Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
| Decision Date | 21 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 46547,46547 |
| Citation | 328 N.E.2d 290,60 Ill.2d 469 |
| Parties | Adam PERMINAS, Appellant, v. MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Horwitz, Anesi, Ozmon & Associates, Ltd., Chicago (Nat P. Ozmon and Dario A. Garibaldi, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Baker & McKenzie, Chicago (Robert Kent Scott, Thomas F. Tobin, Francis D. Morrissey, and Michael K. Murtaugh, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The plaintiff, Adam Perminas, sued the defendant, Montgomery Ward & Company, to recover damages for a back injury he suffered when he fell while shopping in one of defendant's retail stores in Chicago. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $85,000. The appellate court reversed (16 Ill.App.3d 445, 306 N.E.2d 750), and we granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal.
The basis for the appellate court decision was that plaintiff had failed to establish a Prima facie case on the issue of defendant's negligence under any of the plaintiff's several theories of liability. It is undisputed that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was a business invitee on defendant's premises and that defendant owed him a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition. (Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc. (1955), 5 Ill.2d 153, 125 N.E.2d 47.) In Donoho v. O'Connell's, Inc. (1958), 13 Ill.2d 113, 148 N.E.2d 434, and Olinger v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (1961), 21 Ill.2d 469, 173 N.E.2d 443, we clarified the application of this standard to those cases in which injuries to a business invitee are caused by slipping on a foreign substance on the floor. Plaintiff contends that the appellate court improperly applied Donoho, thereby effectually abolishing the rule established in that case. Plaintiff also contends that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff under two other theories of liability: (1) A business is liable for injuries caused by accidental, negligent or intentionally harmful acts of third persons if the business fails to exercise reasonable care to discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done or fails to give adequate warning to business invitees to enable them to avoid harm; (2) A business is liable for injuries suffered by business invitees as a result of a dangerous condition created by a particular method of displaying merchandise, if the creation of the dangerous condition was reasonably foreseeable.
In light of our conclusion that the evidence supports a finding of negligence under the well-established 'ordinary care' standard, we find it unnecessary to discuss these theories at length, but several observations are appropriate before discussing the evidence. First, plaintiff's latter two theories are, in our view, encompassed within the general rule of 'ordinary care' and are nothing more than specific ways in which a business can breach its obligation to exercise ordinary care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Secondly, we note that the appellate court properly applied the Donoho doctrine. In that case, this court held that where, as here, the substance on the floor is related to defendant's business and 'the plaintiff offers some further evidence, direct or circumstantial, however slight, such as the location of the substance or the business practices of the defendant, from which it could be inferred that it was more likely that defendant or his servants, rather than a customer, dropped the substance on the premises' (13 Ill.2d at 122, 148 N.E.2d at 439), then plaintiff has established negligence without showing that defendant had knowledge or constructive notice that the item was on the floor. In this case, however, there is no evidence in the record 'from which it could be inferred that it was more likely that defendant or his servants, rather than a customer,' dropped the particular item on which plaintiff slipped.
We turn now to an analysis of the evidence which we believe sufficient to support the trial court's judgment. A detailed statement of the testimony is unnecessary since it is adequately set forth in the appellate court opinion and clearly supports findings that: (1) the plaintiff fell when he stepped on a small triangular shaped object with wheels on the bottom while walking in an aisle in defendant's store; (2) that object was probably an attachment to a floor polisher sold by defendant and displayed on low shelves in the area where plaintiff fell; and (3) the plaintiff suffered a serious back injury as the result of his fall. There was no evidence specifically indicating how this particular object got on the floor, how long it had been there or whether defendant or its servants knew of the presence of the object on the floor.
The crucial testimony was that of Anna Stecyna, who had been a clerk in the department which handled the floor-polisher attachments until May 1, 1966, when she was transferred to another department. As the result of injuries suffered in an automobile accident, she temporarily left work on May 26, 1966, and thus was unaware of actual conditions in the store on May 31, 1966, the date of plaintiff's accident. She testified that prior to May 1, 1966, while working in the department which handled the attachments, she personally observed on a number of occasions both children and adults (primarily store employees on their 'breaks') using these attachments as skateboards to skate up and down the aisles. She also stated that she had often found these attachments on the floor and had picked them up and replaced them on the low shelves where they were displayed with the floor polishers. After cross-examination, defense counsel moved to strike all her testimony because it was not 'remotely connected with the facts in this case.' Up to that time, plaintiff's counsel had made no mention of offering her testimony for a limited purpose, but in response to the motion to strike he commented that '(t)he only purpose (of the testimony) is to...
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...where the same type of substance was present on the floor creating a potentially dangerous situation. Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290; Nicholson v. St. Anne Lanes, Inc. (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 664, 91 Ill.Dec. 9, 483 N.E.2d In Perminas v. Montgomery Wa......
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...towards the invitee the occupier owed a duty of maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition. (Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 469, 471, 328 N.E.2d 290.) Thus we have a series of labels, as well as exceptions to each. It was simple justice which dictated the I......
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...will probably not create liability. Hennessey v. Hennessey , 145 Conn. 211, 140 A.2d 473 (1958). In Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Co. , 60 Ill. 2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290 (1975), the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that a store operator with notice of a dangerous condition in the store has an o......
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Motion for Summary Judgment (Slip and Fall Case)
...of foreign objects upon which an invitee may slip and fall, see, e.g., Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 60 Ill.App.2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290 (1975) and latent defects on the premises upon which a Plaintiff may be injured. Gunther v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 27 Ill.App.3d 214, 326 N.E.......
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Motion for Summary Judgment (Slip and Fall Case)
...of foreign objects upon which an invitee may slip and fall, see, e.g., Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 60 Ill.App.2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290 (1975) and latent defects on the premises upon which a Plaintiff may be injured. Gunther v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 27 Ill.App.3d 214, 326 N.E.......
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Motion for Summary Judgment (Slip and Fall Case)
...of foreign objects upon which an invitee may slip and fall, see, e.g., Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 60 Ill.App.2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290 (1975) and latent defects on the premises upon which a Plaintiff may be injured. Gunther v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 27 Ill.App.3d 214, 326 N.E.......