Perez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 49723
• Citation: 105 Mich.App. 202,306 N.W.2d 451
• Parties: Herminio PEREZ and Matilde Perez, husband and wife, and Emilio P. Lopez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 451

306 N.W.2d 451

105 Mich.App. 202

Herminio PEREZ and Matilde Perez, husband and wife, and Emilio P. Lopez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Defendant.

Docket No. 49723.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

April 8, 1981.

Released for Publication June 16, 1981.

Joel E. Dowley, Everett R. Trebilcock, Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

William E. Rheaume, Lansing, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and ALLEN and WALSH, JJ.

WALSH, Judge.

Plaintiffs brought an action for no-fault automobile insurance benefits. Summary judgment was granted in plaintiffs' favor against defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Accelerated judgment was granted in favor of defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. Defendant State Farm, hereinafter defendant, brings this appeal.

In the spring of 1979, plaintiffs, employees of International Mini-Plaza, Inc., were driving to Detroit in a vehicle insured by defendant. They were involved in a collision with a semi-trailer and sustained serious injuries. The corporation employing plaintiffs did not carry any workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiffs submitted claims for personal protection insurance benefits from defendant for approximately $85,000 in medical expenses and lost wages. Defendant denied liability, and plaintiffs filed suit. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted plaintiffs' motion.

The court ruled that defendant was not entitled, under § 3109(1) of the no-fault act, M.C.L. § 500.3109(1); M.S.A. § 24.13109(1), to subtract workers' compensation benefits which are "required to be provided" under the provisions of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. § 418.101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.237(101) et seq., but which remained unpaid from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for plaintiffs' injuries. At issue in this appeal is the propriety of that ruling. We hold that the defendant was entitled to the setoff and reverse.

M.C.L. § 500.3109(1); M.S.A. § 24.13109(1), provides:

"Benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of any state or the federal government shall be subtracted from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury."

Workers' compensation benefits are "benefits provided or required to be provided" under Michigan law. Mathis v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich. 164, 186, 289 N.W.2d 708 (1980), Wolford v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 Mich.App. 600, 604, 285 N.W.2d 383 (1979).

Plaintiffs argue that a setoff should not be allowed in this case because no benefits were actually paid. Plaintiffs' theory is that since the purpose of § 3109(1) is to avoid duplication of benefits, O'Donnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 524, 544, 273 N.W.2d 829 (1979), the setoff provision of that statute is not applicable unless failure to apply it would result in an actual duplication of benefits. This theory ignores the plain meaning of the statutory language.

The most basic rule of statutory construction is that judicial interpretation of a statute is impermissible where the Legislature makes its intent known in the clear, explicit, and unambiguous language of the statute. In such a case the statute is to be applied as written.

"If the language employed in a statute is plain, certain and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices and no interpretation is necessary." Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 189 N.W. 221 (1922).

"It is a cardinal rule that the legislature must be held to intend the meaning which it plainly expressed, and in such cases there is no room for construction, or attempted interpretation to vary such meaning." MacQueen v. City Comm. of Port Huron, 194 Mich. 328, 342, 160 N.W. 627 (1916).

See also Dussia v. Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971), Avon Twp. v. State Boundary Comm., 96 Mich.App. 736, 293 N.W.2d 691 (1980), Cronin v. Minster Press, 56 Mich.App. 471, 224 N.W.2d 336 (1974).

In the present case, the terms of § 3109(1) are clear and unambiguous. When this appeal was argued orally before this Court, counsel for plaintiffs-appellees acknowledged that there is no ambiguity in the language used by the Legislature and that the meaning of that language is clear. The law grants to the no-fault insurer the right to subtract benefits which are "required to be provided" (emphasis supplied) under state or Federal law from PIP benefits otherwise payable. Under Michigan law, workers' disability benefits are required to be paid to these plaintiffs.

Had the Legislature foreseen and carefully considered the facts presented to us in this appeal, it may have provided for a result other than that mandated by the precise language of the statute. Application of the statute here leads to consequences which are tragically unfortunate for the plaintiffs because their employer failed to provide required workers' disability benefits. But the constitution gives us no power to amend legislative enactments. If the statute is unfair, or unreasonable, or unwise, the remedy lies with the Legislature. We have no alternative but to apply the statute as the Legislature wrote it. ¹

We conclude that the trial court erred in its disposition of this case. Defendant should be allowed to subtract from no-fault benefits otherwise payable an amount equal to workers' compensation benefits required to be provided under Michigan law.

Reversed.

T. M. BURNS, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

Respectfully, I dissent.

In Mays v. Ins. Co. of North America, 407 Mich. 165, 284 N.W.2d 256 (1979), the Supreme Court addressed an issue somewhat similar to that at bar. In that case, the defendant insurance company argued that it was entitled to offset against its liability to the plaintiff under a disability insurance policy those benefits to which the plaintiff theoretically was entitled but which had not been paid to him under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The insurance policy provision in question stated:

"The Weekly Benefit Amount shall be reduced by the weekly pro-rata portion of any benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the primary disability monthly benefit payable under the Federal Social Security Act regardless of actual receipt of...