Perez v. Wells Fargo & Co.
| Decision Date | 24 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. C 14-0989 PJH,C 14-0989 PJH |
| Parties | MONIQUE PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO AND CO., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint ("SAC") came on for hearing before this court on March 18, 2015. Plaintiffs appeared by their counsel Rhonda Wills and Jose Moises Cedillos, and defendants appeared by their counsel Richard Alfred and Timothy Watson. Having read the parties papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS the motion as follows.
This is a wage-and-hour case filed as a proposed class and collective action, against defendants Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., WFC Holdings Corporation, Wachovia Corporation, and Wachovia Bank, N.A. (referred to collectively as "Wells Fargo" or "defendants"). Plaintiffs assert claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA"), the California Labor Code, California Business & Professions Code § 17200, California common law, and New York law.
The original complaint was filed on March 3, 2014, and the first amended complaint ("FAC") was filed on March 28, 2014. Defendants filed an answer on April 28, 2014. On May 15, 2014, the parties filed a stipulated request to continue the date for the initial case management conference ("CMC"), from June 5, 2014, to July 24, 2014. The court approved the request on May 16, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally certify a nationwide FLSA collective action, noticing the hearing for July 30, 2014. On June 26, 2014, the court issued an order staying the briefing on the motion pending the initial CMC. At the CMC, plaintiffs' counsel indicated that plaintiffs intended on filing an amended complaint. Accordingly, the court terminated the certification motion, and ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the proposed amended complaint.
The court also set a briefing schedule for a renewed certification motion. Plaintiffs filed the motion as directed on August 1, 2014. However, they did not file a second amended complaint. On October 27, 2014, before its opposition to the certification motion was due, Wells Fargo filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first and second causes of action (the two FLSA claims). On December 11, 2014, the court issued an order granting the motion, and dismissing the FLSA causes of action, with leave to amend.
Plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint ("SAC") on January 9, 2014, eliminating two named plaintiffs and adding three. Of the fourteen current named plaintiffs, five are residents of California who allegedly worked for Wells Fargo in California; five are residents of New York who allegedly worked for Wells Fargo in New York; one is a resident of New Jersey who allegedly worked for Wells Fargo in New Jersey and in New York; and the remaining three are residents of, respectively, Missouri, Florida, and Texas, each of whom allegedly worked for Wells Fargo in his/her state of residence.
The SAC alleges two causes of action under the FLSA. In the first cause of action, Monique Perez, Procelynne Hawthorne, Thaxton V. Rowe, Jr., Corry A. Williams, Karla P. Salazar, John Sorocenski, Sona K. Anand, Jason M. Otto, Anthony Sosa, and AnthonyAustin ("the FLSA plaintiffs"), see SAC ¶ 23, assert individual FLSA claims for "off-the-clock" violations. SAC ¶ 237. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo failed to pay overtime compensation and failed to maintain accurate employee records. SAC ¶¶ 244-245.
Otto is allegedly "aware of other employees who have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of Wells Fargo that is in violation of the FLSA" (failure to pay overtime for breaks of less than 20 minutes in weeks in which the employee worked more than 40 hours). SAC ¶¶ 252, 254. He asserts that Lygia Posey, a teller in Florida, recorded unpaid breaks of less than 20 minutes on several occasions in 2011, in weeks in which she worked more than 40 hours, but received no overtime. He makes similar allegations as to Lidilia Pastora, a teller in Florida, and George Vangelakos, a financial specialist/ personal banker in New York and New Jersey. See SAC ¶ 254. However, none of these three employees is named as a plaintiff in this lawsuit, and none has filed a notice of consent to join the FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
On January 26, 2015, Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the SAC, or in the alternative, to strike the collective action allegations in the SAC. On March 2, 2015, the court administratively terminated the pending FLSA certification motion, stating that plaintiffs could (potentially) refile the motion once the pleadings are settled. On March 18, 2015, the court heard argument in the present motion to dismiss the SAC.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint include a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, although the court can also consider a document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the claims asserted in the complaint, and no party questions the authenticity of the document. See Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007).
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); see also In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
The allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[,]" and a motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558-59 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - butit has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679. Where dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Thus, federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction. See Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992). The court is under a continuing duty to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction. Id.; see also Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003); Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computers Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996).
Standing is a jurisdictional limitation. It is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is not subject to waiver, and must be considered by the court even if the parties fail to raise it. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995). The burden is on the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his or her favor to "clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." Id. at 743. To establish a within the meaning of Article III, a plaintiff must, at an "irreducible minimum," show an "injury in fact" which is concrete and not conjectural, a causal connection between the injury and defendant's conduct or omissions, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,...
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