Perkins v. Suburban Mobility Auth. For Reg'l Transp., 357080
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM. |
Parties | DAVID CHRISTOPHER PERKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, also known as SMART, Defendant-Appellant. |
Docket Number | 357080 |
Decision Date | 01 September 2022 |
DAVID CHRISTOPHER PERKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, also known as SMART, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 357080
Court of Appeals of Michigan
September 1, 2022
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-015032-NF
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this first-party action under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for partial summary disposition.[1] For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an auto accident that took place on May 26, 2019. There is no dispute that plaintiff is entitled to recoup personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from defendant. After the accident, plaintiff assigned his right to collect PIP benefits to various providers. This appeal concerns only two of those providers: Renew Physical Therapy (Renew) and Dr. Wook Kim, M.D., PC, doing business as Farmbrook Interventional Pain &EMG (Farmbrook). Plaintiff assigned his right to collect PIP benefits to Renew on June 28, 2019, and he assigned his right to collect PIP benefits to Farmbrook on July 29, 2019.
On November 11, 2019, plaintiff filed a first-party claim for PIP benefits against defendant. In early October 2020, plaintiff entered into agreements with Renew and Farmbrook revoking the
assignments with these providers so that plaintiff could pursue payment of the bills in this lawsuit, rather than the providers filing suit on their own. Each revocation states that the provider will not pursue any independent action against defendant for the recovery of any bills related to the services provided to plaintiff.
About a month after plaintiff executed the revocations, defendant moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10). Citing the assignments of rights plaintiff had given to his various providers, defendant argued that plaintiff was barred from seeking reimbursement for the expenses he incurred from these providers. Plaintiff contested only the assignments to Farmbrook and Renew, arguing that he had revoked those assignments. Defendant countered that these revocations were invalid for want of consideration. In response, plaintiff argued that defendant lacked standing to challenge the revocations as a nonparty to those agreements.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for partial summary disposition as to all providers except Farmbrook and Renew. With respect to those providers, the trial court ruled that the revocations were valid. Further, the trial court agreed with plaintiff that defendant lacked standing to challenge the revocations. Therefore, the trial court denied in part defendant's motion for partial summary disposition. After this ruling, defendant applied for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked standing to challenge the revocations.[2]
This Court recently reaffirmed that "[w]ith respect to assignments, it is a longstanding rule that someone who is not party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge it." Newman v Real Time Resolutions, Inc, ___ Mich.App. ___, ___; ___N.W.2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 357279); slip op at 4. The Sixth Circuit has recognized an exception for when the third-party obligor makes a challenge that would render the assignment "invalid or ineffective, or void." Conlin v Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys, Inc, 714 F.3d 355, 361 (CA 6, 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).[3]
This exception protects an obligor from the possibility of paying the same debt twice. See Livonia Props Holdings, LLC v 12840-12976 Farmington Rd Holdings, LLC, 399 Fed.Appx. 97, 102 (CA 6, 2010). However, even if we were to recognize this exception and conclude that defendant has standing under it, we would nonetheless conclude that summary disposition was appropriate because the substance of defendant's challenge lacks merit.
Defendant concedes there is no risk that it would have to pay the same debt twice. That is, defendant is not at risk of having to reimburse both plaintiff and the respective providers. As noted, the revocations stated that Renew and Farmbrook would not pursue payment from defendant for the bills relating to plaintiff. Defendant also does not dispute that plaintiff's action in this case complied with the one-year back rule in MCL 500.3145 with respect to the services rendered by Renew and Farmbrook.[4] According to defendant, however, the revocations are nonetheless void because when they were executed Farmbrook and Renew were precluded by...
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