Perkins v. American Electric Power Fuel Supply

• Citation: 246 F.3d 593
• Decision Date: 29 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-4500,99-4500
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2001) James W. Perkins, Plaintiff-Appellant, Judith Lynn Perkins, Plaintiff, v. American Electric Power Fuel Supply, Inc.; Indiana Michigan Power Company, Inc., River Transportation Division, Defendants-Appellees. Argued:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 593

246 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2001)

James W. Perkins, Plaintiff-Appellant, Judith Lynn Perkins, Plaintiff, v. American Electric Power Fuel Supply, Inc.; Indiana Michigan Power Company, Inc., River Transportation Division, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-4500

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Argued: November 29, 2000

Decided and Filed: April 6, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 98-00064, Sandra S. Beckwith, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] James B. Helmer, Jr., HELMER, MARTINS & MORGAN, Cincinnati, Ohio, Meredith Lynn Lawrence, LAWRENCE & SCHLETKER, Warsaw, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Todd M. Powers, SCHROEDER, MAUNDRELL, BARBIERE & POWERS, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: NELSON, SILER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NELSON, J., joined. SILER, J. (p. __), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, James Perkins, appeals from the district court's order entering judgment in favor of Defendants, American Electric Power Fuel Supply, Inc. ("AEP") and Indiana Michigan Power Company, Inc., River Transportation Division, ¹ after a bench trial on Plaintiff's claims for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. Plaintiff also appeals the district court's order denying Plaintiff's pre-trial motion to continue the trial date, extend discovery, and amend his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part the district court's order entering judgment against Plaintiff and REMAND; however, weAFFIRM the district court's order denying Plaintiff's pretrial motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked for Defendant AEP from 1980 until the date of his accident. Plaintiff worked as a deckhand from 1980 to 1988 on commercial river vessels. In 1988, he was promoted to second mate, the position he held until his injury which is the subject of this litigation. Defendant AEP is a river transportation company, transporting bulk commodities, primarily coal, on the Ohio River and its tributaries. Defendants were the operators of the M/V C.J. Bryan and barge AEP-508.

Plaintiff's duties as second mate included seeing that wires, ratchets and rigging were properly placed on the tow, in accordance with the captain's orders, and inspected prior to use. Plaintiff was injured on December 28, 1997 when he fell from barge AEP-508 to the deck of the M/V C.J. Bryan, a distance of about eight or nine feet. When Plaintiff fell, he was attempting to "lay" a "rock and roll" or "jockey" wire from an outside barge to the M/V C.J. Bryan. Although Plaintiff had laid dozens of wires on inside barges before, he had never performed this specific task. Plaintiff was attempting to lay the wire by tightening it using a stationary rachet located on the port stern of barge AEP-508, cranking the ratchet outboard with a cheater pipe slipped over the ratchet handle for added leverage. Plaintiff had gotten the wire substantially tight when the "dog"² of the ratchet failed to catch properly, causing the tension on the cheater pipe to give way. Then, Plaintiff was propelled forward, lost his balance and fell over the edge of the barge onto the deck of the M/V C.J. Bryan. The evidence at trial revealed that Plaintiff was straddling the ratchet while attempting to lay the wire.

Plaintiff sustained extensive injuries from the fall including permanent disabling injuries. Plaintiff suffers from chronic pain and permanent physical limitations. He has had five surgeries; his right knee is permanently fused; his right leg stands a half inch off the ground; and his left ankle is fitted with a steel plate and may require fusion or even amputation.

Plaintiff and his wife, Judith Perkins, filed suit against Defendants for his injuries on January 21, 1998. The complaint alleged that Defendants were liable for negligence under the Jones Act and for the unseaworthiness of the M/V C.J. Bryanand/or the AEP-508 barge under general admiralty law because the ratchet Plaintiff used was defective and was the cause of his injuries, and Defendants failed to take adequate safety precautions and provide training for Plaintiff³.

Prior to trial, on July 6, 1999, Plaintiff filed a motion to continue the trial, amend his complaint, and extend discovery. The district court denied the motion on August 17, 1999 and the matter went to trial on September 20, 1999.

After a three-day bench trial, the district court found that Defendants were not negligent and that the M/V C.J. Bryan and AEP-508 barge were seaworthy. Moreover, although not necessary to its decision, the district court concluded, without explanation, that Plaintiff was negligent in straddling the ratchet in violation of AEP policy and that his negligence was likely the sole proximate cause of his injuries. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I.

We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. See Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1173 (6th Cir. 1999). The factual findings of the district court following a bench trial are reviewed for clear error. See id. In our review of the district court's factual findings, this Court gives due regard to the district court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Adams County Reg'l Water Dist. v. Vill. of Manchester, Ohio, 226 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 2000). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "'when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

This action arises under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general admiralty law. Plaintiff, Defendants' employee and a seaman, ⁴ claims that Defendants were negligent and Defendants' vessels, the M/V C.J. Bryan and AEP-508, were unseaworthy because the equipment appurtenant thereto, namely the ratchet, malfunctioned under proper and intended use and Defendants failed to provide adequate safety measures and training for Plaintiff.

Plaintiff contends on appeal that the district court erred in its factual findings and application of the law. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the district court erred in finding that the ratchet was not defective, that Plaintiff had received adequate training, that Defendants were not negligent in failing to take certain safety precautions to prevent Plaintiff's injury, and that the M/V C.J. Bryan and AEP-508 barge were not unseaworthy. Plaintiff also claims that the district court disregarded Plaintiff's status as a ward of the court and erred in its application of the proof of negligence required under the Jones Act and the standard of liability under the seaworthiness doctrine. And although not necessary to the district court's decision, Plaintiff also challenges the district court's finding that Plaintiff was negligent in straddling the ratchet and that Plaintiff's negligence was likely the sole cause of his injuries. We hold that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff was not entitled to recover either on the Jones Act claim or the unseaworthiness claim.

A.

It is a well-settled principle of law that seamen are "emphatically the wards of the admiralty." Chrandis, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1995) (citation and quotation omitted); accord Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939); Davis v. Am. Commercial Lines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1006, 1007 (6th Cir. 1987).

The paternal regard of the Courts and Congress for seamen has, for the most part, grown out of the peculiar conditions of their employment. These conditions, by their very nature rigorous and subjecting the seaman to unusually severe discipline for extended periods of time, are quite unlike the conditions which attend land labor, and have resulted in extraordinary remedies being made available to those who accept this calling.

Paul v. United States, 205 F.2d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 1953). "It is for this reason that remedial legislation [enacted] for the benefit and protection of seamen has been liberally construed to attain that end." Socony-Vaccum, 305 U.S. at 431; accord Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 782 (1952).

One such remedial measure is the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688, which provides in pertinent part:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.

46 U.S.C. § 688. Under the Jones Act, seaman are afforded rights parallel to those given to railway employees under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et. seq. The FELA provides in pertinent part:

Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

45 U.S.C. § 51. Therefore, in suits under the Jones Act, the court must determine whether the evidence justifies the conclusion that the employer was negligent and...