Perez v. Postal Police Officers Ass'n

• Decision Date: 27 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–4390.,12–4390.
• Parties: Thomas E. PEREZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. POSTAL POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

736 F.3d 736

Thomas E. PEREZ, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.POSTAL POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–4390.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Oct. 11, 2013.

Decided and Filed: Nov. 27, 2013.

ARGUED:Robert D. Kamenshine, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael T. Anderson, Murphy Anderson PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Robert D. Kamenshine, Michael Jay Singer, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael T. Anderson, Arlus J. Stephens, Murphy Anderson PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before: MERRITT and CLAY, Circuit Judges; STAFFORD, District Judge. ^*

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Sections 401 and 402 of the Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481, 482, regulate union elections and authorize the Secretary of Labor to bring suit to enforce these provisions. Before the Secretary can commence an enforcement action, a member of the union must exhaust—or attempt to exhaust—his internal union remedies, then file an administrative complaint with the Secretary. The complaining member has just one calendar month to file his administrative complaint, measured from the latest of two dates: the date he “exhausted” his internal union remedies, or the date three months after the member invoked his internal union remedies “without obtaining a final decision.” 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).

This case turns on how we determine when a member has “exhausted” his internal union remedies. Plaintiff, the Secretary of Labor,¹ contends that a member exhausts the union's remedies when he receives the union's final decision. Defendant, the union representing police officers working for the United States Postal Inspection Service, asserts that the member's one-month limitations period runs from the date the union sends out its final decision. The district court agreed with Defendant and dismissed this case on the grounds that the complaining member had not filed his administrative complaint within the prescribed time period. We disagree, and hold that a member has not “exhausted” his internal union remedies until he receives the union's final decision. We therefore REVERSE the district court and REMAND this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts and Procedural History

In the summer of 2011, Defendant held an election to choose six officers, including its President. Scott Murray was the incumbent President, but when the election was held on July 29, 2011, he was ousted in favor of Christopher Vitolo, then the First Vice President. Murray was convinced that the election was tainted, and he raised his protests with Eric Freeman, Defendant's Election Chair, in a letter dated September 12, 2011. Among other things, Murray claimed that Vitolo had gained an unfair advantage by getting access to union members' personal e-mail addresses. Freeman denied Murray's protests in a letter dated October 12, 2011. Murray appealed to Defendant's Executive Board. The Board, in turn, issued a final decision affirming Freeman's rulings on December 9, 2011. The Board sent this decision on to Murray by certified mail on December 9, 2011, and Murray received the decision on December 14, 2011. Murray filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Labor on January 13, 2012.

Section 402(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b), gives the Secretary of Labor 60 days to investigate an administrative complaintand file a civil action in federal court if he finds probable cause to believe that the LMRDA was violated. Defendant agreed to extend this deadline to April 13, 2012. On that day, Plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging two causes of action: first, that Defendant violated the LMRDA by discriminating in the use of its list of members' e-mail addresses; and second, that Defendant improperly used union resources to promote Vitolo's candidacy. Defendant answered the complaint and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted Defendant's motion. Although the court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's suit, ² it held that Murray's administrative complaint had been untimely, meaning that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. See Solis v. Postal Police Officers Ass'n, No. 12–CV–897, 2012 WL 4056074 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 17, 2012). Plaintiff timely appealed.

B. The Statutory Scheme

Congress enacted the LMRDA, also widely known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, to stem what it saw as “ ‘shocking abuses' in the process by which labor unions govern[ed] themselves and [to] ensure ‘internal union democracy.’ ” Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C.Cir.1986) (citations omitted) (quoting S.Rep. No. 86–187, at 5, 6 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2322). The LMRDA was thus intended “to restore to members of labor unions the right to participate freely in the government of their union.” Sertic v. Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga & Ashtabula Counties Carpenters Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 423 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir.1970). “Congress saw the principle of union democracy as one of the most important safeguards against such abuse, and accordingly included in the LMRDA a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of union elections.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 531, 92 S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972). This regulatory scheme is set out in Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481–483.

Title IV reflects Congress' “weigh[ing] how best to legislate against revealed abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from its long-standing policy against unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal union affairs.” Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 471, 88 S.Ct. 643, 19 L.Ed.2d 705 (1968). Section 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481, establishes terms of office for union officers and the method of their election. Section 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482, “sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights, by permitting an individual member to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor challenging the validity of any election because of violations of Title IV.” Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964). “The Secretary of Labor was selected for this task due to the special knowledge and expertise enjoyed by him in regard to union activities.” Donovan v. Westside Local 174, Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 783 F.2d 616, 620 (6th Cir.1986) (citing Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140, 85 S.Ct. 292). “Because the Secretary acts on behalf of union members in § 402 actions, Congress mandated exhaustion of internal union remedies as a prerequisite to suit in federal court to permit a union to set its own house in order before subjecting it to costly litigation.” Holmes v. Donovan, 796 F.2d 173, 177 (6th Cir.1986). This exhaustion “ ‘rule preserves a maximum amount of independence and self-government by giving every international union the opportunity to correct improper local elections' ” before government intervention becomes necessary. Hodgson v. Local Union 6799, United Steelworkers of Am., 403 U.S. 333, 339, 91 S.Ct. 1841, 29 L.Ed.2d 510 (1971) (quoting S.Rep. No. 86–187, at 21, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2337).

Sections 402(a)(1) and (a)(2) provide two ways that a union member may satisfy the exhaustion requirement: respectively, either by “exhaust[ing] the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of” his union, 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(1), or “invok[ing] such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months after their invocation.” 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2). If the member wishes to pursue the matter further, he must file an administrative complaint with the Secretary “within one calendar month” after satisfying the exhaustion requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a). The Department of Labor has issued self-styled interpretive regulations construing this section. See38 Fed.Reg. 18,324, 18,324 (July 9, 1973). The regulation rephrases the exhaustion method of § 402(a)(1), stating that “[i]f the member obtains an unfavorable final decision within three calendar months after invoking his available remedies, he must file his complaint within one calendar month after obtaining the decision.” 29 C.F.R. § 452.135(b). The rule also interprets the limitations period of § 402(a) to run from the later of the two dates of exhaustion. See id. The legislative history confirms what the text of the exhaustion requirement and limitations period make plain—“time is of the essence” in filing an administrative complaint. S.Rep. No. 86–187, at 21, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2337.

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents a single issue—whether a member exhausts his internal union remedies under LMRDA § 402(a)(1) when the union sends its final decision, or when the member receives it. We review the district court's interpretation of this statute de novo. See S.E.C. v. Mohn, 465 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir.2006). Our analysis begins with the plain meaning and, if the language is unambiguous, ends there as well. See Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Sec'y of Dep't of Transp., 654 F.3d 654, 657 (6th Cir.2011). If the text alone does not admit a single conclusive answer, we can draw on a broader range of interpretive tools. See Kasten v. Saint–Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 1333–36, 179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011). Those tools include the Secretary of Labor's construction of the statute. See id. at 1335. The regulation interpreting § 402(a) is not binding on this Court or entitled to Chevron deference. See Martin v. Local 480, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 946 F.2d 457, 462 n. 1 (6th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Mead...