Perkins v. School Bd. of Pinellas County

• Decision Date: 08 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-379-CIV-T-17B.,93-379-CIV-T-17B.
• Parties: Grace PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

902 F. Supp. 1503

Grace PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 93-379-CIV-T-17B.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

March 8, 1995.

B. Edwin Johnson, Clearwater, FL, for plaintiff.

Robert G. Walker, Jr., Law Office of Robert G. Walker, Jr., Clearwater, FL, for defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Motion filed October 31, 1994 and October 17, 1994, respectively (Dkt. Nos. 61 and 36) and Plaintiff's Objection and Memorandum of Law in Opposition thereto filed December 2, 1994 and December 6, 1994, respectively (Dkt. Nos. 67 and 71).

Plaintiff brought this action on March 5, 1993 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. charging Defendant with discrimination based upon race. She has met the procedural requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 in that she timely filed a written charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a Notice of Right to Sue. Plaintiff requested equitable relief, damages and attorneys fees, and trial by jury pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

This circuit clearly holds that summary judgment should only be entered when the moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact when all the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1983). All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-97 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting Gross v. Southern Railway Co., 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1969)). Factual disputes preclude summary judgment.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is brought pursuant to Rule 56(c) Fed. R.Civ.P., which provides in pertinent part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

A material fact is one which "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, (1986) the Supreme Court of the United States held:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(e) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. The Court also stated: "Rule 56(e) therefore requires that nonmoving party go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant on August 18, 1985 as a classroom teacher. From September of 1990 to June of 1992 Plaintiff held the position of assistant principal. Plaintiff contemporaneously maintained a diary in which she made daily entries of events of significance to her. Within a few weeks after her appointment as the only black assistant principal at Tarpon Springs Middle School, Plaintiff stated that principal Larry Goodbread began a campaign of systematic efforts to discriminate against her based upon her race. He alleged that Plaintiff could not get along with certain members of the teaching staff, although he did not document the complaints.

During her tenure, some of the teachers did object to her insistence upon compliance with the school policies. There were several teachers meetings in which discussion of Plaintiff's management style was on the agenda. Plaintiff did not attend those meetings and was not required to do so. She preferred to meet with smaller groups. Former acting assistant principal, Vincent Boruta, filed a grievance against Plaintiff for what he believed to be unprofessional treatment. That grievance was dismissed as unfounded. Plaintiff received negative treatment on her evaluation as a result of that grievance, although Mr. Boruta did not receive the same negative treatment on his evaluation.

A reduction in force plan was put into effect during Plaintiff's second year as an assistant principal which affected "temporary assistant principals" regardless of race. Temporary assistant principals were those who had less than two years of service as an assistant principal. Of the eight temporary assistant principals who were affected by the reduction in force and returned to classroom teacher status, only Plaintiff has not been restored to assistant principal status.

On June 7, 1991, Mr. Goodbread evaluated Plaintiff's administrative ability as "less than acceptable" in several areas. Plaintiff appealed the performance evaluation, but on October 4, 1991, Bill Williamson, the Area One Superintendent, upheld the evaluation after review. On January 9, 1992, Dr. J. Howard Hinesley, the Superintendent of Schools reviewed the appeal and likewise upheld the evaluation.

On January 10, 1992, Plaintiff stated that Mr. Goodbread began a second campaign of discrimination in retaliation for the appeal she had filed with his supervisors. On January 31, 1992, Plaintiff objected to Mr. Goodbread having certain sanitary supplies delivered to her, which later became the subject of ridicule.

On February 20, 1992, as a result of Plaintiff's complaints, she met with Mr. Williamson, Shelby Harvey, the principal of Osceola Middle School, and Bette Ra Ivey, the Area Three Superintendent. Plaintiff was told she was being transferred to Osceola Middle School, but was not told that transfer was disciplinary. That decision was implemented by the School Board on March 11, 1992. Mrs. Ivey later told Plaintiff that the purpose of the February 20th conference had been to discuss unsatisfactory performance.

On June 9, 1992, Plaintiff requested that she be considered for the assistant principal position at Northeast High School. On June 10, 1992, the School Board rejected her request and appointed a person with less seniority. In this regard, Plaintiff stated that the School Board failed to abide by its written reduction in force guidelines.

Plaintiff stated that prior to June 9, 1992 the NEAT (Notify, Explain, Assist, Give Time) process was not followed because she had been assured that she was succeeding as assistant principal and that there were no complaints against her. Plaintiff stated that she was not informed that her future performance at Osceola Middle School would be the "final opportunity to demonstrate proficiency as an administrator" until after she was denied the opportunity to be appointed as assistant principal at Northeast High School.

Since June 10, 1992, two white assistant principal appointments have been made which allegedly deviated from procedures for appointment of white and black assistant principals during the reduction in force process. Plaintiff stated that if Defendant had followed its guidelines for such appointments, she would have been appointed to an assistant principal position.

Plaintiff again met with Shelby Harvey who evaluated her at "less than acceptable" in several areas, which evaluation was appealed by Plaintiff on June 26, 1992. On July 14, 1992, a meeting was held with Mrs. Ivey to review the evaluation. Plaintiff presented her written response to the ratings, but Mrs. Ivey stated that Plaintiff had demonstrated a "consistent pattern of disputing evaluations" and upheld the decision.

Plaintiff stated that white assistant principals and staff have been treated differently on evaluations and resulting disciplinary actions, which disparate treatment is a result of racial discrimination by Defendant.

Despite continued interest in appointment to an assistant principal position, Plaintiff has been denied that opportunity, although the other assistant principals affected by the reduction in force program were placed back in assistant principal positions.

On August 26, 1992 Plaintiff's name was removed from the eligibility list for appointment as assistant principal by the Superintendent. Plaintiff stated that the discriminatory action was taken based upon her race and in retaliation for her appeal of the evaluations.

ANALYSIS

Defendant is an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as to Plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination. Plaintiff is an employee of Defendant.

There are various types of Title VII claims; disparate treatment, retaliation, constructive discharge, and disparate impact. A charge of retaliation is one where an employee alleges retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. A disparate treatment charge is one where an employee alleges less favorable treatment because of race, sex, etc. In a disparate treatment case a plaintiff must prove discriminatory animus. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Plaintiff alleges claims of disparate treatment and retaliation. In both cases, Plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Defendant intentionally discriminated against her.

A prima facie case of discrimination...