Perry-Anderson v. Howard Univ. Hosp.

Decision Date29 June 2016
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 14-2111 (BAH)
Citation192 F.Supp.3d 136
Parties Donna PERRY-ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Pamela Lewis Ashby, Jackson & Associates Law Firm, PLLC, Upper Marlboro, MD, Dawn R. Anderson-Jackson, Jackson Associates Law Firm, PLLC, Largo, MD, for Plaintiff.

Alan S. Block, Bonner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge

The plaintiff, Donna Perry-Anderson, brings this action against her former employer, Howard University Hospital ("HUH"), pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , asserting two counts of failure to accommodate her disability. Compl. ¶¶ 27–28, 30, ECF No. 1. The plaintiff alleges that, after suffering a stress-induced stroke, she requested to be reassigned to a position in a less stressful environment or to return to her former position with a modified work schedule in order to accommodate her disability, but that her requests were denied by her employer. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. Pending before the Court is HUH's motion for summary judgment. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 16. For the reasons laid out below, HUH's motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff began working for HUH in or around September 1998, and over the next decade was repeatedly promoted to positions with increasingly more responsibilities. Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute ("Pl.'s SMF") ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 18-1; Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n"), Ex. 2 ("Pl.'s Dep.") at 29:14–15, ECF No. 18-2. On May 5, 2008, the plaintiff transferred to her last position as the executive assistant to HUH's CFO and Deputy CFO in the finance department. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 4; Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.'s SMF") ¶ 1, ECF No. 16-1. Concomitant with this new job, the plaintiff received a raise of $10,560.06 to a total annual salary of $60,000. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 5; Def.'s Mem., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF No. 16-3. In that position, the plaintiff "handled the day-to-day activities of the chief and deputy chief financial officer," including scheduling, maintaining correspondence, and overseeing five other administrative assistants. Def.'s Mem., Ex. 3 ("Pl.'s Dep.") at 43:2–11, 103:2–9, ECF No. 16-3. The plaintiff's job responsibilities increased over time, until she was eventually placed on three committees, as she was being "groom[ed] to be a hospital administrator" by the Deputy CFO. Id. at 56:1–17, 103:12–18, ECF No. 16-3. In order to complete her increased assignments, the plaintiff alleges that she "frequently skipped lunch and rest breaks and worked longer than 8-hour work days, and sometimes worked weekends." Pl.'s SMF ¶ 7.

Due to these increased duties and longer work hours, in August 2009, the plaintiff began to suffer from physiological symptoms of stress. Pl.'s Dep. at 63:13–64:17, ECF No. 16-3. As a consequence, she "requested a transfer to a job where [she] could work eight hours." Id. at 64:2–4, ECF No. 16-3; Pl.'s SMF ¶ 8. She applied for a vacant position in a different department but her application was denied in favor of another person from the finance department. Pl.'s Dep. at 74:6–75:7, ECF No. 16-3. A month later, in October 2009, the plaintiff suffered a stress-induced stroke

, resulting in her being placed on medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Def.'s SMF ¶ 2; Pl.'s SMF ¶ 10; Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 6 ("FMLA App.") at 40–41, ECF No. 18-3; id. , Ex. 7 (Pl.'s Emails with HUH HR, dated Nov. 11–13, 2009) at 42, ECF No. 18-3. On the FMLA application, submitted to HUH's Human Resources Department ("HR"), the plaintiff's neurologist listed the plaintiff's medical restriction as "needs [a] job with less stress," and her only limitation as "cannot work [more than] 40 hours per week." FMLA App. at 41; Pl.'s Emails with HUH HR, dated Nov. 11–13, 2009, at 42.

On November 9, 2009, the plaintiff's neurologist medically cleared the plaintiff to return to work on December 7, 2009, "[a]ssuming a transfer to a less stressful department has occurred." Def.'s Mem., Ex. 2 (Letter from Pl.'s Neurologist, dated Nov. 9, 2009) at 2, ECF No. 16-3. Around this time, consistent with the plaintiff's neurologist's recommendation to seek reassignment to a less stressful department, the plaintiff initiated conversations with the Director of Risk Management regarding a new position in that department.1 Def.'s Mem., Ex. 9 ("Dir. Risk Management 30(b)(6) Dep.") at 17:12–18:17, ECF No. 16-3. The risk management coordinator was on short-term disability leave at the time, and the Director considered the plaintiff for a potential new position in her department as an administrative assistant. Id.

