 271 Conn. 901, 859 A.2d 565 (2004).
On August 10, 2006, Perez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville. See Perez v. Warden, No. TSR-CV06-4001319-S. On August 9, 2011, a judge issued a memorandum of decision denying all grounds raised in the amended state habeas petition. See Perez v. Warden, No. CV064001319, 2011 WL 4347038, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2011)
On appeal from the decision denying the state habeas petition, Perez raised eight grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Resp'ts' Mem. Opp'n Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus, App. X, ECF No. 18-26, at 3-7. On February 7, 2017, the Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the appeal from the decision of the trial court dismissing the habeas petition. See Perez v. Comm'r of Correction, 170 Conn. App. 906, 154 A.3d 90 (2017) (per curiam). On April 5, 2017, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied the petition for certification to review the decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court. See Perez v. Comm'r of Correction, 325 Conn. 909, 158 A.3d 319 (2017). Perez commenced this action on December 27, 2017, having exhausted his state remedies.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.
The federal court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a state court conviction only if the petitioner claims that his custody violates the Constitution or federal laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A claim that a state conviction was obtained in violation of state law is not cognizable in the federal court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
Section 2254(d) "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A federal court cannot grant a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus with regard to any claim that was rejected on the merits by the state court, unless the adjudication of the claim in state court either:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That standard is very difficult to meet. See Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 357-58 (2013).
Clearly established federal law is found in "holdings," not "dicta," of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted. "[C]ircuit precedent does not constitute 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,'" and "therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief." Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). The law in question may be either a "generalized standard" or a "bright-line rule designed to effectuate such a standard in a particular context." Kennaugh v. Miller, 289 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 2002).
A decision is "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law" when the state court "applies a rule different from the governing law set forth" by the Supreme Court or when it "decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). A decision "involve[s] an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law" when the state court has correctly identified the governing law, but applies that law "unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case, or refuses to extend a legal principle that the Supreme Court has clearly established to a new situation in which it should govern." Davis v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is not enough that "a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect" or erroneous. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Rather, the state court's application of clearly established law must be "objectivelyunreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a state prisoner must show that the challenged court ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Burt v. Titlo...
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