Perkins v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 14 January 1971
• Docket Number: No. 46,46
• Citation: 400 U.S. 379,91 S.Ct. 431,27 L.Ed.2d 476
• Parties: Ernest PERKINS et al. v. L. S. MATTHEWS, Mayor of the City of Canton, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

400 U.S. 379

91 S.Ct. 431

27 L.Ed.2d 476

Ernest PERKINS et al.

v L. S. MATTHEWS, Mayor of the City of Canton, et al.

No. 46.

Argued Oct. 20, 1970.

Decided Jan. 14, 1971.

Syllabus

Appellants, voters and candidates for city offices, sought to enjoin the 1969 election in Canton, Mississippi, alleging that the 1969 requirements differed from those in effect on November 1, 1964, and at the last city election in 1965, and that the city sought to enforce the changed requirements without following the approval procedure set forth in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Section 5 precludes a State or political subdivision covered by the Act from administering 'any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,' without first submitting the change to the U.S. Attorney General or securing a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. Canton, which is covered by the Act, sought to enforce changes (1) in location of polling places, (2) in municipal boundaries through annexations of adjacent areas, thus increasing the number of eligible voters, and (3) from ward to atlarge election of aldermen. Though atlarge election of aldermen was called for by a 1962 Mississippi statute, the 1965 Canton election was by wards. A single District Judge, relying on Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1, temporarily restrained the election, but a three-judge court, after examining the challenged changes to determine whether they had 'a discriminatory purpose or effect,' dissolved the injunction and dismissed the complaint. Held:

1. The three-judge court should have considered only the issue of 'whether a particular state enactment is subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore must be submitted for approval before enforcement.' Allen, supra, at 559, 89 S.Ct. at 828. Pp. 383—387.

2. Each of the challenged changes falls within § 5 as a 'standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,' and requires prior submission. Pp. 387—395.

(a) Changed locations of polling places come within § 5 since such changes may affect one's ability to vote and may have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. Pp. 387—388.

(b) Changes in boundary lines through annexations, by determining who may vote in city elections through inclusion of certain voters and by diluting the weight of the votes of those who had the franchise prior to annexation, in view of the great potential for racial discrimination in voting, clearly come within the scope of § 5. Pp. 388—394.

(c) The change from ward to attlarge election of aldermen comes within the purview of § 5 since the procedure in fact 'in force or effect' on November 1, 1964, was the election of aldermen by wards. Pp. 394—395.

3. The appropriate remedy should be determined by the District Court after hearing the views of the parties. Pp. 395 397.

301 F.Supp. 565, reversed and remanded.

Armand Derfner, Jackson, Miss., for appellants.

Robert L. Goza, Canton, Miss., for appellee.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. V),¹ provides that whenever a State or political subdivision covered by the Act² shall enact or seek to administer 'any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 * * * no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure' if the State or subdivision has not first obtained a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure 'does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,' or unless the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision has submitted the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure to the Attorney General of the United States 'and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission.' The question in this case is whether the city of Canton, Mississippi, was precluded by § 5 from enforcing at the 1969 elections for mayor and aldermen certain changes with respect to voting not first submitted to the Attorney General or to the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Appellants, voters and candidates for mayor or alderman, sought to enjoin the 1969 elections in this action brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.³ They alleged that the requirements at the 1969 elections differed from those in effect on November 1, 1964, and at the last mayoral and aldermanic elections in 1965 because of (1) changes in locations of the polling places, (2) changes in the municipal boundaries through annexations of adjacent areas which enlarged the number of eligible voters,⁴ and (3) a change from ward to at-large election of aldermen. The city of Canton, they alleged, sought to enforce these changes without first submitting them to the Attorney General or obtaining a declaratory judgment under § 5. Pending the convening of the court of three judges required by § 5, a single judge temporarily restrained the elections, which were originally scheduled for the spring of 1969. The three-judge court, however, after hearing, dissolved the temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint. 301 F.Supp. 565 (1969). The elections were then held in October 1969 with the challenged changes in effect.⁵ We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 901, 25 L.Ed.2d 85 (1970). We reverse.

I

The three-judge court misconceived the permissible scope of its inquiry into appellants' allegations. Our decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817 (1969), handed down two months before this action was instituted, settled that question. The inquiry should have been limited to the determination whether 'a state requirement is covered by § 5, but has not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny.' Id., at 561, 89 S.Ct. at 829. Allen held explicitly '(t)he only issue is whether a particular state enactment is subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore must be submitted for approval before enforcement.' Id., at 558—559, 89 S.Ct. at 828. For emphasis, we added:

'It is important to distinguish the instant cases from those brought by a State seeking a declaratory judgment that its new voting laws do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. * * * In the latter type of cases the substantive questions necessary for approval (i.e., discriminatory purpose or effect) are litigated, while in the cases here decided the only question is whether the new legislation must be submitted for approval.' Id., at 555—556, n. 19, 89 S.Ct., at 826. (emphasis supplied).

The single judge who first acted in this case before the three-judge court was convened recognized that Allen so limited the inquiry. In his unreported oral opinion granting temporary relief, he correctly stated:

'The only questions to be decided by * * * the three judge court to be designated, (are) whether or not the State of Mississippi or any of its political subdivisions have acted in such a way as to cause or constitute a voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which changed the situation that existed as of November 1, 1964, and whether or not prior to doing so the City had filed a request for declaratory judgment with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or asked for approval of the Attorney General of the United States * * *.'

He correctly observed further that, although there was no proof that the challenged annexations which changed the city's boundaries were made for the purpose of denying anyone any voting right or any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, 'the case of Allen versus State Board of Elections held it is not the function or prerogative of this Court, even if it were now sitting as a three judge court, to determine the motive of the City in extending its boundary.' For Allen had explicity held that, as between the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and other district courts 'Congress intended to treat 'coverage' questions differently from 'substantive discrimination' questions,' 393 U.S. at 559, 89 S.Ct. at 828, and therefore: 'we do not consider whether this change has a discriminatory purpose or effect.' 393 U.S., at 570, 89 S.Ct. at 834. This is not to say that a district court limited to deciding a 'coverage' question should close its eyes to the congressional purpose in enacting § 5—to prevent the institution of changes which might have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, for Congress meant to reach 'the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations * * *' which may have that effect. 393 U.S. at 565, 89 S.Ct. at 831. What is foreclosed to such district court is what Congress expressly reserved for consideration by the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General—the determination whether a covered change does or does not have the purpose or effect 'of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.'

The single judge made the limited examination of the claims concerning boundary extensions and selection of...