Perez v. U.S. Steel Corp.

Citation426 N.E.2d 29
Decision Date28 September 1981
Docket NumberNo. 981S264,981S264
PartiesBenedicto PEREZ, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant below).
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

J. B. Smith, Andrew J. Fetsch, Beckman, Kelly & Smith, Hammond, for appellant.

Douglas F. Stevenson, Robert K. Bush, Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

This cause is before us on the petition to transfer of Benedicto Perez, wherein he seeks review of the Court of Appeals' opinion found at Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1981) Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 864 (Staton, J., dissenting). We hereby grant transfer, vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand the cause to the Industrial Board with instructions to make specific findings of fact.

Benedicto Perez sustained a work-related injury while employed at United States Steel Corporation in 1970. His claim for Workmen's Compensation culminated in the Industrial Board's decision that Perez had suffered a twenty per cent permanent partial impairment. Perez appealed, challenging the Board's failure to find he was permanently totally disabled. The Court of Appeals held that the Board's findings of fact with respect to Perez's claim of permanent total disability were inadequate to permit an informed and intelligent review and remanded the cause with instructions for the Board to enter its specific findings of basic fact. Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 242, 359 N.E.2d 925. The Court of Appeals also directed that, in view of the definition of "permanent total disability" adopted in its opinion, as well as the then-recent decision in Covarubias v. Decatur Casting, (1976) 171 Ind.App. 533, 358 N.E.2d 174, the Board should permit the parties to present additional evidence regarding Perez's claim.

On remand, additional evidence was presented. The Industrial Board again concluded Perez had not sustained a permanent total disability. In the portion of its order entitled "Findings," the Board included only the following summarily-stated evaluation of the evidence:

"That plaintiff is not permanently totally disabled within the definition set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals."

As the Court of Appeals noted, this "finding" is merely the statement of the Board's finding of ultimate fact that Perez was not permanently totally disabled. It does not reveal the factual basis for the Board's ultimate determination of Perez's claim, which is the quintessential purpose of the requirement that administrative agencies enter specific findings of fact as part of their orders. Hawley v. South Bend Dept. of Redevelopment, (1978) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 333; Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573, 283 N.E.2d 371. Without question, this "finding," standing alone, would have warranted the Court of Appeals to again remand the cause for more specific findings of basic fact. Id.

The Industrial Board, however, also had included the following statements in that portion of its order entitled "Summary of Evidence":

"In the Board's experience, the medical findings in the evidence in this case, from both Plaintiff's and Defendant's physicians, show that Plaintiff is capable of pursuing many normal kinds of occupations. He has a permanent partial impairment, but not a permanent total disability."

The Court of Appeals held these statements were "in reality" the Board's findings of fact; inasmuch as the purpose for which findings of fact are required was deemed satisfied, the majority concluded the location of the statement within the order was a defect in form which did not warrant reversal. Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra, 416 N.E.2d at 866. Judge Staton dissented on the basis that the statements did not satisfy the substantive purposes of the fact-finding requirement. Id. We embrace the latter view.

In its disposition of Perez's first appeal, the Court of Appeals, as the rule to be employed by the Industrial Board on remand, expressly adopted Dean Small's definition of "permanent total disability" and the proof necessary to establish the existence of that condition under Ind.Code § 22-3-3-10(b)(3) (Burns 1974). Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra, 172 Ind.App. at 245-6, 359 N.E.2d at 927-8, quoting Small, Workmen's Compensation Law of Indiana § 9.4 p. 244 (1950). To establish a "permanent total disability," the workman is required to prove he or she "cannot carry on reasonable types of employment." Id. The "reasonableness" of the workman's opportunities are to be assessed "by his physical and mental fitness for them and by their availability." Id.

The Industrial Board's statement in its "Summary of Evidence" that the evidence revealed "Plaintiff is capable of pursuing many normal kinds of occupations" no more enlightens us than its statement that "plaintiff is not permanently totally disabled." To state the former is merely to restate the latter, for the legal definition of a term or phrase is but another statement in the abstract. Here, it provides no insight into the factual basis for the Industrial Board's finding of ultimate fact that Perez was not permanently totally disabled or, as defined, unable to carry on reasonable types of employment. Consequently, we find the statements insufficient to satisfy the substantive purposes of the requirement that administrative agencies make specific findings of fact.

Our courts have repeatedly emphasized the imperative nature of the need for specific findings of fact. See, e. g., Talas v. Correct Piping Company, Inc., (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 845; Hawley v. South Bend Dept. of Redevelopment, supra; Kunz v. Waterman, supra; Uhlir v. Ritz, (1970) 255 Ind. 342, 264 N.E.2d 312; Carlton v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, (1969) 252 Ind. 56, 245 N.E.2d 337; Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Owens, (1980) Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 443; Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Savage, (1979) Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 203; Yunker v. Porter County Sheriff's Merit Bd., (1978) Ind.App., 382 N.E.2d 977; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324. Our insistence on compliance with the requirement has not been predicated on esoteric legal technicalities or the rote imposition of statutory provisions. Ind.Code § 22-3-4-7 (Burns 1974); Ind.Code § 4-22-1-10 (Burns 1974).

Rather, as the General Assembly undoubtedly recognized in establishing the fact-finding requirement, specific findings of fact are essential to an effective system of administrative law. The significance of the requirement was extensively analyzed by Professor Kenneth Davis in his voluminous treatment of administrative law:

"The practical reasons for requiring administrative findings are so powerful that the requirement has been imposed with remarkable uniformity by virtually all federal and state courts, irrespective of a statutory requirement. The reasons have to do with facilitating judicial review, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearings and judicial review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdiction." Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05 p. 444 (1958).

These various reasons for the rule echo the thoughts of the learned Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter (see, United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., (1935) 294 U.S. 499, 510-11, 55 S.Ct. 462, 467, 79 L.Ed. 1023, 1032, and City of Yonkers v. United States, (1944) 320 U.S. 685, 694-95, 64 S.Ct. 327, 332, 88 L.Ed. 400, 406 (dissenting opinion) respectively), as well as the numerous decisions of the courts of this jurisdiction cited herein.

No better example of the need for specific findings of fact exists than the case at bar. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the findings of fact, Perez also argued on appeal that the evidence did not support the finding of ultimate fact reached by the Board that he was not permanently totally disabled. The Court of Appeals, without findings to guide its review, summarily disposed of Perez's claim regarding the evidence. Without any evidentiary analysis, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Since the record of the evidence does support a determination by the board that Perez was not permanently totally disabled because he was capable of pursuing many normal kinds of occupations, the findings are not contrary to law and the decision is to be sustained." Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, supra, 416 N.E.2d at 866.

In short, no specific reasons or evidentiary analyses for the ultimate finding that Perez is not permanently totally disabled have ever been stated.

We believe that both claimant and employer have a legal right to know the evidentiary bases upon which the ultimate finding rests. Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise, supra, at 448. 1 That responsibility initially lies with the administrative agency, who for that reason must enter specific findings of basic fact to support its finding of ultimate fact and conclusion of law. Parties will thereby be enabled to formulate intelligent and specific arguments on review. In turn, the reviewing court can expeditiously and effectively review the agency's determination; the integrity of that decision will be maintained by judicial review which is limited to these findings. Hawley v. South Bend Dept. of...

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