Perry v. State of R.I.
| Decision Date | 24 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 95-336B.,C.A. No. 96-052B. |
| Citation | 975 F.Supp. 418 |
| Parties | David E. PERRY, Michael Kelleher, Lucille A. Sasso, Joyce C. Dube, William Aliferakis, William T. Laferriere, Gerald J. Griffin, Doreen R. Bowen, John J. Martino, Joseph Conley, Marguerite Dipalma, Cheryl Witt, Susan Ryan Froment, Barbara Brooks, F. Charles Haigh, Dennis Revens, Kenneth Haupt, and Arlene Maloney, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Lincoln Almond, in his Capacity as Chief Executive Officer of The State of Rhode Island, Nancy Mayer, in her Capacity as Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island, Jeffrey Pine, in his Capacity as Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gayl W. Doster, in his Capacity as Director of the Department of Administration, Jane Doe, Alias, and John Doe, Alias, in their Capacities as Members of the Unclassified Pay Plan Board, Defendants, RHODE ISLAND LABORERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL, Laborers' Local Union 808 Judicial and Technical Employees, Ronald M. Coia, Frank Ciccone, Anthony Piccirilli, Mark Benjamin, Erin Burn, Brian Burn, Deborah Buisclair, Michael Cafferty, Beverly Clerk, Carol Costa, Lois Karlafarski, Paula Larivee, Phyllis Lynch, Jean Maggiacomo, Joseph Maggiacomo, Linda Piccirilli, Claudia Porrazzo, and Dennis Sao Bento, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Lincoln Almond, in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the State of Rhode Island, Nancy Mayer, in her Capacity as Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island, Jeffrey Pine, in his Capacity as Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Robert J. Carl, Jr. in his Capacity as Director of the Department of Administration, Robert Harrall, in his capacity as Chief Administrator of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Amato A. DeLuca, Miriam Weizenbaum, DeLuca & Weizenbaum, Ltd., Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs in C.A.95-336B.
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Thomas A. Palombo, James R. Lee, Atty. Gen. Office, Providence, RI, Harris K, Weiner, Office of the Governor, Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., Office of the Governor, Executive Counsel, Providence, RI, for Defendants in C.A. 95-336B.
Michael S. Bearse, Providence, RI, Richard A. Fairbrothers, Laborers' Int. Union of North Amer., for Plaintiffs in C.A. 96-052B.
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Thomas A. Palombo, James R. Lee, Atty. Gens. Office, Providence, RI, Harris K. Weiner, Office of the Governor, Providence, RI, for Defendants in C.A. 96-052B.
Both of these actions are before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Civil Action No. 95-336B, the plaintiffs ("Perry plaintiffs") are court clerks employed by the State of Rhode Island. They challenge the constitutionality of the 1994 amendments to the Rhode Island Court Clerks' Incentive Pay statute, R.I.Gen.Laws §§ 84.1-1 to -7. The Perry plaintiffs seek declaratory, compensatory and injunctive relief. Defendants assert that the amendments are constitutional on their faces and as applied.
In the second action, Civil Action No. 96-052B, the plaintiffs ("Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs") are labor organizations, elected representatives of those labor organizations, and court clerks employed by the State of Rhode Island. The Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs allege that the Rhode Island General Assembly's 1994 amendments to the Court Clerks' Incentive Pay statute violate the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions and the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages. The defendants assert that the amendments are constitutional on their faces and as applied.
The Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs also assert a fourth cause of action in their complaint. They request a declaratory judgment regarding whether the Court Clerks' Incentive Pay statute is subordinate to the Rhode Island Public Bargaining Law, R.I.Gen.Laws §§ 28-7-1 to -48. Because the Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs did not brief this issue in their Memorandum of Law or argue this issue before the court, it will not be addressed in this opinion. Furthermore, the issue is moot, since the terms of the amended Court Clerks' Incentive Pay statute indicate that the amended plan did not become effective until after the expiration of any collective bargaining agreements. See R.I.Gen.Laws §§ 8-4.1-7.
For the following reasons, both plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment are denied, and both defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted.
