Perez v. Posse Comitatus

Decision Date28 June 2004
Docket NumberDocket No. 03-7963.
Citation373 F.3d 321
PartiesIsrael PEREZ and Magdaleno Estrada Escamilla, on behalf of themselves and all other Mexican/Chicano Day Laborers and/or Latino Day Laborers similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. POSSE COMITATUS, Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, American Patrol, the Creativity Movement, National Alliance, Sachem Quality of Life, Inc., World Church of the Creator, Christopher Slavin and Ryan Wagner, Defendants. Sachem Quality of Life, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, v. Frederick K. Brewington and Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Michael E. Rosman, Washington, D.C. (Center for Individual Rights, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant.

Scott Korenbaum, Hempstead, New York (Frederick K. Brewington, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, New York, on the brief), for Appellees.

Before: KEARSE and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, District Judge*.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Sachem Quality of Life, Inc. ("Sachem"), appeals from so much of a partial final judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Joanna Seybert, Judge, dismissing the complaint against Sachem and certain other defendants, as denied Sachem's motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for the imposition of sanctions against appellees Frederick K. Brewington and the Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington (collectively "Brewington"), plaintiffs' attorneys, for filing the complaint against Sachem. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs Israel Perez and Magdaleno Estrada Escamilla were assaulted by defendants Christopher Slavin and Ryan Wagner and that Sachem and the other defendants had, inter alia, conspired to bring about the assault. On appeal, Sachem contends that the district court should have granted its motion for sanctions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint alleged the following events. In September 2000, Perez and Escamilla were Mexican/Chicano day laborers residing in Farmingville, New York. On September 17, Slavin and Wagner lured Perez and Escamilla from their home with a false promise of work, led them into the cellar of an abandoned building, and attacked them with various weapons. Escamilla was bludgeoned by Slavin until he lost consciousness; Perez too was clubbed by Slavin and was stabbed several times by Wagner. Escamilla eventually regained consciousness, and both plaintiffs managed to escape. They were aided by a passing motorist who summoned the police.

In September 2001, Perez and Escamilla commenced the present action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1988, and state law, with the filing of a complaint signed by Brewington, alleging the above acts of violence by Slavin and Wagner (see Complaint ¶¶ 22-64). The complaint also named as defendants seven advocacy organizations (collectively the "organization defendants"), describing them as associations that advocated hatred against various groups on the basis of, inter alia, race, nationality, or religion (see id. ¶¶ 7-13), and alleging that Sachem, a Farmingville-based association, "advocate[d] hatred and intolerance against immigrants, and in particular, day laborers" (id. ¶ 12). The complaint alleged that defendants had conspired to deprive plaintiffs and similarly situated immigrant laborers of, inter alia, their Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to travel, to enjoy equal protection of the laws, to "be free from badges and incidents of slavery," and to "be free from assault and battery motivated by racial prejudice" (id. ¶ 80; see id. ¶¶ 78, 80, 88-91). It alleged that Slavin and Wagner had "acted with the support of" the organization defendants (id. ¶ 71) and that the assaults by Slavin and Wagner constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy (see id. ¶ 80).

Sachem and most of the other defendants moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, contending that the allegations against the organization defendants were vague and conclusory and that, insofar as the claims were based on the organization defendants' political views, the claims were barred by the First Amendment. Subsequently, those defendants filed motions under Rule 11 for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel on the principal grounds that the complaint was factually groundless and legally frivolous and violated Rule 11(b)(1), (2), and (3). To the extent pertinent to this appeal, Sachem, in support of its motion, presented declarations of its president and other officials attesting that they had never met, communicated with, or entered into any agreement with Slavin or Wagner; that neither Slavin nor Wagner was a member of Sachem, had attended Sachem meetings, or had received assistance from Sachem; and that Sachem advocated the enforcement of laws against illegal immigration, but had never advocated violence or discrimination against illegal immigrants.

Wagner, in addition to joining the organization defendants' motions to dismiss, filed an answer to the complaint, denying, or denying information sufficient to form a belief as to, most of its allegations. His answer also asserted a cross-claim "against his co-defendants in this action jointly and severally for liability and indemnification" (Answer of Ryan Wagner dated January 9, 2002 ("Wagner Answer"), ¶ 19), asking that "in the event [Wagner] is found to be at fault or liable" (id.), "in whole or in part for any of the allegations averred by the plaintiff [sic], that his liability be comparatively weighed and considered and that he have a claim over and against the co-defendants in this action jointly and severally" (id. WHEREFORE ¶). Wagner's attorney also sent the district court a letter stating as follows:

I am aware that certain defendants have made a claim for Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs and Mr. Brewington. The record should be very clear that I have, on behalf of my client, joined in any motions to dismiss or for summary judgment that have been heretofore filed on behalf of other defendants. I do not, however, join in any application for sanctions being made by any party to this litigation.

(Letter of Thomas F. Liotti, counsel for Wagner, dated February 6, 2002 ("Wagner Letter") (emphasis in original).)

In a Memorandum and Decision dated September 10, 2002 ("District Court Opinion"), the district court granted the organization defendants' motions to dismiss but denied their motions for sanctions. As to the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court concluded, inter alia, that the complaint was flawed because it contained only conclusory allegations as to any affiliation between Slavin and Wagner on the one hand, and the organization defendants on the other. See District Court Opinion at 9-10. Noting also that the complaint failed to allege that the organization defendants had engaged in any conduct "which would fall outside the realm of constitutionally protected speech," the court concluded that "the First Amendment bars these claims." Id. at 12.

The court denied the motions for Rule 11 sanctions, stating as follows:

In evaluating a Rule 11 motion, the court must "`resolve all doubts in favor of the signer.'" Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy, 127 F.Supp.2d 364 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987)). Pursuant to the Rule, a party or an attorney has an affirmative duty to make "reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law." See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542-43, 111 S.Ct. 922, 929, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991). The imposition of sanctions against attorneys is discretionary and may be warranted "where an attorney's conduct degrades the legal profession and disserves justice." MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 73 F.3d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir.1996).

The Court notes that civil rights attorneys are held to no lesser standard than their colleagues. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1280. Mindful of its need to exercise caution, the Court declines to impose sanctions in this case where there is some arguable basis for sustaining the civil rights claims against the two individual defendants. See Levy v. City of New York, 726 F.Supp. 1446, 1457 (S.D.N.Y.1989[]). Accordingly, in consideration of the facts and circumstances presented in this case, the Court DENIES the defendants' motions for sanctions.

District Court Opinion at 19-20.

The district court denied Wagner's motion to dismiss the claims against him. Slavin, who had not yet appeared, was given extensions of time to respond to the complaint, and the case remained pending against him as well. In August 2003, a partial final judgment was entered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) dismissing the claims against Sachem and the other organization defendants and declining to impose sanctions. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Sachem argues principally that the complaint against it lacked evidentiary support and attacked constitutionally protected speech and hence violated Rule 11(b)(1), (2), and (3), and that the district court committed an error of law because it "apparently concluded that one non-frivolous claim against two defendants insulated the entire complaint from any attack under Rule 11" (Sachem brief on appeal at 28). For the reasons that follow, we disagree with Sachem's interpretation of the district court's opinion, and we conclude that the denial of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion.

Rule 11(b) provides in pertinent part that, by presenting a complaint to the court, the attorney signing or filing the complaint

is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, —

(1) it is not...

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