Perez v. Marshall
| Decision Date | 22 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-16950,96-16950 |
| Parties | 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5774, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9265 Daniel PEREZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles D. MARSHALL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michael A. Kresser, Executive Director, Sixth District Appellate Program, Santa Clara, CA, for petitioner-appellant.
Ronald E. Niver, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David H. Rose, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; James Ware, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-20505-JW.
Before GOODWIN, D.W. NELSON, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
OVERVIEW
Daniel Perez, a California prisoner, appeals the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Perez seeks to invalidate his state convictions for robbery and assault with a firearm. He argues that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by removing the sole dissenting juror, Jennifer Robles, from the jury on the grounds that she was emotionally incapable of continuing to participate in the jury-deliberation process. In denying the petition, the district court concluded that the trial judge had discretion to remove the juror on the basis of her emotional instability and that the record supported the trial court's determination that Robles was unwilling and unable to remain on the jury. We affirm.
The State of California charged Perez with multiple counts of assault and robbery as a result of four separate incidents occurring in 1992. The case was tried to a jury in Monterey County Superior Court. After the jury deliberated for one-half hour, the bailiff informed the judge that one juror, twenty-year-old Jennifer Robles, wanted to speak to him.
At an in camera hearing, Robles made clear that she entertained a reasonable doubt as to Perez's guilt, while the other jurors had voted guilty and had told her that they were going to change her mind. She explained that "everybody is mad at each other in there," that the jurors were all "stressing out," and that "the guy with the accent yelled at her." She told the judge that she was distressed and that she did not want the responsibility of deciding whether Perez was guilty.
The judge asked Robles if she was willing and able to continue deliberating. Robles asked if she would get in trouble if she did not. When the court said "no," Robles stated:
The judge explained that Robles responded: The court answered yes, "[i]f you think you're right, and being reasonable," to which Robles replied: "What if I'm wrong?" The judge answered: Robles replied:
The judge excused Robles from the courtroom and informed counsel that he intended to have Robles continue deliberating. The prosecution objected, arguing that Robles was refusing to deliberate as a juror. The defense counsel countered that he believed Robles was participating, "[s]he just happens to disagree."
The judge then summed-up his views on the issue:
It's a perfect appellate trap: either way I go, it's probably not going to be right.... She flip-flops. She indicates that she is not in favor of a guilty verdict at this point, and yet .... [h]e may well be guilty. She just doesn't want to take the responsibility of making a decision.... She seems much younger than 20.... She seems to me to be like a 16 year old individual.
The judge also noted that Robles had been in tears twice during the in-chambers interview. The judge then recalled Robles to the courtroom and asked her to continue to deliberate. Robles refused the judge's suggestion that she should knock on the door or tell the foreperson if she decided she no longer could participate, explaining:
The judge offered to instruct the jury to conduct their deliberations in a proper fashion, but Robles declined the offer. She informed the court that she had put off jury duty all summer until "[t]hey told me if I didn't come, they were going to send a sheriff to my house and get me." Robles finally agreed to resume deliberations.
Shortly after deliberations began again, the foreperson halted deliberations because of difficulties in the jury room. The judge excused all the jurors except for Robles until the next morning. When asked what happened, Robles explained that "the lady was mad at me" because the other eleven jurors had persuaded her to agree with them on a verdict but then she changed her mind. She stated "[w]hen I went back in there [after lunch] I told them I ... didn't want to say The judge explained to Robles that a "juror is ... supposed to be able to discuss the case with other jurors, and not get overly emotional." When the judge asked Robles if she was emotionally able to continue deliberations, she indicated that she was not. The judge excused Robles for the evening, and at Perez's request, agreed to wait until the next morning to determine whether Robles was fit to continue as a juror.
that. And then ... they got up and came out here, because I want to change my answer." Robles indicated that she had been prepared to continue and that she had not refused to have further discussions with the jury
The next morning, the judge called the jury foreperson into court and asked her to explain what had transpired in the jury room. The foreperson explained that eleven of the jurors had been in agreement as to a verdict on count one, and that they eventually had managed to convince the holdout juror to join the verdict. After the lunch recess, however, that holdout juror changed her mind. The foreperson said, "it started to be a very emotional thing with the jurors where basically no one could try to make an intelligent decision when you're dealing with somebody that's basically in pieces ... you can't get somebody to be rational when they're in that state." When asked whether the jury could continue deliberating with Robles, the foreperson said "[m]y own feeling is it's not to everybody's best interest if that person continues."
The judge then spoke with Robles, who indicated that she still did not want to continue on the jury, but said that she would if she had to. She agreed, however, that "it would be a very emotional experience ... like it was yesterday with tears and everything else."
The judge concluded that Robles was incapable of continuing to participate on the jury. He expressed a wish that Robles's appearance had been recorded on a video camera, "because so much not only from what she actually expressed but what you could just tell by looking at her that she, particularly yesterday, appeared to be an emotional wreck...." He then explained:
watching today, her head is bowed; she looked tentative and coerced, and she is willing to do what she is forced to do, I suppose. With the bailiff armed in the courtroom here and the proceedings are ominous to her, and that's the impression I get.... I think she is just emotionally out of control. And so I will find cause.
The judge excused Robles from the jury. Defense counsel objected that "good cause" for Robles's removal did not exist and moved for a mistrial. The judge denied this motion and substituted an alternate juror in Robles's place.
The reconstituted jury began deliberations anew and subsequently returned guilty verdicts on counts one through five. The jury was unable to reach verdicts on the remaining counts, so the court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The court sentenced Perez to twenty-seven years, four-months imprisonment.
Perez appealed to the California Court of Appeals and to the California Supreme Court, both of which affirmed his conviction. Perez then filed this habeas corpus petition in the Northern District of California, arguing: 1) that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury when it dismissed Robles; 2) that the trial court erred by failing to admonish the jury to deliberate fairly; 3) that the trial court erred by allowing Robles to reveal to the court the jury's numerical division; and 4) that the trial court coerced the guilty verdict by dismissing the sole dissenting juror. The district court rejected all four arguments and dismissed the petition.
After the district court issued a certificate of appealability, Perez timely appealed to this court, abandoning all but the first of the four arguments raised above: that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by dismissing juror Robles on the basis of her emotional condition.
We review de novo the district court's decision to grant or deny a section Whether a trial court violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Carrillo v. Biter
...were violated by excusing a juror when it was known that the juror was the lone juror holding out for an acquittal. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1997.) On habeas review, a trial court's findings regarding juror fitness are entitled to special deference. Id. The trial cou......
-
The People v. Hightower
...unable to perform her duties, whether or not that inability flowed from an emotional reaction to the evidence. Indeed in Perez v. Marshall, supra, 119 F.3d 1422, the Ninth Circuit recently approved an extensive inquiry into jury deliberations. A defendant convicted in a California court sou......
-
See v. Brazelton
...(1961). A trial court's decision to substitute a juror without good cause can establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1997). Under California law, a trial court may order a juror discharged if the juror dies or becomes ill, or if good cause fo......
-
Roberts v. Warden, San Quentin State Prison, No. CIV S-93-0254 GEB DAD
...reasons for a juror's dismissal. Among those situations discussed by the court in Williams was that presented in Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir. 1997). In Perez the state trial judge had dismissed a lone holdout juror on the grounds that "she was emotionally incapable of co......