Perry v. Heirs at Law of Gadsden
| Decision Date | 03 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 3691.,3691. |
| Parties | Alice C.G. PERRY, Emily Mitchell, Eliza Tremble, and Doris Green, Respondents, v. HEIRS AT LAW and Distributees OF Charles GADSDEN, C.H. Gadsden, Cecil S. Gadsden, C.S. Gadsden, Louise Gadsden, Cain Gadsden, John Gadsden, Lula Nelson, Louis Gadsden, Herman Gadsden, Carrie Gadsden, Estella Gadsden, Mattie Gadsden, United States Department of Agriculture, Farmers Home Administration, South Carolina Electric and Gas, Hazel Point Partnership, Luther Major, Martha Major, Queenie Taylor, Dolly Fripp, Beaufort-Jasper Comprehensive Health Services, Inc., also, the following persons believed to be living, Cecil J. Gaston, Jr. a/k/a Cecil J. Gaston, Cornelius Gaston a/k/a Cornelius Gadsen, Herman Gaston, Lisa Roacher, Linda Mason, Herbert Mason, Willis Gaston, and Louise Gaston a/k/a Louise Gadson, and all heirs at law, devisees, or persons unknown claiming by, under or through any of the above-named persons, John Doe or Mary Roe, being fictitious names designating a class of persons, or a legal entity, infants, incompetents, persons in the military service, if any, known or unknown, who may be an heir, distributee, devisee, legatee, issuee, aliente, administrator, executor, creditor, successor or assign having or claiming to have any right, title, interest, estate in or lien upon the real estate described in the Complaint herein, Defendants, of whom Heirs at Law and Distributees of Charles Gadsden, C.H. Gadsden, Louise Gadsden, Cain Gadsden, John Gadsden, Lula Nelson, Louis Gadsden, Herman Gadsden, Estella Gadsden, Mattie Gadsden are the Appellants. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Mary P. Miles, of West Columbia, for Appellants.
Louis O. Dore, Cheryl V. Doe and Thomas A. Holloway, all of Beaufort, for Respondents.
More than four years after the master-in-equity ordered the partition of the 110.54-acre tract of land at the heart of this litigation, Gadsden filed a Rule 60(b), SCRCP motion to set aside the partition order, alleging fraud on the court and inequitable prospective application of the order. The trial court denied the motion. Gadsden appeals. We affirm.
On February 13, 1990, Alice C.G. Perry, Emily Mitchell, Eliza Tremble, and Doris Green ("Respondents") brought an action against their uncle Cecil J. Gadsden, Jr. and the heirs of their grandfather Cecil J. Gadsden, Sr. (collectively "Gadsden"), seeking the partition of 110.54 acres of land occupied by Cecil J. Gadsden, Jr. (Cecil, Jr.), as well as punitive damages and an accounting. (R. at 3.) The master determined the various heirs' interests in the property and awarded $100 in punitive damages, finding Cecil, Jr., had defrauded the heirs. The master ordered the parties to devise a partition plan within thirty days. When the parties failed to produce a plan, the master ordered a public sale of the property.
Gadsden appealed, and this court held that the master correctly found that Gadsden had defrauded the heirs, but ruled that the property should have been partitioned in kind rather than sold. Perry v. Heirs at Law & Distributees of Gadsden, 313 S.C. 296, 437 S.E.2d 174 (Ct.App.1993). After granting Gadsden's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed our decision and remanded to the master to partition in kind. Perry v. Heirs at Law & Distributees of Gadsden, 316 S.C. 224, 449 S.E.2d 250 (1994).
On remand, the master entered a judgment against Cecil, Jr. and in favor of ten respondents in the amount of $151,146.27. Cecil, Jr. appealed again asserting that he had been wrongfully denied credit against the judgment for certain timber cultivation expenses and distributions to the heirs over the years. We affirmed the master's decision in an unpublished opinion.
To effectuate the partition mandated by our decision, partition commissioners were appointed by the master. The court empowered the commissioners to hire surveyors and appraisers as needed. (R. at 25.) In determining the appropriate division of the property, the commissioners considered, inter alia, the testimony of a licensed appraiser that the fair market value of the property was $354,000.00 as of February 9, 1995. (R. at 32.) Using this value as a starting point, the commissioners adjusted the value of the property to coincide with the increase in value of other properties in the immediate vicinity over the previous two years. (R. at 33.) Adopting a per annum increase of ten percent, the commissioners determined the current fair market value of the property to be $424,800.00. (R. at 33.) Based on the commissioners' report, the master entered an order in partition on February 20, 1998 that left Gadsden with title to 4.26 acres of the 110.54 acre tract. (R. at 37-39.)
More than four years after the 1998 partition order was entered, Gadsden filed a motion to reopen the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP, asserting the $424,800.00 value assigned to the property by the commissioners was "so incorrect as to amount to fraud upon the Court." (R. at 61.) By order dated May 3, 2002, the trial court denied Gadsden's motion. This appeal followed.
A party seeking to set aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) has the burden of presenting evidence entitling him to the requested relief. Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 67, 403 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1991). Whether to grant or deny a motion under Rule 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Coleman v. Dunlap, 306 S.C. 491, 494, 413 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1992). On review, we are limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying such a motion. Saro Invs. v. Ocean Holiday P'ship, 314 S.C. 116, 441 S.E.2d 835, 840 (Ct.App.1994).
Although other motions to reopen judgments based on fraud must be filed within a year of the judgment or order, Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from an order for "fraud upon the court" after the expiration of one year. Fraud upon the court is a narrow and invidious species of fraud that "subvert[s] the integrity of the Court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 78, 579 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2003). Like all other types of fraud, proving fraud upon the court requires showing that the perpetrator acted with the intent to defraud, for there is no such thing as accidental fraud. See Chewning, 354 S.C. at 78,
579 S.E.2d at 608 (); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990) ().
Here, Gadsden's failings are several. First, Gadsden has not met his burden of showing fraudulent intent. In fact, Gadsden has failed to even allege the existence of fraudulent intent. Instead, Gadsden merely states that the "appraised value of $424,800.00 as applied by the commissioners to the realty in question is grossly insufficient and seriously understates the actual value of the property." (R. at 59.) Even if the value applied by the commissioners understated the property's value, any undervaluation would not amount to fraud unless the commissioners...
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