Perry v. Roy

• Decision Date: 03 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1466.,14–1466.
• Citation: 782 F.3d 73
• Parties: Rico PERRY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Susie ROY ; Claire Rocha, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

782 F.3d 73

Rico PERRY, Plaintiff, Appellant

v.Susie ROY ; Claire Rocha, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 14–1466.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

April 3, 2015.

Benjamin M. McGovern, with whom Amanda O. Amendola and Holland & Knight LLP, were on brief, for appellant.

Tory A. Weigand, with whom James A. Bello and Morrison Mahoney LLP, were on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, THOMPSON, and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal stems from an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts by Appellant Rico Perry (“Perry”), an inmate at the Bristol House of Correction, against Susie Roy (“Nurse Roy”) and Claire Rocha (“Nurse Rocha,” and together with Nurse Roy, “Appellees”), both of whom were staff nurses at said correctional institution. The complaint alleged that the medical treatment Perry received from Appellees for injuries resulting from a violent scuffle with prison guards did not meet the constitutional standard required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Perry now challenges the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees and the resulting dismissal of his § 1983 action. Because the record establishes that there are issues of material fact in dispute that need to be decided by a factfinder, we remand this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

A. Factual History

We review the facts in the light most favorable to Perry, the party opposing summary judgment. Rockwood v. SKF USA Inc., 687 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Agusty–Reyes v. Dep't of Educ., 601 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2010) ).

On Saturday, June 9, 2007, at approximately 1:10 a.m., while Perry was being booked into the Bristol facility following transfer from another correctional center, a fight broke out between him and several correctional officers. During the course of this incident, the officers caused serious injuries to Perry.

Within five minutes of this altercation, Perry was evaluated by Nurse Roy, who asked him about his injuries. Perry swears that his mouth was “pouring blood” from a long gash, his jaw was “clenched,” and he had a lump on his head. Although he could barely talk, Perry was able to tell Nurse Roy that he was in pain and that his jaw was broken. He claims further that Nurse Roy did not “thoroughly examine” him, nor did she ever “come to focus on his jaw.” Nurse Roy did, however, observe and diagnose a cracked tooth, clean the open wound, provide Perry with gauze, rinse his mouth with saline water, and advise Perry to obtain a sick slip for the tooth to enable him to see a dentist, who would be available the following Tuesday, June 12, 2007. But he was not given ice or aspirin for his pain, or otherwise provided any treatment for the jaw. Perry then requested to file a grievance report. Nurse Roy relates a fundamentally different story, backed up by her notes. She says that Perry complained only of the cut (not a broken jaw ), that she checked his jaw, and that he could open it wide and verbalize without difficulty. For summary judgment purposes, though, we must assume that Perry's version of the exam (or lack thereof) might be believed by the jury.

Approximately one hour after the incident with the correction officers and the evaluation by Nurse Roy, Perry was formally booked into the Bristol facility. Later that night, while in his cell, Perry passed out and was awakened by Nurse Roy, who applied smelling salts to him. He asked Nurse Roy to be taken to the hospital again, but this request was also ignored.

At around 4:10 a.m., he complained to a second attending nurse, Nurse Rocha, that he had been beaten by correctional officers and had an unattended broken jaw. Perry requested again to be taken to a hospital. Nurse Rocha examined Perry through a glass window for less than a minute and noted that Perry had an “egg” on his forehead. Although Nurse Rocha initially said she would help him, her willingness to help came to naught after she spoke to Lt. Robert Shubert, who had been involved in the incident where Perry was hurt. Perry claims that the officer asked her to let Perry “sleep it off.” Thereafter, Nurse Rocha denied all further care. Perry does, however, concede that Nurse Rocha told Lt. Shubert that she did not believe he had a broken jaw. Nurse Rocha claims that, despite telling her that he had a broken jaw, Perry denied having any pain at that time. Finally, Nurse Rocha entered a note for someone to notify the medical unit if Perry “began to suffer from nausea/vomiting or vertigo.”

At approximately 5:30–6:00 p.m. that same day—seventeen hours after the beating—Perry was examined again, this time by a third nurse, due to his complaint of jaw pain and shortness of breath. Perry had developed swelling of the jaw and also some wheezing. This resulted in his immediate transfer to St. Luke's Hospital, where, within two hours of his arrival, he was diagnosed with an acute bilateral mandibular fracture. The attending physician, Dr. David Fuerman, also noted tenderness and swelling on Perry's forehead, jaw, neck, and cervical spine as well as bilateral shallow breath and bilateral rib pain. He classified Perry's injuries as “critical injuries” caused by the use of a “tremendous amount of force.”

Perry was transferred out of St. Luke's to Massachusetts General Hospital (“M.G.H.”) because neither the attending physician, Dr. Fuerman, nor any member of the St. Luke's medical staff was qualified to treat Perry's severe mandibular fractures. Despite the district court not having the benefit of expert witness testimony presented by the plaintiff to support his contentions regarding his serious medical need, Dr. Fuerman testified that, although he had on occasion released patients with broken jaws back to a stable home environment, he did not release Perry back to the Bristol House of Correction in part because “[w]ith an injury this significant, with the amount of force required to fracture the mandible and have a laceration in the base of his mouth, waiting 20 hours to bring him in for medical attention, I didn't know that he would receive appropriate attention.” Instead, Perry underwent surgery at M.G.H. to repair the mandibular fracture. Dr. Fuerman also testified that Perry required “critical care” when he arrived at the hospital and that he spent sixty minutes caring for Perry.

B. Procedural History

Perry filed this § 1983 action for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In his amended complaint he requested compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees.

The district court dismissed the claim on summary judgment, reasoning that Perry failed to establish that the Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by ignoring his requests to go to the hospital or provide treatment to his broken jaw. In the district court's opinion, the fact that Perry had been provided at least some treatment contradicts the showing that the Appellees knew that his condition was sufficiently serious when he requested to go to the hospital, but opted to ignore it. Also, Perry was sent to the hospital seventeen hours after the incident, which seemed reasonable to the district court, since it only demonstrated that the condition worsened over time and was treated appropriately as it progressed.

Furthermore, the district court concluded that: (1) Perry had not established that the Appellees acted with a culpable state of mind in ignoring his requests for additional treatment; (2) the Appellees provided the medical treatment they saw fit according to the information they had at the time they made the decisions; and (3) any issues of fact would be immaterial to that conclusion. On the issue of whether the Appellees had a culpable state of mind, the court added that the fact that Perry alleged that Nurse Rocha denied him care with the intent to punish him for being involved in the brawl after talking to an officer was not a material fact in controversy but rather was simply an “improbable or overly attenuated inference[ ], unsupported conclusion[ ], and rank speculation” that it need not consider. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Perry, as we are required to do, we disagree that there is no issue of material fact and that Appellees were entitled to summary judgment.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment

A grant of summary judgment must be reviewed de novo. Ortiz–Bonilla v. Federación de Ajedrez de P.R., Inc., 734 F.3d 28, 40 (1st Cir.2013) (citing Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir.2013) ); Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 470 F.3d 422, 426 (1st Cir.2006). All facts in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, are drawn in favor of the nonmovant. Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir.2013). Summary judgment is only appropriately granted “where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Vives v. Fajardo, 472 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ).

A genuine issue of material fact “must be built on a solid foundation—a foundation constructed from materials of evidentiary quality.” García–González v. Puig–Morales, 761 F.3d 81, 87 (1st Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nieves–Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 378 (1st Cir.2013) ). The district court's role is limited to assessing whether there exists “evidence [ ] such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Showtime Entm't, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir.2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).

B. Deliberate Indifference

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines...