Perkins v. State
Decision Date | 02 November 2012 |
Docket Number | CR-08-1927 |
Parties | Roy Edward Perkins v. State of Alabama |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CC-92-478.60)
Roy Edward Perkins, a death-row inmate at Holman Penitentiary, appeals the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32,Ala. R. Crim. P., in which he attacked his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death.
In 1994, Perkins was convicted of murdering Cathy Gilliam during the course of a kidnapping in the first degree, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. The jury recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Perkins be sentenced to death. The circuit court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Perkins to death. On direct appeal, both this Court and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed Perkins's conviction and sentence of death. See Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 808 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. 2001). The Supreme Court of the United States, however, remanded the cause to the Alabama Supreme Court in light of its holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that it is unconstitutional to sentence a mentally retarded individual to death. See Perkins v. Alabama, 536 U.S. 953 (2002). On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the record did not show that Perkins met the most liberal definition of mental retardation and affirmed Perkins's death sentence. See Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002). Thereafter, the Supreme Court ofthe United States denied certiorari review. See Perkins v. Alabama, 540 U.S. 830 (2003). This Court issued the certificate of judgment on February 20, 2003.
In 2004, Perkins filed a 372-page Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court attacking his conviction and sentence of death. Perkins filed amendments to specific issues in September 2004, May 2005, August 2007, and May 2009.
The reason for the delay in this case is that Perkins filed several extraordinary petitions while his postconviction petition was pending in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. In May 2005, Perkins moved for discovery, seeking access to his Department of Youth Services ("DYS") and Department of Human Resources ("DHR") records and to DHR records related to his mother, stepfather, and sister. The circuit court denied that motion. In Ex parte Perkins, 920 So. 2d 599 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), this Court granted Perkins's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to grant him discovery of his own DYS and DHR records. In May 2006, this Court denied Perkins's second extraordinary petition requesting that this Court set aside the circuit court's order granting theState reciprocal discovery. See Ex parte Perkins, (CR-05-0148, May 31, 2006). In April 2008, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Perkins's postconviction petition and on July 30, 2009, issued an order denying relief.1 On August 17, 2009, Perkins moved the circuit court to rule on those claims not specifically addressed in its July 30 order. On September 3, 2009, the circuit court amended its original order denying Perkins's petition. Perkins appealed to this Court.
The circuit court set out the following facts in its order sentencing Perkins to death:
At trial, Perkins's counsel stipulated to the following:
Perkins appeals the circuit court's denial of a postconviction petition he filed in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court attacking his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death. According to Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., "The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief."
"Though we reviewed the claims on [Perkins's] direct appeal for plain error, the plain-error standard of review does not apply to a postconviction petition attacking a capital-murder conviction and death sentence. SeeFerguson v. State, 13 So. 3d 418, 424 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Waldrop v. State, 987 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Hall v. State, 979 So. 2d 125 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Gaddy v. State, 952 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). 'in addition, "[t]he procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed "' Brownlee v State, 666 So 2d 91, 93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). When reviewing the circuit court's rulinas on the claims raised in [Perkins'sl postconviction petition, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gaddy, 952 So. 2d at 1154."
Ray v. State, 80 So. 3d 965, 971 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
With these principles in mind, this Court turns to the claims Perkins raises in his brief to this Court.
Perkins first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a statement the victim's daughter made to a victims' services officer with the Tuscaloosa County District Attorney's Office.
At Perkins's trial, Candace Gilliam testified that on August 9, 1990, at around 4:00 p.m., she heard her mother scream. After this statement, Candace became very emotionaland started crying. Perkins's counsel and the State stipulated to the following in lieu of Candace's continued testimony:
When denying relief on this claim, the circuit court stated:
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