Perket v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

• Decision Date: 08 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1574,89-1574
• Citation: 905 F.2d 129
• Parties: , 30 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 155, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15502A Curtis J. PERKET, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 129

905 F.2d 129

58 USLW 2745, 30 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 155,

Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15502A

Curtis J. PERKET, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-1574.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 2, 1990.

Decided June 8, 1990.

Richard J. Jason, Marquette, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee.

Donna Morros Weinstein, Chief Counsel, Denise S. Spencer, Richard A. Urbin (argued), Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of the General Counsel, Region V, Chicago, Ill., Michael L. Shiparski, Asst. U.S. Atty., Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendant-appellant.

Before JONES and MILBURN, Circuit Judges, and RUBIN, District Judge. ^*

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services ("the Secretary") appeals the district court's award of attorney fees to disability insurance claimant Curtis J. Perket under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982). We affirm.

I.

On December 21, 1982, the Secretary notified Perket that based on current medical evidence he was no longer eligible to receive the disability insurance benefits which he had been receiving since December 7, 1973. Perket appealed this determination to Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") John Roger Corcoran, and on September 8, 1983, ALJ Corcoran concluded that Perket's disability had ceased as of December 1982. Perket was denied review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. On January 5, 1984, Perket filed the current action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Judge Douglas Hillman presiding, seeking judicial review of the Secretary's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) (1982).

Perket's original December 7, 1973 disability determination was based on diagnoses of organic brain syndrome, polyarticular gout, alcoholism and polyneuropathy. J.App. at 74. In his September 8, 1983 termination decision, ALJ Corcoran did not find that Perket's medical condition had improved from the time of the original determination of disability. Id. at 9-14. At the time of the ALJ's decision, the Secretary had promulgated regulations which interpreted the Social Security Act "as not requiring there to be medical improvement in the claimant's disability before termination." Trujillo v. Heckler, 569 F.Supp. 631, 632 (D.Colo.1983). Furthermore, congressional inaction regarding the appropriate standard for termination of benefits had lateralled to the courts the question of whether a showing of medical improvement was required. Id. at 634.

However, in Haynes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 284, 288 (6th Cir.1984), this court held that to terminate disability benefits the Secretary must present evidence that the claimant's disability has improved since the original determination of disability. In so holding, we created a "presumption of continuing disability" in termination cases. Id. In light of Haynes, decided after the filing of his complaint, Perket moved for summary judgment against the Secretary. The Secretary responded with a cross-motion which challenged Haynes. It acknowledged that "the Court of Appeals for this circuit has adopted a medical improvement standard and that this Court is bound to apply [Haynes ]," but it nevertheless contested Perket's summary judgment motion on the ground that no medical improvement standard was applicable to termination cases. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief for Summary Judgment at 4. Before the district court reached the merits of these motions, on October 9, 1984, Congress passed the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 ("DBRA"), Pub.L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984). DBRA mandated the remand to the Secretary of disability termination cases pending as of September 19, 1984 for reevaluation under a newly promulgated medical improvement standard. Pub.L. No. 98-460, Secs. 2(a) and 2(d)(2)(C), 98 Stat. 1794, 1797-98. ¹ After reevaluation pursuant to DBRA, on January 23, 1987, the Secretary notified Perket that it had determined that he was still disabled and reinstated his benefits.

On February 20, 1987, Perket filed a motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A). After briefing and oral argument on Perket's fee petition, the district court granted Perket $1,793.75 in attorney fees in a February 16, 1989 opinion. Although the passage of DBRA and the ultimate restoration of Perket's disability benefits on remand to the Secretary obviated a decision on the merits of Perket's summary judgment motion, the Secretary's non-acquiescence to this court's holding in Haynes figured critically in the district court's award of attorney fees to Perket. The district court first determined that Perket was a prevailing party within the meaning of the EAJA because the Secretary actually granted him benefits after remand. See Perket v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Case No. M84-0002CA, February 16, 1988 at 5. The court premised this conclusion on two alternate theories. First, it concluded that Perket's lawsuit could be deemed a "catalyst" for the remand and restoration of benefits under DBRA because "the filing of a lawsuit was a prerequisite to SSDBRA remand." Id. at 6-7. Alternatively, Judge Hillman ruled that Perket may be deemed a prevailing party because the restoration of his disability benefits was inevitable in light of this circuit's holding in Haynes.

After concluding that Perket was a prevailing party under the EAJA, the district court next addressed whether the Secretary's position was substantially justified. Again noting that Haynes was controlling at the time of Perket's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the Secretary's attempt to re-traverse matters already decided in Haynes made its opposition to Perket's motion unjustifiable. Id. at 9-10. Accordingly, the district court granted Perket's petition for attorney fees.

II.

The EAJA provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A). Thus, in order to recover attorney fees under the EAJA, three conditions must be met: 1) the plaintiff must be a prevailing party; 2) the government's opposition must be without substantial justification; and 3) no special circumstances warranting denial of fees may exist. Plaintiffs are a "prevailing party" under the EAJA " 'if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.' " Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (citations omitted). However, a party's victory need not be obtained by final adjudication of a lawsuit's merits. Rather, "it is enough that the lawsuit acted as a 'catalyst' in prompting defendants to take the desired action." Citizens Coalition for Block Grant v. City of Euclid, 717 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir.1983). In order for the government's position to be substantially justified under the EAJA, its position must be " 'justified in substance or in the main'--that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (citations omitted).

An award of attorney fees under the EAJA is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jankovich v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 867, 869 (6th Cir.1989) (per curiam). Under this standard, the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its legal conclusions are examined de novo. Id. The Secretary argues that whether Perket is a prevailing party under the EAJA is a legal question subject to de novo review. However, insofar as the district court based its prevailing party determination on a finding that Perket's lawsuit was the catalyst for the reinstatement of his disability benefits, such a finding is a factual conclusion subject to review for clear error. See Citizens Coalition for Block Grant, 717 F.2d at 967 (district court's judgment regarding "catalytic effect" of organization's efforts in forcing settlement agreement reviewed for clear error).

A.

The Secretary contends on appeal that the district court erred in finding that Perket was a prevailing party under the EAJA. The Secretary argues that Perket's restoration of benefits resulted from DBRA's requirement that all disability termination cases pending as of September 19, 1984 be remanded for redetermination under the statutorily prescribed medical improvement standard. It also maintains that because DBRA modified the criteria for disability determinations based on mental impairments, Perket's restoration of benefits was due at least in part to this changed criteria. ² According to the Secretary, because passage of DBRA was the proximate cause of Perket's restoration of benefits, and because the district court never reached the merits of Perket's claim, Perket's lawsuit cannot be considered a "catalyst" for the reinstatement of his benefits. In arguing that Perket is not a prevailing party, the Secretary relies on cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits which hold that when a plaintiff's disability benefits are restored pursuant to remand and reevaluation under DBRA, the plaintiff is not a prevailing party under the EAJA because his suit was not the catalyst for reinstatement of his benefits. E.g., Truax v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir.1988); Huett v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.1989); Hendricks v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 1255, 1258 (7th Cir.1988); Shepard v....