On November 29, 2009, however, the plaintiff suffered another health setback requiring a brief hospitalization. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 18. A stroke

was ruled out and, on December 2, 2009, the plaintiff was cleared a second time to return to work on January 14, 2010, again, subject to "a transfer to a less stressful department" at work. Id. ¶ 19; Def.'s SMF ¶ 5; Def.'s Mem., Ex. 4 (Letter from Pl.'s Neurologist, dated Dec. 2, 2009) at 39. Around this time, the plaintiff indicated to HR that she intended to return, not to her previous position in the finance department, but to a new position, potentially in Risk Management. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 16 (Pl.'s Email to HUH HR, dated Dec. 10, 2009) at 3, ECF No. 18-5. In response, however, HR informed the plaintiff that such a transfer to Risk Management might not occur after all, which news was confirmed by the Director of Risk Management by telephone. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 17 (Pl.'s Email to Dir. of Risk Management, dated Dec. 10, 2009) at 4, ECF No. 18-5; Pl.'s Dep. at 164:14–165:4, ECF No. 16-3.

The plaintiff fell ill once again, and, on January 11, 2010, her medical leave was extended for a second time until March 1, 2010, "[a]ssuming a transfer to another department has occurred." Def.'s Mem., Ex. 5 (Letter from Pl.'s Internist, dated Jan. 11, 2010) at 40, ECF No. 16-3. On January 29, 2010, HUH sent a letter to the plaintiff informing her that her FMLA leave was exhausted and, consequently, the finance department "is no longer able [to] hold [her] position, and must replace [her] with another employee." Def.'s Mem., Ex. 15 ("End of FMLA Leave Letter") at 79, ECF No. 16-3. The letter further indicated that HUH is "[u]nder no obligation to transfer [her] to another position," and if she is "interested in transferring to a different position within the hospital, [she] will need to view the job postings board." Id. On February 2, 2010, the plaintiff emailed HR to reiterate that she could not return to work until March 1, 2010 due to medical reasons, and that she was not delaying her return pending a transfer. Def.'s Mem., Ex. 16 (Pl.'s Email to HUH HR, dated Feb. 2, 2010) at 80, ECF No. 16-3. Furthermore, the plaintiff clarified that while "it was [her] physician's desire if possible, that a transfer would be granted," she "had all intention to return to work on March 1, 2010," even if a transfer were not possible. Id.

In response to the plaintiff's indication that she would, if all else failed, return to her position as executive assistant in the finance department, HR inquired whether the Deputy CFO or the CFO were interested in having her back, noting at the same time that HUH is "not obligated to return her to her same or a similar position." Def.'s Mem., Ex. 18 (HR's Email to CFO and Deputy CFO, dated Feb. 2, 2010) at 87, ECF No. 16-3. Citing the plaintiff's desire, "made [ ] clear over an extended period of time[,] that she does not want to work in Finance permanently," both the CFO and Deputy CFO declined to offer the plaintiff her job back. See id. ; Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 21 at 8, ECF No. 18-5.

On March 1, 2010, the date on which the plaintiff was cleared to return to work, the plaintiff met with an HR analyst, who told the plaintiff that she was "technically terminated." See Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 25 (Pl.'s Emails with HUH HR, dated Mar. 29 to Apr. 22, 2010) at 18, ECF No. 18-5. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 27 (Pl.'s Emails to HUH HR, dated June 23, 2010) at 22, ECF No. 18-5; Def.'s Mem., Ex. 8 (Pl.'s Letter to HUH, undated) at 44, ECF No. 16-3. Yet, despite HUH's representations to the plaintiff about her status as "technically terminated" and that HUH had no obligation to find her alternative employment, the record reflects that HUH continued to engage the plaintiff in discussions regarding potential positions.

On or before March 1, 2010, for example, the plaintiff was considered for a temporary position to replace the risk management coordinator in Risk Management, but ultimately no offer was extended to the plaintiff. See Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 23 (Emails between Dir. Risk Management and HUH HR, dated Mar. 1, 2010) at 13, ECF No. 18-5. By March 29, 2010, the plaintiff was also considered for three other temporary positions, but the plaintiff indicated her lack of interest because "no benefits [would be] involved." Pl.'s Emails with HUH HR, dated Mar. 29 to Apr. 22, 2010 at 20. The plaintiff then interviewed for a position as an administrative assistant to the Chief Information Officer ("CIO"), but the plaintiff, again, indicated her lack of interest because "the level of responsibility" associated with that position was not, in her and her physician's opinion, in her "best interest health wise." Id.

Based upon the plaintiff's expressed disinterest in any of the discussed positions, HR referred the plaintiff to someone in Nurse Recruiting. Id. at 19. On or around April 7, 2010, the plaintiff was informed that a "Unit Secretary" position was available in Nursing, one of the departments to which she expressed an interest in transferring. Def.'s Mem., Ex. 7 (Pl.'s Emails to HUH HR, dated Apr. 7, 2010) at 43, ECF No. 16-3. The plaintiff relayed the information to HR, adding that her "physician is in agreement with a modified work...

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