In 1976, the Rhode Island General Assembly adopted Public Laws Chapter 205, Section 1, which created a Court Clerks' Incentive Pay Plan. The plan provided for incentive steps for clerks of the various Rhode Island state courts who "further[ed] their education in the field of court administration or law enforcement." 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws c. 205, § 1. A percentage increase over base salary was awarded to clerks who achieved either an Associate degree or a Baccalaureate degree. Credit was given only for a degree in administration of justice or law enforcement, or a Baccalaureate degree acceptable for admission to a law school accredited by the American Bar Association. In addition, any clerk who earned a Masters degree in public administration was paid a monetary sum in addition to basic salary and any other credit to which he or she was entitled.
Many clerks took advantage of the incentive pay plan. For some, the plan required not only the pursuit of a degree but also the expenditure of time and money which could have been otherwise used. Some of the clerks made serious financial commitments based upon the terms of the plan, including obtaining bank loans and mortgages to pay for their education.
In 1994, the General Assembly adopted Public Laws Chapter 125, Sections 1 and 2, which changed the benefits under the Court Clerks' Incentive Pay Plan from a percentage of base salary to a sum certain. The effect of the amendment was to reduce the amount of money each eligible clerk received under the plan. The amendment also made the incentive program applicable only to clerks who held their positions on the effective date of the act, and not to persons hired as clerks after the effective date of the act. The act specified that it would not take effect until the expiration of any collective bargaining agreement in existence on the effective date of the act.
The Perry plaintiffs fall into three categories. First, there are those plaintiffs who accepted employment before the incentives were established and who already held degrees when the incentives were established. Second, there are other plaintiffs who accepted employment before the incentives were established and who received degrees after the incentives were established. Third, there are other plaintiffs who accepted employment after the incentives were established and who thereafter earned their degrees.
The Perry plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court referred the motions to a Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation on July 16, 1996, recommending that the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted on all counts. On September 24, 1996, this Court heard the Perry plaintiffs' objection to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. On December 16, 1996, a hearing was held on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
The factual background is essentially the same as that in the Perry matter, the primary difference being that the Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs were covered by a collective bargaining agreement between Rhode Island Laborers' District Council and the State of Rhode Island. The matter began in state court. The Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs filed an action in Rhode Island Superior Court on June 29, 1995, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus for injunctive relief This complaint was withdrawn on September 6, 1995. On September 29, 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene and complaint for intervention in the Perry plaintiffs' federal action described above, Civil Action No. 95-336B. On November 29, 1995, the motion to intervene was denied without prejudice. The Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs subsequently filed the complaint in this action, docketed as Civil Action No. 96-052B, in January, 1996.
The Rhode Island Laborers plaintiffs are court clerks within the state judiciary who are also union members of Rhode Island Laborers' District Council — Local 808. As of July 1, 1992, the Rhode Island Laborers' District Council — Local 808 entered into a collective bargaining contract with the State of Rhode Island and negotiated the provisions of their collective bargaining agreement, including a provision covering educational leave. Article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement establishes an incentive pay program in accord with the provisions of the Court Clerks' Incentive Pay statute. The incentive steps provide for percentage increases which are identical to those enunciated in the plan: a 10% increase above basic salary for an associates degree and a 16% increase for a baccalaureates degree. The primary difference between the agreement and the incentive pay plan is the amount paid to clerks who earned advanced degrees. Under Section 8-4.1-6 of the plan, clerks who earned masters in public administration degrees earned an additional $750.00, while under Article XVII § 17.5 of the collective bargaining agreement, clerks who earned one of a number of advanced degrees were paid the more generous sum of $1,200.00.
The sixteen individual plaintiffs received educational incentive pay under the Court Clerks' Incentive Pay statute and their collective bargaining agreement with the state ...
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...formation, such as `contract,' `consideration,' `acceptance,' and `reliance,' do not appear in the statute[s]." Perry v. Rhode Island, 975 F. Supp. 418, 424 (D.R.I. 1997). However, as I will show, an implied contract is clearly established when viewing the language and the circumstances att......
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