Perrone v. State

• Decision Date: 02 July 1925
• Docket Number: No. 24692.,24692.
• Citation: 148 N.E. 412,196 Ind. 384
• Parties: PERRONE v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

196 Ind. 384

148 N.E. 412

PERRONE

v.STATE.

No. 24692.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 2, 1925.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County; Earl B. Stroup, Judge.

Frank Perrone was convicted of maintaining a liquor nuisance, and appeals. Affirmed.

Rabb, Mahoney & Fansler, of Logansport, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, of Indianapolis, for the State.

MYERS, J.

On December 11, 1923, appellant, by indictment in the Cass circuit court, was charged with maintaining a nuisance by keeping a place where intoxicating liquors were sold, etc., in violation of section 20, Acts 1917, p. 25, c. 4; section 8356t, Burns' Supp. 1921. The court overruled appellant's motion to quash the indictment. Trial, finding of guilty, followed by sentence.

In this court the overruling of the motion to quash is the only error assigned. In support of this motion, appellant's only insistence is that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a public offense, for the reason that the title of the act does not embrace the provisions of section 20, supra, and hence that section contravenes article 4, § 19, of the Constitution of Indiana, citing Crabbs v. State (Ind. Sup.) 139 N. E. 180, and Powell v. State (Ind. Sup.) 139 N. E. 670. These cases are not controlling, for the reason there was no attempt by section 20, to introduce new matter as the basis for an offense, as was sought to be done by the amendment of section 4 of the 1917 act.

The precise question here urged by this appellant has been before this court in a number of cases, and in each instance the decision has been against his contension. For our last rulings upon this question see Polsinelli v. State (No. 24693, this term) 147 N. E. 918, and Alyea v. State (Ind. Sup.) 147 N. E. 144.

Let it be said that “intoxicating liquor” is the subject of the act of which section 20, supra, is a part, and that the title of such act is restricted to prohibiting the manufacture, sale, gift, advertisement, or transportation of such liquor. Still, inasmuch as the offense defined by section 20 is predicated upon the prohibited act, expressed in the title, and tends to enforce compliance with the things prohibited, it evidently must be regarded as a matter properly connected with the subject of the legislation.

For the foregoing reasons and former rulings to which we still adhere, the judgment in this case is affirmed.