Perry v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-558-B.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-558-B.
• Citation: 761 F. Supp. 437
• Parties: Lynda D. PERRY v. MERCEDES BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., and ABC Insurance Company.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

761 F. Supp. 437

Lynda D. PERRY v. MERCEDES BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., and ABC Insurance Company.

Civ. A. No. 89-558-B.

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

March 22, 1991.

Michael C. Palmintier, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiff.

Stephen B. Lemann, Monroe & Lemann, New Orleans, La., Benjamin R. Slater, III, Mark E. Van Horn, for defendants.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

POLOZOLA, District Judge.

This case requires the Court to determine whether plaintiff's claim under Louisiana products liability law for an alleged manufacturing or design defect in an automobile airbag is preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (National Safety Act) and the federal safety standards.¹ On March 4, 1986, Lynda D. Perry suffered personal injuries when she drove her vehicle into a ditch after running a stop sign at a "T" intersection. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was driving a 1986 Mercedes Benz, Model 190E, which is distributed in the United States by the defendant, Mercedes Benz of North America (MBNA). Perry was not wearing her seat belt at the time of the accident. The plaintiff filed suit against MBNA in a Louisiana state court alleging the defendant is strictly liable under Louisiana products liability law due to the failure of the factory installed airbag to deploy or inflate upon impact. Specifically, Perry contends that the airbag did not operate properly because of a manufacturing defect and/or a design defect. MBNA timely removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

The case is now before the Court on the defendant's motion for summary judgement. MBNA contends any action concerning the defective design of airbags pursuant to Louisiana products liability law is preempted by the National Safety Act and the federal safety standards.² MBNA also contends it is entitled to summary judgment on the defect claim because there is no material issue of fact in dispute concerning a defect in the product itself or the facts surrounding the accident.

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."³ To oppose the granting of summary judgment, Rule 56(e) provides that "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, ... instead, the defending party, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." The nonmoving party must bring forth "significant probative evidence."⁴ When all the evidence presented by both parties could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.⁵

I. Is the Louisiana Products Liability Cause of Action for Design Defect Preempted By the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act?

The Court must first determine whether the plaintiff's state law cause of action based on a design defect is preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by the National Safety Act. To determine whether the federal act has preempted Louisiana state law, the court must follow the pronouncements set forth by the United States Supreme Court.⁶ Under Article I of the United States Constitution and the Supremacy Clause, Congress has the power to legislatively preempt state law in all or in part of a particular field. The essence of the Court's inquiry concerning "a preemption question requires an examination of congressional intent."⁷

The Supreme Court recognizes three situations where preemption may apply: (1) where Congress's intent as to the extent of preemption is explicitly defined within the federal law;⁸ (2) "in the absence of express preemptive language, Congress may legislate in a given area so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field, leaving no room for state regulation;"⁹ and, (3) even when the federal law is not intended to occupy the entire field, the state law will be preempted if it in fact conflicts with the federal law,¹⁰ or "when the state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objects of Congress.'"¹¹ The Fifth Circuit however has warned that "while the path of analysis is clear, we must nevertheless tread cautiously. Preemption should not be inferred from every Congressional enactment that overlaps state regulation.... We are concerned only with an actual conflict between federal and state law...."¹² In the case now before this Court, there are no federal statutes expressly establishing design standards for automobile airbags, a passive restraint device. If preemption does exist, the Court must find that Congress implicitly and not explicitly intended to preempt this area of the law.

To fully understand the nature of the issue before the Court insofar as the design claim is concerned, the Court must set forth the nature of the plaintiff's claim. The jurisprudence has conclusively established that any state products liability cause of action for design defect based on the failure of an automobile manufacturer to install airbags is preempted under the National Safety Act.¹³ However, this case concerns the next step in the process. Specifically, the issue before this Court is whether or not an automobile manufacturer is suspectable to a design defect cause of action when the airbag was installed in the vehicle, but the plaintiff contends the installed airbag was not properly designed. To determine whether such a cause of action exists, the Court must look to the provisions of the National Safety Act, the federal regulations, and their legislative history to ascertain, if possible, the congressional intent when it enacted the federal legislation.

Section 1392(d) of the National Safety Act, commonly referred to as the "preemption clause," provides, in pertinent part:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established ... is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard....¹⁴

The above provision of the Act must read in light of § 1397(k), the "savings clause," which provides:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.¹⁵

The task of implementing safety regulations under the National Safety Act was delegated to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).¹⁶ Pursuant to § 103 of the National Safety Act, the NHTSA established mandatory safety standards for vehicles, called the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS).¹⁷ The standards applicable to seatbelts and passive restraint devices, i.e., airbags, is set forth in FMVSS 208, entitled "Occupant Crash Protection." This safety standard has formed the basis of preemption of state law claims for the failure to install airbags in automobiles.¹⁸ In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that FMVSS 208 also implicitly preempts the plaintiff's state law cause of action concerning an alleged design defect of an installed airbag.

To determine the intended scope and purpose of the federal law and regulations, the Court must examine both the legislative history concerning automobile airbags and the jurisprudence decided by the courts. In 1966, the Senate Report addressing the National Safety Act noted that:

Unlike the General Services Administration's procurement standards, both the interim standards and the new and revised standards are expected to be performance standards, specifying the required minimum safe performance of vehicles but not manner in which the manufacturer is to achieve the specified performance. (sec. 101(b)). Manufacturers ... will thus be free to compete in developing and selecting devices and structures that can meet or surpass the performance standard.¹⁹

The Senate Report further stated that Congress desired that the regulations should provide performance standards but the safety standards should not "stifle innovation in automotive design" by setting forth specific design details.²⁰

After passage of the National Safety Act, the NHTSA promulgated FMVSS 208. Subsequently, the NHTSA considered, but decided against, amending FMVSS 208 to incorporate specific design regulations of airbags, along with a rule requiring mandatory installation in all vehicles.²¹ In 1984, the NHTSA released its final rule concerning standards for occupant crash protection.²² The report of the NHTSA discussed in great detail all aspects of automobile safety restraint devices, including the merits of airbags. However, the agency declined to require airbags in automobiles, or institute design specifics.²³

While the NHTSA did not require mandatory use of airbags in automobiles, FMVSS 208 does provide for the use of airbags as one of the three options available to the manufacturer. If a manufacturer should decide to install airbags, as MBNA did in this case, the airbag must meet specified performance guidelines concerning impact.²⁴ This requirement complies with congressional intent that the NHTSA not institute rigid design specifications, but set forth performance standards.

This relationship between the impact of the performance standards on the design standards was discussed by the court in Woods v. General Motors Corporation.²⁵ In Woods the First Circuit found that the National Safety Act preempted a state products liability cause of action, stating:

Plaintiff

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