Perkins v. City of Pocatello
| Decision Date | 05 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 10150,10150 |
| Citation | 448 P.2d 250,92 Idaho 636 |
| Parties | John D. PERKINS et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF POCATELLO, a municipal corporation of Idaho, E. A. Bogert, Norman Vaughn, Earl Pond, Rampton Barlow, Joel Anderson, Don Brennan, and Fred Snyder, City Commissioners, City of Pocatello, and W. D. Webb, City Manager, City of Pocatello, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Gerald W. Olson, Pocatello, for appellants.
Baum, Peterson & Kugler, Pocatello, for respondents.
The plaintiffs-respondents, policemen of the City of Pocatello, instituted this action against the City, its Council and Manager, defendants-appellants, seeking an order requiring that additional funds be paid into the City's Policemen's Retirement Fund. Following answer by the appellants, both parties moved for a summary judgment on the basis of pleadings and affidavits submitted by each of the parties. An 'Order on Summary Judgment' was entered for the respondent policemen, and this appeal was taken by the City.
In 1947 the legislature enacted a law entitled 'Policemen's Retirement Fund' authorizing cities and towns to come within its provisions. (S.L.1947, Ch. 101, I.C. Title 50, Ch. 21). In 1967 the Act was revised and recodified as I.C. Title 50, Ch. 15. (S.L.1967, Ch. 429, §§ 253-276). The Act authorized cities and towns to establish a policement's retirement fund, financed by a property tax not exceeding one mill of assessed valuation, and by deductions not exceeding 3% from each policemen's salary. Shortly after enactment of the 1947 Act, the City of Pocatello elected to establish such a retirement fund for its policemen and since that time has annually levied one mill on all assessed valuation of the City, and has deducted 3% from each policemen's monthly salary for the purpose of financing the fund. In 1959 the legislature amended I.C. § 50-2112 (S.L.1959, Ch. 138) increasing the authorized tax levy from one to two mills, and the salary deduction from 3% to 4%. The City of Pocatello never increased the levy of taxes above one mill nor increased the deduction from salaries above three per cent.
The trial court did not enter a summary judgment pursuant to the motion of the respective parties, but entered what it denominated an 'Order on Summary Judgment.' Under this order the court held that respondent policemen had acquired vested rights to retirement benefits by virtue of their contract of employment with the City, and that these rights were being endangered by the City's refusal to increase the tax levy and salary deductions authorized by the 1959 amendment to I.C. § 50-2112. The court then ordered that an actuarial study of the fund be made and that, dependent upon the results of that study, if necessary, the City should increase its levy to the maximum of two mills and deduct 4% from the policemen's salary, and 'appropriate such further sums as may be necessary to establish a fund of sufficient size to discharge the obligations of the fund to the plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, and maintain such fund in an actuarilly sound condition.' The court then continued in its order as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That upon said study being made by some person or firm qualified to project the obligations of the fund and such study being returned to the City and the Court, that the Court will consider allowing attorney fees in this action against the defendants and reserves a right to make such other order or decree to the city as may be appropriate in the light of such actuarial study to the end that there may be established and maintained an adequate sum in the fund to discharge the obligations arising against it by plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, and the court does hereby retain jurisdiction over this matter to enter any necessary orders that may be necessary to accomplish justice between the parties, based upon the actuarial study herein ordered.' (Emphasis added.)
The Order on Summary Judgment is thus a finding by the court that the plaintiffs have acquired present vested rights and that it is necessary that an actuarial study of the fund be made. The court directed the City to have such an actuarial study of the fund made to determine the amount, if any, necessary to keep the fund in sound financial condition. The court, by its order, retained jurisdiction of the cause for further consideration and for further order. This ...
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...judgment individually if there is no just reason for delay. 54 Yale L.J. 263 (1953); 65 Harv.L.Rev. 1245 (s952); Perkins v. City of Pocatello, 92 Idaho 636, 448 P.2d 250 (1968). In the case at bar a counterclaim had been interposed by the defendant-respondent, but the district judge, pursua......
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...13-201. The district court's order is an intermediate order reviewable only upon appeal from the final judgment. Perkins v. City of Pocatello, 92 Idaho 636, 448 P.2d 250 (1968); I.C. § 13-219. As the Court stated in State ex rel. State Board of Medicine, 'The failure of the legislature to p......
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...the summary judgment provides for 'any further relief deemed just by the Court,' it is generally not appealable. Perkins v. City of Pocatello, 92 Idaho 636, 448 P.2d 250 (1968). The interlocutory character of the summary judgment appealed from in this case is indicated not only by the fact ......
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...for it to be classified as a final judgment. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 95 Idaho 108, 503 P.2d 308 (1972) (per curiam); Perkins v. City of Pocatello, 92 Idaho 636, 448 P.2d 250 (1968). However, where a judgment fully and finally settles all the issues of a case and jurisdiction is retained only to ass......