Perez v. State

Decision Date04 October 1976
Docket NumberNo. CR--76--52,CR--76--52
Citation541 S.W.2d 915,260 Ark. 438
PartiesTony PEREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Laster & Lane, Little Rock, for appellant.

Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by Gary Isbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

FOGLEMAN, Justice.

Appellant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver. For reversal he challenges the validity of a search of an automobile which was being driven by him. About 100 kilograms of marijuana were found in its trunk. The trial judge, holding that the search was valid as a 'consent search,' denied motions to suppress this evidence and to quash the information, both of which were based upon the asserted invalidity of the search. We affirm without reaching the question of the validity of the consent, because we find that the search without a warrant and not incident to arrest was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

At approximately 7:55 p.m. on April 28, 1975, appellant was driving east on Interstate Highway 40 near Lonoke, when he was stopped by Arkansas State Police Trooper Imboden, who was observing traffic along the highway. Imboden testified substantially as follows:

I was sitting approximately two miles west of Lonoke, eastbound, when I noticed a Ford Fairlane, occupied by two persons who appeared to be very young, pass at an extremely slow rate of speed. The occupants were sitting very low in the seat and appeared to be in the 14 year age group. The vehicle was travelling at 37 miles per hour as shown by my 'radar' but slowed to at least 30 miles per hour when it passed me. The flow of traffic, which was moderate, was proceeding at 55 to 60 miles per hour, at the least. It seemed to me that the vehicle, which bore California license plates, was blocking traffic and creating a hazard. The car was 'sitting down in the back and reared up in the front.' It is a part of my duties to see that traffic is flowing smoothly. I pulled out and 'pulled them over.' I stopped the car for several reasons. The first was because of speed. I stop every car driving at 37 miles per hour in moderate or heavier traffic. I stop vehicles driven by persons sitting low in the seat because I suspect they might be too young to drive. I stop vehicles driving at 37 miles per hour because I suspect drunkenness. I wanted to find out why a person driving all the way from California was going so slow. When I started after them, I suspected it was a stolen car. I got out of the vehicle and directed the driver to come to me at the back of his car. I asked for his driver's license. It was a Texas license. He appeared to be intoxicated, and I suspected alcohol, but I couldn't smell anything. He wasn't coherent and just didn't act right to me. I asked for proof of ownership of the automobile and he produced a registration in someone else's name. Perez, the driver, said the car belonged to a relative or friend. I went to the right front of the car to talk to the passenger, who turned out to be a girl. I asked her who she was and where she was going. She would not respond or look at me at first, but finally after I asked several times, she said that she was going to Tennessee or somewhere, she did not know for sure, and said she was just riding with Perez. When I was at the right front of the car, I noticed a spare tire, a suitcase or two, and some clothes in the back seat. I had been informed through intelligence meetings of the Arkansas State Police that Mexican- Americans that had equipment of this nature in the back seat were possibly carrying illegal contraband or marijuana. I was told through written information and also through contract with CID officers to be on the lookout for Mexican-Americans in a variety of cars from Texas and California carrying spare tires and clothes in the front, with the car sitting down. Except for the information from the State Police, all I had was a hunch or belief about this particular individual. I asked Mr. Perez what he had in the trunk, because it looked suspicious and I wanted to see what his reaction would be. He said he had some clothes. I asked if he minded if I saw what was in the trunk and he did not say anything. I said, 'You don't have to, but I would like to see what is in the trunk.' Without any further response he went and put the keys in the trunk and opened it. It was difficult for Perez to understand what I was saying but I felt that this was due to his intoxication and not to a language problem.

Perez denied that he was intoxicated. He testified he had smoked a marijuana cigarette about three hours earlier and had taken 'speed' about eight hours earlier. He stated that he opened the trunk of his vehicle because of the officer's menacing appearance, demeanor and gestures. He denied that Imboden told him he had a right not to open the trunk. He said that the trooper told him that he had been stopped because the car had 'highjacker' shock absorbers. Perez stated that he was driving at a speed of 48 to 50 miles per hour. The testimony of the passenger tended to corroborate that of Perez as to the officer's actions and statements and as to the speed of the vehicle.

It is the duty of the State Police to patrol the highways and to enforce the laws of the state relating to motor vehicles and the use of the highways. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 42--407 (Repl.1964). Therefore, the original intrusion upon Perez' freedom of movement was justified as a proper investigatory stop, either to determine the reason for the subject vehicle's slow speed, which violated Ark.Stat.Ann. § 75--604 (Supp.1975) or to determine if the driver was of legal age to operate a vehicle. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 75--309 (Supp.1975). See Adams v. Williams 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In either event, it was proper for the officer to demand that Perez exhibit his driver's license. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 75--323 (Repl.1957).

When Officer Imboden actually confronted him, the defendant manifested symptoms of intoxication and displayed a driver's license from one state and a registration certificate from another, issued to an entirely different person. In addition, the clues to which Imboden had been alerted by the CID and the State Police were manifested in 'plain view.' Assuming the officer had no more than a suspicion before he stopped Perez, either Perez' apparent intoxication coupled with evidence that the vehicle may have been stolen or the 'plain view' evidence that the vehicle contained contraband justified a thorough search.

It is well established that warrantless searches of automobiles that are constantly movable may be reasonable when, under the same circumstances, a search of a home, store or other fixed piece of property would not be. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). An important consideration in contrasting automobile searches with other types is that the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will, of necessity, be substantially greater than such contacts in a home or office; therefore the citizen's expectation of privacy in his auto is not the same as in his home. Also, 'community caretaking functions' will more likely bring police officers in plain view of evidence of crimes or contraband in a car than in a home or office. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).

Whenever a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that contraband is being unlawfully transported in a vehicle then the vehicle may be the object of a warrantless search. Gordon v. State, 259 Ark. 134, 529 S.W.2d 330; Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925). Determination of the soundness of his concluding that probable cause for the search existed is made in the light of the particular situation, with account taken of all the circumstances. Gordon v. State, supra; Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). See also, Adams v. Williams, supra; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Even though a stop for a traffic violation may not justify a vehicle search, circumstances surrounding the stopping together with facts becoming apparent to the officer after the stop has been made may afford probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. Gordon v. State, supra. In such cases, given exigent circumstances, the right to search and the validity of the consequent seizure depend on the reasonableness of the cause the seizing officer has for believing that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. Cox v. State, 254 Ark. 1, 491 S.W.2d 802, cert. den. 414 U.S. 923, 94 S.Ct. 230, 38 L.Ed.2d 157; Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122, cert. den.393 U.S. 1063, 89 S.Ct. 714, 21 L.Ed.2d 705.

Given probable cause, the search here was valid if it was not reasonably practical to obtain a search warrant. Tygart v. State, 248 Ark. 125, 451 S.W.2d 225, cert. den. 400 U.S. 807, 91 S.Ct. 50, 27 L.Ed.2d 36. See also, Cott v. State, 249 Ark. 967, 463 S.W.2d 404; Maltos-Roque v. U.S., 381 F.2d 130 (5 Cir., 1967). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hamphire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

As pointed out in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the circumstances furnishing probable cause to search a particular automobile for particular articles are most often unforeseeable, so that, if an effective search is to be made, it must often be made immediately and without a warrant or the car must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant. Accordingly, the court held in Chambers that, for constitutional purposes, given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Since Imboden was...

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