Permitting of Media Coverage for an Indefinite Period, In re, 88-140

• Decision Date: 31 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 88-140,88-140
• Citation: 539 A.2d 976
• Parties: 15 Media L. Rep. 1473 In re PERMITTING OF MEDIA COVERAGE FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. M.P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 976

539 A.2d 976

15 Media L. Rep. 1473

In re PERMITTING OF MEDIA COVERAGE FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.

No. 88-140 M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 31, 1988.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This matter comes before us pursuant to a recommendation of the Advisory Board to the Chief Justice relating to access by electronic media, including broadcasting, televising, and photographing, to judicial proceedings. On April 22, 1981, we adopted Provisional Order No. 15, which allowed media access to judicial proceedings on an experimental basis for a period of one year subject to guidelines that were appended to the rule and made a part thereof. Thereafter, on December 31, 1982, we amended Provisional Order No. 15 and extended the experimental period of media access through January 16, 1984. On March 23, 1984, we again amended Provisional Order No. 15 and further extended the experimental period of media access. This experimental period, as extended, expired on September 30, 1985. Since the time of expiration of the experimental period, media access to judicial proceedings has continued without the formal extension of the experimental period by order of this court. This court has sought advice and recommendation from the Advisory Board to the Chief Justice, which consists of the Chief Justice, the Associate Justices of this court, the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court, the Chief Judge of the Family Court, and the Chief Judge of the District Court. This Advisory Board is a body authorized by G.L. 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 8-15-5.

At the time of our last extension of media access to judicial proceedings, we issued an opinion entitled In re Extension of Media Coverage for a Further Experimental Period, 472 A.2d 1232 (R.I. 1984). In that opinion, we commented upon the failure of the media to make significant efforts to achieve the goal of public education as a justification for their presence in the courtroom.

"This court expresses its disappointment at the failure of the television and broadcast media to make more significant efforts to achieve the goals of public education. The only substantial educational effort of which we are aware is the complete recording by channel 10 of an appellate argument before this court with accompanying commentary by a member of the bar. We believe that in the light of the broad potential for education of the public in regard to the judicial process, the efforts of the media in this area to date may only be described as feeble.

"We are constrained to reject suggestions made by representatives of the media and other witnesses at the committee hearings that there is no obligation to educate. We begin with the recognition that the electronic media have no First Amendment right to photograph or broadcast judicial proceedings. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 569, 101 S. Ct. 802, 807, 66 L. Ed. 2d 740, 748 (1981); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1318, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570, 587 (1978). Consequently, as suggested by the Supreme Court of Florida in In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1979), the reason for allowing broadcasting and photographing of trial procedures is the potential contribution that the media can make in the area of wider public understanding and acceptance of judicial proceedings and decisions. Id. at 780. We suggest that a forty-five-second fragment of a judicial proceeding accompanied by a still or moving image scarcely contributes to such public understanding. Therefore, the presence of the electronic media with its potential for recording and broadcasting of judicial proceedings is based not upon any constitutional imperative but rather is dependent on a policy decision made by this court in the exercise of its supervisory authority. This policy decision is obviously subject to review and analysis based upon the weighing of benefits as opposed to disadvantages of such media presence." 472 A.2d at 1234.

We further stated that many trial justices have found that the presence of the media adds to their already substantial burdens in the governance of adversary proceedings, already often charged with emotion and tension. We then reiterated our prior statement that this additional burden must be balanced by some benefit in terms of increasing public understanding that can only come about through a process of education. We concluded our comments upon the need for public education by the media with certain suggestions:

"The preservation of tapes of judicial proceedings for use in educational programs, the occasional broadcasting of significant portions of judicial proceedings together with informed commentary are illustrations of opportunities that the media have by which they can contribute to public education and understanding. Disregard by the media of its obligation to contribute to public understanding and education during a further experimental period may result in the termination of media access." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1234-35.

From our review of the record of media education since March 23, 1984, we may repeat a comment which we made in a prior opinion entitled In re Extension of Media Coverage for a Further Experimental Period, 454 A.2d 246 (R.I. 1982): "Our consideration of the results of the experiment has disclosed that the public educational value of media access has, to this point, been of so limited a value as to be nearly imperceptible." Id. at 247.

In spite of the fact that we have indicated in prior opinions that failure to balance the additional burdens upon the trial justice of having media present during judicial proceedings by contributing to public education and understanding of the judicial proceedings might cause media access to be terminated, we have chosen rather to adopt an intermediate position, in accordance with the recommendation of the American Bar Association. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 11, 1982, amended Canon 3 A(7) relating to media access to read as follows:

"A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court, or recesses between sessions, except that under rules prescribed by a supervising appellate court or other appropriate authority, a judge may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording and photographing of judicial proceedings in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto consistent with the right of the parties to a fair trial and subject to express conditions, limitations, and guidelines which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice."

As a result of our observation of media access to judicial proceedings since 1981, informed by opinions expressed by the trial justices of our various courts, and in light of the Canon of Judicial Ethics most recently adopted by the American Bar Association, we shall authorize trial justices to allow media coverage under guidelines promulgated by this court but modified to reflect the discretion reposed in the trial justice.

We therefore authorize the trial justice, in his or her sole and unreviewable discretion, to determine whether the media as defined in our guidelines may have access to the courtroom during any trial or other judicial proceeding. In the event that the trial justice for any reason determines that the presence of the media may...