Perez v. Gulf Coast Mgmt. Co.
Decision Date | 03 March 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00426-N |
Parties | THOMAS E. PEREZ, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. GULF COAST MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HAMPTON INN SARALAND, and ANAND PATEL, individually, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This action is before the Court on the Motion for Default Judgment(Doc. 14) filed by PlaintiffThomas E. Perez, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor(hereinafter, "the Secretary").Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the motion is due to be GRANTED, as set out.1
The Secretary commenced this action on September 12, 2014, by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1) against the Defendants alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.("the FLSA").On October 23, 2014, DefendantAnand Patel("Patel") executed a waiver of service in this District that was sent on September 24, 2014(seeDoc. 6;Doc. 8at 2, ¶ 4); thus, his responsive pleading was due November 24, 2014.SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3), 12(a)(1)(A)(ii), & 6(a)(1)(C).A process server served DefendantGulf Coast Management Company, LLC("GCMC"), through its registered agent Ramon Patel, on November 8, 2014(seeDoc. 7;Doc. 8at 2, ¶ 5); thus, its responsive pleading was due December 1, 2014.SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) & 6(a)(1)(C).To date, neither Defendant has appeared, filed a responsive pleading, or otherwise defended in this action.
On January 12, 2015, upon application by the Secretary (seeDoc. 11), the Clerk of Court entered default against both Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).(SeeDoc. 12).On February 5, 2015, the Secretary filed the present Motion for Default Judgment(Doc. 14) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) against both Defendants, requesting that the Court"enter judgment as prayed for in the Complaint."2
In this Circuit, Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1369(11th Cir.1982)(internal citation omitted).See alsoIn re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295(11th Cir.2003)().
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409(11th Cir.1999)(quotingTaylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367(11th Cir.1994)).Accordingly, "it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking."Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress."Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668, 676(5th Cir.1978).3
The Secretary has asserted claims that the Defendants have violated the minimum wage and overtime compensation requirements of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206and207, respectively, which also constitute violations of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2)( ).The Secretary has demanded damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), which expressly provides that the "Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees under section 206 or section 207[and] may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages."SeeMitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F.2d 929, 932(5th Cir.1958)(), rev'd on other grounds, Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288(1960).
The Secretary has also requested injunctive relief under 29 U.S.C. § 217, which provides that the "district courts... shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain violations of section 215 of this title, including in the case of violations of section 215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or overtime compensation found by the court to be due to employees under this chapter..."The Eleventh Circuit has held that "the Secretary of Labor has the exclusive right to bring an action for injunctive relief" under the FLSA.Powell v. State of Fla., 132 F.3d 677, 678(11th Cir.1998)(per curiam).Thus, because the FLSA has expressly authorized the Secretary to sue for the relief requested, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 1345.
The Secretary's Complaint alleges that both Defendants conduct business in Mobile County, Alabama, and that all relevant actions occurred in this district.These uncontested allegations indicate that the Court can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over both Defendants and that venue is proper in this District.
"An allegation - other than one relating to the amount of damages - is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied."Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6).Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x 860, 863(11th Cir.2007)(per curiam)(unpublished)(quotingNishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206(5th Cir.1975))(footnote omitted).See alsoChudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1371 n.41(11th Cir.1997) ("[A] default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim."(citing Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206( ).
The FLSA currently provides that, subject to certain inapplicable exceptions, "[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages" in the amount of $7.25 an hour.29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C).The FLSA also provides that, subject to certain inapplicable exceptions, "no employer shall employany of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).It is "unlawful for any person...to violate any of the provisions of section 206 or section 207..."29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2).
By failing to answer the allegations in the Complaint, Patel has admitted that, at all relevant times, he"acted directly or indirectly in the interest of" GCMC "in relation to their employees," as he"makes final decisions on the operation of the enterprise, is responsible for maintaining compliance with the Hilton franchise agreement, and the general manager answers directly to him."(Id. at 2).Thus, Patel deemed an "employer" for purposes of the FLSA.See29 U.S.C. § 203(d)( ).
Moreover, by failing to answer the allegations in the Complaint, both Defendants have admitted that they"engaged in related activities performed either through unified operation or common control for a common business purposes"(Doc. 1at 2), which constitutes an "enterprise" under the FLSA.See29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1)(...
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