Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co., Melrose Div.
| Citation | 823 F.2d 207 |
| Decision Date | 06 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-5455,86-5455 |
| Parties | Ray and Marilyn PERKINS, Appellants, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, MELROSE DIVISION, Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Charles A. Collins, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellants.
John D. Kelly, Fargo, N.D., for appellee.
Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Ray and Marilyn Perkins appeal from an order of the district court 1 granting Clark Equipment Company's motion for summary judgment in this product liability case. The district court held that Iowa's two-year statute of limitations applies and that the Perkinses' suit was time barred. For the reasons stated below we affirm.
At all relevant times Ray and Marilyn Perkins were residents of Iowa. On January 5, 1982, while working for the City of Des Moines, Iowa, Ray Perkins fractured his right leg while attempting to mount a model 631 Bob Cat Skid-Steer Loader. Perkins' hospital bills and workers compensation disability benefits were paid by the City of Des Moines.
The loader involved in the accident was designed, manufactured, and assembled by Clark Equipment Company at its Fargo, North Dakota facility. The loader was sold and delivered to a third party in Des Moines who in turn resold it to the City of Des Moines. While in the hands of the third party, modifications were made on the loader which, Clark argues, ultimately resulted in the accident.
On December 13, 1984 the Perkinses filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. Clark moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by Iowa's two-year statute of limitations. The Perkinses resisted the motion, arguing that North Dakota's six-year statute of limitations applies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Clark, holding that under North Dakota's significant contacts approach to choice of laws questions, Iowa's statute of limitations applies. Subsequently, the Perkinses moved the district court to stay judgment and to certify the choice of laws question to the North Dakota Supreme Court. This motion was denied.
In diversity of citizenship cases the district court must apply the choice of laws rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). On appeal great deference is given to the district court's interpretation of state law. In re Wild, 795 F.2d 666, 668 (8th Cir.1986). When the state's highest court has not decided the issue we will reverse the district court's interpretation only if it is "fundamentally deficient in analysis or otherwise lacking in reasoned authority." Barber-Greene Co. v. National Bank of Minneapolis, 816 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir.1987) (quoted citations omitted).
In the present case the district court noted that the North Dakota Supreme Court has not specifically addressed how statutes of limitations should be characterized for choice of law purposes. In 1972 the North Dakota Supreme Court abandoned the lex loci delicti (law of place of injury controls) approach to choice of laws questions and adopted the most significant contacts approach. Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D.1972). The Perkinses argue that Issendorf only applies to substantive law and that the forum should always apply its own procedural laws, including the statute of limitations. The Perkinses argue that other states which have abandoned the lex loci delicti approach have retained the substance/procedure distinction where statutes of limitations are involved.
The district court held that although Issendorf did not specifically address the issue, it did offer sufficient guidance. The court in Issendorf called the substance/procedure distinction "an unsatisfactory approach to the determination of the choice law in tort cases." 194 N.W.2d at 754. The court in Issendorf adopted the most significant contacts approach because the substance/procedure distinction was easily manipulated in hard cases and because it was more just, fair, and practical to apply the law of the state most interested in the outcome. Id. From this reasoning the district court determined that the North Dakota Supreme Court would apply the most significant contacts approach to statutes of limitations. We agree.
The Perkinses argue that the reasons for abandoning the substance/procedure distinction do not apply to statutes of limitations and that the lack of clear guidance from the North Dakota Supreme Court suggests that the old rule, including the distinction, should be retained. Although these arguments deserve consideration, they fall short of showing that the district court's interpretation of North Dakota law is "fundamentally deficient in analysis or otherwise lacking in reasoned authority." 816 F.2d at 1270.
Affirming the district court's application of the most significant contacts approach to the statute of limitations does not end our inquiry, however. The Perkinses argue that the district court erred in holding that Iowa had the most significant contacts under the facts in this case. The undisputed facts show the following contacts with North Dakota: 1) Clark is licensed to do and does business in North Dakota; 2) Clark designed and assembled the loader in North Dakota; and 3) the Perkinses filed this lawsuit in North Dakota.
The Iowa contacts are: 1) the accident occurred in Iowa, in the course of Ray Perkins' employment with the City of Des Moines, Iowa; 2) the Perkinses were, at all pertinent times, Iowa residents; 3) Clark is licensed to and does business in Iowa; 4) Ray Perkins' medical care was provided in Iowa; 5) the City of Des Moines paid his medical bills pursuant to Iowa worker compensation law and paid his worker compensation benefits; 6) the loader was sold and delivered by Clark to a third party in Iowa; and 7) modifications to the loader were made in Iowa.
We agree that Iowa has the more significant contacts. The Perkinses argue that the most significant contact is that since the loader was designed and manufactured in North Dakota, North Dakota's six-year statute of limitations is evidence of a strong policy to hold North Dakota manufacturers liable for an extended period of time. However, it is not our role to second guess the district court's interpretation of state law. Absent clear error or an abuse of discretion we will not reverse the district court's interpretation of state law. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel, Inc., 767 F.2d 464, 469 (8th Cir.1985). After careful consideration we believe that the district court's interpretation was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion, but, in fact, was correct.
Finally, the Perkinses argue that this court...
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