Perroz v. Fox Chapel Borough
| Decision Date | 13 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1133 C.D. 2015,1133 C.D. 2015 |
| Citation | 143 A.3d 520 |
| Parties | William J. PERROZ, Appellant v. FOX CHAPEL BOROUGH. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Jesse A. Drumm, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Brian P. Gabriel, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
BEFORE: MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge, and RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, and ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, and P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, and PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, and ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, and MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge SIMPSON
.
In this appeal, William J. Perroz (Perroz) asks whether the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County1 (trial court) erred in affirming a decision of the Fox Chapel Borough Council (Borough Council) that denied his application for a disability pension benefit. Perroz argues the trial court erred in: (1) upholding Borough Council's denial of his application for a disability pension benefit; (2) failing to find Borough Council violated his constitutional due process rights by not providing a neutral and detached hearing officer at his disability pension review hearing; and, (3) failing to find Borough Council's denial of his application for a disability pension benefit violated public policy. Upon review, we affirm.
Before the trial court, the parties stipulated to the following facts. Fox Chapel Borough (Borough) hired Perroz as a police officer in August 1990. He remained employed by the Borough until his honorable discharge in March 2014.
In 2010, Perroz suffered an on-duty injury to his right shoulder while apprehending a suspect. The injury necessitated medical treatment, and Perroz was unable to work as a police officer for an extended period. Perroz underwent two surgeries on his right shoulder in 2011 and 2012. More particularly, he underwent a rotator cuff repair
on his right shoulder in 2011 (first surgery).
Thereafter, Perroz suffered a tear in his deltoid at the repair site as physical therapy progressed in his efforts to return to work as a police officer. He underwent a deltoid repair in 2012 (second surgery). Dr. James P. Bradley, Perroz's treating physician, opined that, as of August 2012, Perroz was unable to return to his job as a full-time police officer.
In March 2014, a workers' compensation judge approved a compromise and release agreement. The Borough then proceeded with Perroz's removal based on a physical injury that precluded his return to work. Ultimately, the Borough honorably discharged Perroz by reason of disability in March 2014. Through a letter from Perroz's then attorney to Borough Council, Perroz applied for a disability pension benefit.
Shortly thereafter, the Borough's Pension Plan Administrator (Plan Administrator) acknowledged receipt of the letter and addressed the applicable deadlines under the Borough's Police Pension Plan (Plan). The Plan Administrator also directed Perroz to the relevant Plan provisions, including the definition of “Total and Permanent Disability” requiring that it “qualifies the Participant for federal social security disability benefits.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 10 (citing Certified Record (C.R.), Tab 1, Ex. 2); Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 31. The letter also stated:
The information submitted by [Perroz], and that which relates to the prior proceedings under the Heart and Lung Act,[2 ] does not appear to address whether [Perroz] qualifies for ‘federal social security disability benefits.’ Please provide any information or documents relevant to this issue. As stated above, any additional information may be submitted by March 27, 2014, or you may request a reasonable extension of time for this purpose. Upon review of this letter, please notify me of whether [Perroz] will be submitting additional information and/or requesting more time to do so.
Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 11 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. 2); R.R. at 32. Perroz's attorney submitted a letter in furtherance of his application for disability pension benefits and included three reports authored by Dr. Bradley.
In May 2014, the Plan Administrator issued a determination that denied Perroz's application for a disability pension benefit. The determination quoted the definition of “Total and Permanent Disability” contained in Article I, Section 1.34 of the Plan and summarized Dr. Bradley's April 2014 report. Section 5.04 of the Plan vests the Plan Administrator with sole discretion to determine whether participants qualify for disability pension retirement. Section 5.02 of the Plan states the “Disability Retirement Benefit shall equal 50% of the Member's Salary at the Time the Disability was incurred” (basic rate of pay during the year the disability occurred, Section 1.22 of the Plan), “provided that any member who receives benefits for the same injuries under [federal Social Security Disability] shall have the Participant's disability benefits offset or reduced by the amount of such benefits.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 16 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. G); R.R. at 32.
The disability pension Perroz applied for and which the Borough denied would encompass approximately 16 months, March 18, 2014 through August 2015, when Perroz's deferred vested pension benefit would begin. Perroz did not apply for federal Social Security Disability benefits because he did not believe he was eligible. Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 18 (citing C.R., Tab 1 at 24, 29); R.R. at 33.
The Plan defines “Total and Permanent Disability” as “a condition of physical or mental impairment
due to which a participant is unable to perform the usual and customary duties of [e]mployment, which is reasonably expected to continue to be permanent for the remainder of the Participant's lifetime and which qualifies the Participant for federal social security disability benefits. ” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 19 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Exs. 1, G); R.R. at 33 (emphasis added).
The Borough and the Police Department negotiated and entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in September 2013, which covered the period from January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2017. The 2013 CBA specifically addresses disability pension benefits through the following provision:
Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 21 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. I); R.R. at 33–34. The CBA also states: “Each Police Officer shall be entitled to a pension following retirement or permanent disability, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the official Police Pension Plan of the Borough.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 22 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. I); R.R. at 34.
During his employment with the Borough, Perroz served on the police negotiation team every year. Perroz testified that the police bargaining unit never attempted to change the disability definition contained in the Plan.
At all relevant times, the Plan received state aid. Perroz contended the Borough's receipt of state aid invoked the application of the Municipal Police Pension Law,3 commonly known as Act 600.
Perroz sought review of the Plan Administrator's denial of his disability pension application. A hearing ensued at which both Perroz and the Plan were represented by counsel. The Borough hired Ira Weiss, Esquire, to serve as hearing officer. After the hearing, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter, Borough Council enacted Resolution 600, which denied Perroz's appeal and sustained the decision of the Plan Administrator denying Perroz's application for a disability pension. Attached to Resolution 600 were the hearing officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law and adjudication. Perroz appealed Borough Council's decision to the trial court.
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued an order dismissing Perroz's appeal and affirming Borough Council's decision. In its order, the trial court adopted the parties' joint stipulation of facts. It explained the definition of “disability” in the CBA between Borough Council and its Police Department was binding and the definition of “disability” in Act 600 was not binding. See Norcini v. City of Coatesville, 915 A.2d 1243 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007)
; Breeden v. Borough of Crafton, No. SA 11–000582 (C.C.P. Allegheny 2012), aff'd, 57 A.3d 222 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012). Perroz appealed to this Court, and the trial court directed him to file a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal, which he did.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.1925(a)
. Initially, the trial court explained, because this was an appeal of a decision under the Local Agency Law,4 its review of Borough Council's decision was limited. Where, as here, a full and complete record is made before Borough Council, the trial court was required to affirm the adjudication unless it found the adjudication was in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or not in accordance with law, or the provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 5 () were violated in the proceedings before Borough Council, or any finding of fact made by Borough Council and necessary to support its adjudication was not supported by substantial evidence. Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(b).
Here, the trial court explained, Perroz did not specify any error of law or unsupported finding of fact. The trial court observed that Perroz's application for a disability pension was denied based on his failure to meet the Plan's definition of “Total and Permanent Disability” as defined in the parties' CBA, an agreement Perroz negotiated with other members of the...
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