Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-929 (RC)
• Court: United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
• Parties: SHANIQUE PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. KIPP DC SUPPORTING CORPORATION, et. al, Defendants.

SHANIQUE PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. KIPP DC SUPPORTING CORPORATION, et. al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-929 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

February 16, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RE DOCUMENT NOS.: 11, 16

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This is the second action filed by Plaintiff Shanique Perez in which she seeks civil damages as a result of the years of sexual abuse that she suffered as a minor student at the hands of her one-time teacher. This Court first considered Ms. Perez's claims in January 2019 and dismissed them as time-barred under the controlling D.C. statute of limitations in Doe v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp., 373 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019). A few months thereafter, the D.C. Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act became effective and extended the relevant statute of limitations for civil actions arising out of sexual abuse. Although the result is no doubt disappointing to Ms. Perez, the Court determines that its previous decision was already final and claim preclusion bars this case notwithstanding the subsequent change in the law. Accordingly, it grants Defendants' motions to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Coleman's Abuse of Ms. Perez

Ms. Perez was a student at KIPP DC from approximately 2001 to 2005. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 1.^[1] She first came into contact with Defendant Alan Coleman during the 2003-2004 school year, when he was her eighth-grade science and history teacher and her drumline coach. Id. ¶ 24. At the time, Coleman was 34 years old, and Ms. Perez was only 14. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Coleman manipulated her with gifts and attention, including making Ms. Perez his “teacher['s] assistant” and taking her on a “first date.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 25-27. Within a few months, Coleman began sexually assaulting Ms. Perez on a regular basis. Id. ¶¶ 28-32. He continued to abuse her for the remainder of the 2004-2005 school year. Id. ¶ 34.

Ms. Perez began attending a different school in the fall of 2006. Id. ¶ 36. She alleges on information and belief that KIPP DC terminated Coleman's employment based on suspicions of his inappropriate actions with Perez in approximately the 2005-2006 school year, but that Coleman was soon thereafter hired by Defendant Capital City Public Charter School. Id. ¶ 55. Meanwhile, the abusive relationship continued. Id. In addition to subjecting Ms. Perez to frequent sexual assault and humiliation, Coleman forbade her from attending a prestigious out-of-state school where she had earned a full scholarship because it would require her to move away from him. Id. ¶¶ 30-33, 37.

At some point during the 2006-2007 school year, Ms. Perez's mother learned of the ongoing sexual assault and abuse and reported it to Coleman's employer, Capital City Public Charter school, which failed to investigate or take any disciplinary action against Coleman. Id. ¶ 56. Ms. Perez likewise alleges that KIPP DC took no action to investigate Coleman's behavior or otherwise protect her and allowed Coleman to have unrestricted and unsupervised contact with her throughout his employment at KIPP. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. And despite Ms. Perez's mother's attempts at intervention, Coleman persuaded Ms. Perez to move into his house in 2007. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Ms. Perez continued to live with Coleman until approximately the fall of 2009. Id. ¶ 58. During that time, Coleman sexually abused her on a regular basis and became increasingly controlling over all aspects of her life, including restricting her social interactions. Id. ¶ 57.

Ms. Perez ended her relationship with Coleman in 2009, but it was not until 2015 that she began to realize the wrongfulness and abusiveness of his behavior. Id. ¶¶ 58-60. In February 2015 she asked Coleman to resign from his teaching position at Capital City, where he was still employed. Id. ¶ 60. After he failed to do so, Ms. Perez contacted Capital City herself and informed them of the sexually abusive relationship that Coleman had with her while she was a minor. Id. ¶ 61. Capital City terminated Coleman's employment but did not notify the authorities. Id. ¶ 62. The D.C. Metropolitan Police Department was not alerted to Coleman's conduct until April 2016, when Ms. Perez told another former KIPP teacher about the abuse and that teacher subsequently notified the police. Id. ¶ 63. Coleman was arrested and pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in Maryland state court and to first-degree sexual abuse in D.C. Superior Court. See Docket, People v. Coleman, No. 130514C (Md. Montgomery Cnty. Cir. Ct.); Docket, United States v. Coleman, No. 2016 CF1 011951 (D.C. Super. Ct.).

2. The Doe v. KIPP litigation

Ms. Perez, under the pseudonym Jane Doe, filed a civil complaint with this Court on February 2, 2018, bringing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title IX, gross negligence, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Coleman, KIPP DC, KIPP DC's principal Ettinger, ^[2] and Capital City Public Charter School. See Doe v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp., 373 F.Supp.3d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2019). At the time Ms. Perez brought the prior action, the parties debated which of two D.C. statute of limitations provisions applied to her claims: D.C. Code § 12-301(8), the catch-all provision establishing a three-year statute of limitations for claims not otherwise specified, or D.C. Code § 12-301(11), which established the statute of limitations for claims “arising out of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor” as “the later of seven years from the victim's eighteenth birthday or three years from ‘when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting abuse.'” See Id. at 10 (summarizing D.C. Code §§ 12-301(8) and (11) (2009)). The Court held that because the discovery rule did not toll Ms. Perez's claims until she realized the wrongfulness of the abuse in 2015, her claims were time-barred as a matter of law under either provision. Id. at 8, 11. It likewise denied Ms. Perez's motion to amend the complaint without prejudice and entered an order dismissing the case “without prejudice.” See Order Granting Defs.' Mots. Dismiss, Doe v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp., et al., No. 1:18-cv-00260-RC (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No. 21. Ms. Perez did not seek leave to amend the complaint and did not appeal the dismissal.

3. The Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018 Since that time, §12-301(11) of the D.C. Code has been amended by the Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018 (“Amendment Act”). See Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018, D.C. Law 22-311, 66 D.C. Reg. 1398 (Feb. 1, 2019); see also 66 D.C. Reg. 5806 (May 10, 2019) (setting effective date of May 3, 2019). That provision now applies to civil actions “arising out of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was less than 35 years of age” and sets the applicable limitations period as “the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.” D.C. Code § 12-301(11) (2021). In addition, the Amendment Act created a two-year revival period for claims “that would be time-barred under D.C. Official Code § 12-301 before the effective date of this act, but that would not be time-barred” by the amended act. D.C. Law 22-311 § 5(a)(2). The Amendment Act became effective on May 3, 2019. See Id. § 7; 66 D.C. Reg. 5806 (May 10, 2019).

Ms. Perez filed the present action in April 2021, reasserting many of the same claims, which she argues are now timely in light of the Amendment Act. Defendants KIPP DC and Capital City have both filed motions to dismiss. See Def. KIPP DC's Mot. Dismiss (“KIPP Mot.”), ECF No. 11; Def. Capital City Public Charter School's Mot. Dismiss (“Capital City Mot.”), ECF No. 16. Oppositions and replies have been filed, and the matter is ripe for resolution. See Pl.'s Mem. L. Opp'n to Def. KIPP DC's Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.'s KIPP Opp'n”), ECF No. 12; Def. KIPP DC's Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“KIPP Reply”), ECF No. 13; Pl.'s Mem. L. Opp'n to Def. Capital City Public Charter School's Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.'s Capital City Opp'n”), ECF No. 18; Def. Capital City's Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Capital City Reply”), ECF No. 19.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Brewer v. District of Columbia, 891 F.Supp.2d 126, 130 (D.D.C. 2012). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). Still, the complaint must also “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Res judicata serves “to conserve judicial resources, avoid inconsistent results, engender respect for judgments of predictable and certain effect, and to prevent piecemeal litigation.” Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 ...