Perry v. Perry, S94A1288
| Decision Date | 27 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S94A1288,S94A1288 |
| Parties | PERRY v. PERRY. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
George M. Rountree, Rountree & Souther, Brunswick, for Sharon H. Perry.
John S. Myers, St. Marys, for Michael B. Perry.
Appellant/former wife filed an action in August 1991 seeking to hold appellee/former husband in contempt for having failed to perform the financial obligations imposed upon him by the parties' 1988 judgment of divorce. When appellee filed a bankruptcy action and the bankruptcy court issued a stay order, the contempt action was continued until December 1993. After holding a hearing in January 1994, the trial court determined that appellee was not in contempt; that appellee had reasonably relied on the divorce judgment in reducing the amount of child support due; and that appellee was responsible for one-half of the children's uninsured medical and dental expenses. We granted appellant's application for discretionary review of the trial court's order.
1. The parties were divorced in Camden County, Georgia in 1988. In a separation agreement incorporated into the divorce decree, the parties agreed to joint custody of their three minor children, with each party having physical custody of the children on an alternating weekly basis as long as both parties lived in the Camden County area. The parties provided that the children would live with appellant if either party moved out of the area. Child support was treated as follows:
Husband shall pay to the Wife child support in the amount of $333.00 per month per child until said child reaches the age of majority, marries, enters the Armed Services, ceases to live with the Wife, becomes self-supporting, or dies, whichever event shall first occur ... In the event Husband should voluntarily reject the joint custody of the child and not have the children reside with him on an alternating weekly basis as provided [in the separation agreement], then the child support payment obligation of the Husband referred to herein shall be increased by the amount of twenty-five percent for each child.
2. When appellant moved from Georgia to California in late summer/early fall 1989, the children stayed with appellee until January 1990, when they also moved to California. The children returned to Georgia for the summer of 1990, and remained with appellee until November 1990, when appellant moved to Mississippi. At that time, the two daughters joined appellant in Mississippi, and the son remained with appellee in Georgia. In January 1991, appellee reduced his monthly child support payment by one-third and did so until appellant moved to Marietta, Georgia, and the son returned to live with appellant in February 1992. Appellant contended that appellee was not authorized to reduce the monthly child support payment and was, in fact, obligated to increase the payments twenty-five percent per child because the parties were no longer alternating physical custody of the children on a weekly basis.
Where, as here, the party obligated to make payments under a decree believes that circumstances have arisen which, under the decree, authorize [a decrease in] payments, but there are questions of fact in that regard, that party acts at his or her peril in unilaterally [decreasing] payments. By doing so, that party risks being found in contempt, or, at any rate, liable for all payments, if the other party chooses to file a motion for contempt. The better practice would be for the party obligated to make payments to raise the issue in an action for declaratory relief.
Kent v. Kent, 265 Ga. 211(2), 452 S.E.2d 764 (1995). The divorce decree's child support provision clearly provided for the possibility that one or more of the couple's three children might not reside with appellant during their entire minority, and that appellee would not be obligated for the support of that child upon such an occurrence. See Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69, 70, 257 S.E.2d 904 (1979). Appellee's reduced payments covered...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Quillen v. Quillen, S95A1172
...are free to contract for self-executing changes in an alimony obligation upon the occurrence of certain events. Perry v. Perry, 265 Ga. 186, 187(2), 454 S.E.2d 122 (1995); Weaver v. Jones, 260 Ga. 493, 494(3), 396 S.E.2d 890 (1990). OCGA § 19-6-19 provides that cohabitation is a ground for ......
- Baars v. Freeman., S10A1779.
-
Blair v. Blair
...this contempt proceeding, the court did not have the power to modify the terms of the divorce and alimony judgment. Perry v. Perry, 265 Ga. 186, 188(3), 454 S.E.2d 122 (1995); Peppers v. Peppers, 238 Ga. 411, 412, 233 S.E.2d 374 (1977). But, the trial court did have wide discretion to deter......
-
Pineres v. George
...259 Ga. 68(2), 377 S.E.2d 663 (1989) (obligation to pay child's medical expenses is form of child support). See also Perry v. Perry, 265 Ga. 186(3), 454 S.E.2d 122 (1995) (noting parent's statutory duty to provide for physical and mental health of minor children). Thus, despite Pineres' ass......