Perez v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 1:19-cv-23650-GAYLES/OTAZO-REYES |
| Parties | MARIA ELENA PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Counter and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. MARIA ELENA PEREZ (I), Counter-Defendant and Cross-Claimant, and MARIA ELENA PEREZ (II), Third-Party Defendant and Cross-Defendant on Crossclaim of Maria Elena Perez (I). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant/Counter and Third-Party Plaintiff Midland National Life Insurance Company's ("Midland") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Interpleader (the "Motion") [ECF No. 33]. The Court has reviewed the Motion and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This action stems from a family dispute over who is the proper beneficiary of two life insurance policies insuring the life of the decedent, Rolando A. Perez. Maria Elena Perez ("Perez I"), Mr. Perez's widow, and Maria Elena Perez ("Perez II"), Mr. Perez and Perez I's daughter, each claim to be the true beneficiary of the two life insurance policies.
On November 21, 1999, Mr. Perez and Perez I jointly purchased a life insurance policy from Midland, the insurer, insuring Mr. Perez's life for $97,000.00 (No. 1502342706); and on December 1, 1999, Mr. Perez purchased a second life insurance policy from Midland, insuring his life for $390,000.00 (No. 1502344744) (collectively, the "Policies"). On September 3, 2009, Midland received a Beneficiary Change Request form for both Policies, dated and signed on August 26, 2009, that reflected Perez I as 100% primary beneficiary, and Perez II as a 50% contingent beneficiary.3 Midland provided an Endorsement of Change of Beneficiary to the Owners of the Policies, which confirmed Perez I as the primary beneficiary and Perez II as a contingent beneficiary.
On May 29, 2019, Midland received notice that Mr. Perez died on May 26, 2019. On May 31, 2019, Mr. Perez's agent requested that Midland change the beneficiary address from Catalonia Avenue to Pizarro Street, which Midland did.4 On June 4, 2019, Midland received a second call from Mr. Perez's agent and Perez I, stating that the change in address request was in error and Perez I expressed her belief that Perez II was attempting to claim the proceeds under the Policies. On June 12, 2019, Midland received a request for payment under the Policies from Perez I, who submitted a Proof of Death Claimant's Statement form and supporting documents. Perez II also contacted Midland on June 12, 2019, stating that Mr. Perez indicated to her that she was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring his life. On June 13, 2019, Midland received a competing request for payment under the Policies from Perez II, as well as a Proof of Death Claimant's Statement form and supporting documents.
On August 1, 2019, Perez I filed her Complaint in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, against Midland, seeking payment of $487,000.00 as the beneficiary of the Policies. [ECF No. 1-1]. On August 30, 2019, Midland removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). [ECF No. 1]. On September 6, 2019, Midland filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, as well as a Third-Party Complaint for Interpleader against Perez I and Perez II. [ECF No. 4]. While it admits its contractual liability in the amount of $487,000.00 under the Policies, Midland claims that it has not made payment because "it has received competing claims for the proceeds of the Policies from two individuals, both named Maria Elena Perez . . . ." See, e.g., id. at 2 ¶ 6. Midland further states that it is a disinterested stakeholder,claims no interest in the proceeds to the Policies, and is indifferent as to who is entitled to the proceeds of the Policies. Id. at 9 ¶ 27.
On November 13, 2019, Midland filed a Motion to Deposit Funds in the Court Registry, [ECF No. 29], which the Court granted. [ECF No. 30]. On November 21, 2019, Midland deposited the disputed proceeds into the Court's Registry. [ECF Nos. 31 & 32]. On November 26, 2019, Midland filed the instant Motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c) and 22, seeking discharge from all further liability arising under the Policies and requesting attorney's fees related to litigating its interpleader action. Perez I responded to the Motion, [ECF No. 34], and Perez II did not.
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The court must "accept as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving party's pleading" and "view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)). If a material dispute of fact exists, "judgment on the pleadings must be denied." Id. (citing Stanton v. Larsh, 239 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1956)).
A defendant "may seek interpleader through a crossclaim or counterclaim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(2). "Interpleader is the means by which an innocent stakeholder, who typically claims no interest in an asset and does not know the asset's rightful owner, avoids multiple liability by asking the court to determine the asset's rightful owner." In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Hous. Ass'n, Inc.,21 F.3d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1994). An interpleader action "allow[s] the contesting parties to have their rights determined in a court of equity so as to protect the [innocent stakeholder] from double liability, and to preserve the rights of any claimant to the fund[.]" Orseck, P.A. v. Servicios Legales De Mesoamerica S. De R.L., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1348-49 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F.2d 930, 933 (5th Cir. 1943)). "Interpleader is appropriate where the stakeholder may be subject to adverse claims that could expose it to multiple liability on the same fund." Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Langkau ex rel. Estate of Langkau, 353 F. App'x 244, 248 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(1)).
An interpleader action proceeds in two stages. The court must first determine "whether interpleader is proper and 'whether to discharge the stakeholder from further liability to the claimants.'" Id. (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis, 553 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2009)). The court must then "evaluate[] 'the respective rights of the claimants to the interpleaded funds.'" Id. "A successful interpleader suit results in the entry of a discharge judgment on behalf of the stakeholder; once the stakeholder turns the asset over to the registry of the court, all legal obligations to the asset's claimants are satisfied." In re Mandalay Shores, 21 F.3d at 383. The burden lies with "the party seeking interpleader to demonstrate that he is entitled to it, or more specifically, that he has been or may be subjected to adverse claims." Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp., 353 F. App'x at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 1974)).
Because Midland's interpleader action is in the first stage, the Court must determine whether interpleader is proper and whether to discharge Midland as a disinterested stakeholder. Here, Perez I does not dispute the material facts alleged by Midland in its pleadings and does notoppose discharging Midland from this action. However, Perez I disputes being "collaterally estopped from commencing or prosecuting any proceeding or claim against Midland arising out of or related to [the Policies] . . . , or arising out of the death of" Mr. Perez. See [ECF No. 33 at 9]. Perez I also opposes Midland's request for attorneys' fees and costs related to its interpleader action and the Motion. Because Perez II did not file a response to Midland's Motion, the Court finds that Perez II concedes the points in the Motion. See Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Brickellhouse Condo. Assoc., Inc., No. 16-CIV-22236, 2016 WL 5661636, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2016) . The Court addresses each of Perez I's objections in turn.
Midland moves to be discharged from any further liability under the Policies and dismissed from this action. The Court finds that interpleader is proper and that discharging and dismissing Midland from this action is warranted. Midland filed the interpleader action based on disputed claims to the Policies' beneficiary proceeds by Perez I and Perez II. [ECF No. 35 at 6]; see also [ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 21 & 23]; Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. Knighten, No. 504CV221OC10GRJ, 2005 WL 1309411, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2015) (). Midland admits its contractual liability under the Policies, see, e.g., [ECF No. 4 at 9 ¶ 24; ECF No. 33 at 8], and deposited the disputed funds into the Court's Registry. See [ECF Nos. 31 & 32]. Therefore, Midland is no longer an interested stakeholder to the disputed funds from the Policies. Moreover, neither Perez I nor Perez II asserts independent claims against Midland beyond those related to the disbursement of the disputed funds from the Policies. See Genworth Life Ins. Co. v. Reyes, No. 12-CIV-20959, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial