Perrotti v. Solomon

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MURRAY
• Citation: Perrotti v. Solomon, 657 A.2d 1045 (R.I. 1995)
• Decision Date: 01 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-507-A,92-507-A
• Parties: Lewis A. PERROTTI v. Anthony J. SOLOMON et al. ppeal.

Page 1045

657 A.2d 1045

Lewis A. PERROTTI v. Anthony J. SOLOMON et al.

No. 92-507-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 1, 1995

William A. DiMitri, Jr., Providence, for plaintiff.

Lauren Jones, Jones Associates, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal by Lewis A. Perrotti (Perrotti) from a Superior Court order denying his petition for a permanent injunction to enjoin the defendants, Anthony J. Solomon (Solomon), the former state General Treasurer and chairman of the Retirement Board of the Employee's Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island (retirement board), and James M. Reilly (Reilly), the former acting director of the Employee's Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, from conducting a hearing to determine the propriety of his state pension benefits. ¹ Perrotti challenges the retirement board's authority to conduct a hearing relative to the propriety of his state pension. He contends that the trial justice's denial of his request for injunctive relief violates his rights to equal protection, and that the trial justice's decision ignores the doctrine of laches which he argues bars the state retirement board from reevaluating his pension. For the reasons set forth below we affirm the Superior Court order. The facts as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

In March 1983 Perrotti was employed by the State of Rhode Island Department of Transportation (DOT) as chief deputy registrar of motor vehicles. During Perrotti's tenure in that position, he was accused of preparing a phony motor vehicle registration certificate which was mailed to an insurance company to obtain insurance benefits. While the investigation of the allegations was pending, Perrotti was placed on administrative leave by DOT. As a result of the investigation, Perrotti was indicted by both state and federal grand juries on criminal charges. Thereafter, DOT terminated his employment effective June 30, 1983, for gross misconduct in the performance of his official duties and responsibilities. Perrotti filed an appeal from his employment termination to the state personnel appeal board pursuant to G.L.1956 (1990 Reenactment) § 36-3-10.

Perrotti was convicted of mail fraud in federal court in November 1983, and was sentenced to serve one year in federal prison. He served this sentence and the state indictment was eventually dismissed in March 1987 pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the meantime, Perrotti's appeal to the personnel appeal board of his dismissal from his position with DOT remained pending. That appeal was settled by a conditional agreement dated July 27, 1989. Under the agreement, Perrotti and DOT agreed that: (1) Perrotti would withdraw his appeal to the personnel appeal board; (2) DOT would rescind Perrotti's termination and Perrotti would instead be placed on leave without pay for the period from June 30, 1983, to July 28, 1989; (3) Perrotti would be allowed to return to state employment for one day in order to take advantage of new retirement legislation; (4) Perrotti would forego any claim for back pay, accrual of vacation time, sick leave, or other benefits; and (5) the agreement would be rescinded if the retirement board determined that Perrotti was not eligible for retirement under the new retirement legislation.

The retirement board awarded Perrotti an annual state pension in the amount of $41,437.41 as of July 29, 1989. According to the retirement board, at the time Perrotti applied for his pension it was unaware of both his federal conviction and the agreement with DOT. Upon learning of Perrotti's conviction, Reilly notified Perrotti by letter dated December 18, 1991, that his pension payments would be suspended effective January 1, 1992, pending a hearing. Perrotti's pension suspension was premised upon an advisory opinion issued by former Attorney General James O'Neil (O'Neil), in response to an inquiry made by Solomon, which concluded that honorable service was an implicit requirement for eligibility for a state pension, and that the retirement board may conduct a hearing to consider whether Perrotti's pension could be revoked as a result of his federal conviction.

On December 30, 1991, Perrotti filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a permanent injunction preventing the retirement board from holding a hearing on his pension. On the same date, O'Neil, in a supplemental advisory opinion to Solomon, opined that a hearing was required before the retirement board could suspend plaintiff's pension. Thereafter, Perrotti was advised that his pension payments would not be suspended and that he would continue to receive his pension pending the outcome of the hearing.

On March 11, 1992, the retirement board voted to conduct a hearing to determine whether Perrotti was entitled to continue receiving his pension, and a hearing was scheduled for June 1, 1992, whereupon Perrotti obtained a stay of the hearing in the Superior Court pending the outcome of the instant case.

The trial justice issued a written decision on July 13, 1992, denying Perrotti's request for a permanent injunction to enjoin the state retirement board from conducting a hearing to determine the validity of his pension and an order was entered on September 16, 1992. At the outset, Perrotti complains that the retirement board has no authority to adjudicate the propriety of his state pension, and even if it does have such authority, it already reviewed his request for a pension and found in his favor. It is Perrotti's contention that only the personnel appeal board has the authority to adjudicate the merits of a suspension or termination of a state employee. The retirement board asserts that it has the authority to determine whether a state employee is eligible for a pension, and if the circumstances require, it may reconsider the question.

In her decision, the trial justice reasoned that pursuant to G.L.1956 (1990 Reenactment) § 36-8-3 the retirement board is endowed with a broad grant of authority over the state retirement system and therefore possesses the authority to conduct hearings to investigate the propriety of Perrotti's state pension.

We find support for the trial justice's decision in § 36-8-3 which provides in relevant part that "The general administration and the responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system and for making effective the provisions of chapters 8 to 10, inclusive, of this title are hereby vested in a retirement board. The retirement board shall, from time to time, establish rules and regulations for the administration and transaction of the business of the retirement system. * * * The retirement board shall also perform such other functions as are required for the execution of said chapters 8 to 10, inclusive."

In construing this statute, we are mindful of our responsibility to "determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes." Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987); Gryguc v. Bendick, 510 A.2d 937, 939 (R.I.1986). We will not "interpret a legislative enactment literally when to do so would produce a result at odds with its legislative intent." Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993).

With these principles in mind we now turn to the statute in question. In enacting § 36-8-3, the General Assembly has endowed the retirement board with the authority to "administer" and "operate" the retirement system. The retirement board also possesses the power to "establish rules and regulations" for the administration and transaction of the retirement system and may "perform other such functions as are required" for the administration of the retirement system. We believe this language is sufficiently broad so as to include the retirement board's administrative authority to determine pension eligibility. We therefore accept the trial justice's interpretation of the statute which we conclude effectuates its legislative intent.

We find Perrotti's assertion that only the personnel appeal board has the power to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether an employee's service is honorable to be misplaced. Although Perrotti...