Perper v. Danford

Decision Date26 January 1949
Docket NumberNo. 734.,734.
Citation63 A.2d 773
PartiesPERPER et al. v. DANFORD et al.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Action by Robert M. Danford and another against Dorothy Perper and others, a partnership, trading as Hotel 2400, under the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, for double the amount of alleged overcharge of rent. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Reversed.

Marvin Willig, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

James A. Crooks, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Plaintiffs, hereafter referred to as the tenant, sued defendants, hereafter referred to as the landlord, under section 10(a) of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, 1 for double the amount of alleged overcharge of rent. From a judgment for the tenant in the sum of $1,650, plus $100 attorney's fee, the landlord has appealed.

The case was tried without testimony, the parties being in substantial agreement as to the following facts. Prior to January 1, 1941, the freeze date under the Rent Act, the tenant began to rent an apartment from a predecessor in title to the present landlord. The rent for the apartment unfurnished on January 1, 1941, was $100 per month. In 1942, with permission of the then landlord, the tenant sublet the apartment furnished at a rental of $250 per month, the amount determined by the Rent Administrator as the rent ceiling for the furnished apartment. This subletting continued until 1945 when the present landlord became owner of the building. The present landlord objected to the subletting and after some negotiations it was agreed that the landlord would consent to further subletting on the condition that the tenant pay an additional $75 per month. This arrangement was put into effect and continued for a period of eleven months. In 1946 the landlord again objected to continued subletting and the tenant made complaint to the office of the Rent Administrator. Someone in that office raised the question of the legality of the $75 monthly payments which the landlord had been collecting over and above the rent ceiling. In view of the claim by the tenant that the landlord was guilty of an overcharge and the claim by the landlord that the tenant was guilty of a violation of his tenancy by reason of the subletting, the parties came to an agreement evidenced by the following writing addressed to the landlord and signed by the tenant: ‘In consideration of your having permitted us to sublet Apartment No. 214 during the period that rent control is continued we hereby release you from and waive any claim we may have against you to the date hereof.’

Following this the tenant continued to sublet and paid monthly rent of $100, no longer paying the additional $75 per month. This arrangement continued until the latter part of 1947 when the landlord demanded possession of the apartment on the ground that a member of the partnership constituting the landlord desired possession for his own use and occupancy. The tenant refused to surrender possession, contending that this demand constituted a repudiation of the parties' written agreement. Thereafter the landlord sued for possession. The tenant contested the suit but judgment went for the landlord and no appeal was taken by the tenant.

After surrendering possession under the judgment the tenant brought the present action on the ground that the additional payments of $75 per month for the period of eleven months constituted payment of rent in excess of the maximum rent ceiling. As previously stated the tenant was awarded judgment for double the amount of the alleged overcharge plus an attorney's fee.

The landlord contends that the $75 monthly payments were not paid as rent but were paid for the right to sublet, and that therefore the landlord did not receive rent in excess of the rent ceiling. The Rent Act defines ‘rent’ as ‘the consideration, including any bonus, benefit, or gratuity, demanded or received * * * for the use or occupancy of housing accommodations or the transfer of a lease for such accommodations.' 2 Assuming the landlord's contention that the $75 payments were made strictly and entirely for the right to sublet, nevertheless we think the payments constituted rent, because the subletting was a use of the apartment and anything paid for such use constituted rent. 3

The more serious question is the effect of the writing hereinabove quoted. Both parties referred to this paper as a release. The landlord contends that it is a bar to this action. The tenant says it is no bar because the consideration for it failed. The parties are in general agreement...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Warner v. Rossignol
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • April 7, 1975
    ...parties ever thought about the matter) is frequently a question for the trier of fact, it is not always so. See, e. g., Perper v. Danford, 63 A.2d 773 (D.C.Mun.Ct.1949); cf. Wiggin v. Sanborn, 161 Me. 175, 210 A.2d 38 (1965). The undisputed format of this settlement precludes any reasonable......
  • Shapiro v. Bombardier
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • January 26, 1949
  • Stinton v. Mueller
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 5, 1982
    ...agreement a mere executory accord, and, as such, it could not constitute a bar to the enforcement of other claims. See Perper v. Danford, D.C.Mun. App., 63 A.2d 773 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(1) (1979); 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1269 (1962). The trial court was of the vi......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT