Pestka v. State
Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
Docket Number | No. SC 95369,SC 95369 |
Citation | 493 S.W.3d 405 |
Parties | Timothy S. Pestka et al., Appellants, v. The State of Missouri, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
The challengers were represented by Michael A. Evans and James P. Faul of Hartnett Gladney Hetterman LLC in St. Louis, (314) 531-1054
The state was represented by Maggie M. Ahrens of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.
Timothy S. Pestka and Rudy M. Chavez (hereinafter, “Appellants”) request this Court to determine whether the Missouri Senate (hereinafter, “the senate”) violated article III, section 32 of the Missouri Constitution when it considered, voted upon, and purported to pass Truly Agreed To and Finally Passed House Bill 150 (hereinafter, “HB 150”) during a veto session convened in September 2015. This Court holds the senate lacked authority to vote to override the governor's veto during the September 2015 veto session because only bills returned by the governor on or after the fifth day before the end of the regular legislative session can be taken up during a September veto session. The circuit court's judgment is reversed.
The facts are undisputed. On April 21, 2015, the Missouri General Assembly passed HB 150, which made changes to Missouri's unemployment benefits compensation statutes. The governor vetoed HB 150 on May 5, 2015, more than five days before the General Assembly adjourned sine die . Before adjournment, the Missouri House of Representatives (hereinafter, “the house”) reconsidered HB 150 and voted to override the governor's veto. On May 15, 2015, the senate adjourned without taking any action to reconsider HB 150 or to override the governor's veto.
An unrelated bill, which was vetoed after the General Assembly adjourned, resulted in the General Assembly reconvening for a veto session pursuant to article III, section 32, commencing September 16, 2015. During the veto session, the senate reconsidered HB 150 and voted to override the governor's veto. On October 16, 2015, most of the changes to the unemployment benefits compensation statutes contemplated by HB 150 went into effect. The remaining changes went into effect on January 1, 2016.
Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action to declare HB 150 unconstitutional and requested the entry of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting HB 150 from being executed or enforced. Appellants claimed the senate's veto during the September 2015 veto session was untimely because it violated the procedure set forth in article III, section 32. The state filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the senate's vote was timely and did not run afoul of article III, section 32.
The circuit court sustained the state's motion, finding the senate's reconsideration of HB 150 during the September 2015 veto session did not violate article III, section 32. The circuit court found article III, section 32 did not limit what bills could be considered during the veto session and there was no requirement that a vetoed bill must be reconsidered before the end of the regular legislative session. Appellants appeal. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
When evaluating the circuit court's judgment sustaining the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court reviews the allegations in Appellants' petition to determine whether the facts pleaded therein are insufficient as a matter of law. State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. , 34 S.W.3d 122, 134 (Mo. banc 2000). A circuit court “properly grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This case presents issues concerning legislative power and interpretation of constitutional provisions. “Constitutional challenges are issues of law this Court reviews de novo .” Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat'l Auto Sales North, LLC , 361 S.W.3d 364, 372 (Mo. banc 2012).
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding HB 150 enforceable and constitutionally enacted over the governor's veto because the senate was without authority to consider HB 150 during the September 2015 veto session. Appellants contend article III, section 32 reserves consideration of only those bills vetoed within five days of, or after, the regular legislative session's adjournment (hereinafter, “late vetoed bills”) during a September veto session. Hence, because HB 150 was vetoed prior to the last five days of the regular legislative session, Appellants argue the senate had to vote to override the governor's veto prior to the end of the regular legislative session for the veto to be valid. The state argues the senate acted well within its plenary power, and HB 150 was enacted validly because article III, section 32 contains no language that limits or prohibits the senate from taking this action.
“The legislature represents the plenary power of the people in our three-partite system and may do everything the people have not denied it the power to do in the constitution.” Thompson v. Comm. on Legislative Research , 932 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. banc 1996) (superceded by statute as recognized in Brown v. Carnahan , 370 S.W.3d 637, 648 (Mo. banc 2012) ). Stated differently, the legislature has plenary power to enact legislation on any subject in the absence of a constitutional prohibition. Brooks v. State , 128 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Mo. banc 2004).
The parties do not dispute the legislature's plenary power to reconsider bills returned by the governor and its power to vote to override a gubernatorial veto. Rather, the parties dispute whether the senate had the power to override the governor's veto during the September 2015 veto session when the house voted to override the veto during the regular legislative session. This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court.
Historical Examination of Article III, section 32
“Constitutional provisions are subject to the same rules of construction as other laws, except that constitutional provisions are given a broader construction due to their more permanent character.” Neske v. City of St. Louis , 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. banc 2007) (overruled on other grounds by King – Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist. , 361 S.W.3d 414 (Mo. banc 2012) ). “In construing individual sections, the constitution must be read as a whole, considering other sections that may shed light on the provision in question.” State ex rel. Mathewson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of St. Louis Cnty. , 841 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. banc 1992). “This Court must assume that every word contained in a constitutional provision has effect, meaning, and is not mere surplusage.” State v. Honeycutt , 421 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Mo. banc 2013). “Words used in constitutional provisions are interpreted to give effect to their plain, ordinary, and natural meaning.” Wright – Jones v. Nasheed , 368 S.W.3d 157, 159 (Mo. banc 2012).
“Challenges to legislation based on constitutionally imposed procedural limitations are not favored.” Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State , 396 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Mo. banc 2013). However, if the act “clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitation,” this Court will hold it unconstitutional. Id. (quoting Hammerschmidt v. Boone County , 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 1994) ). “A constitutional provision should never be construed to work confusion and mischief unless no other reasonable construction is possible.' ” Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter , 387 S.W.3d 360, 363–64 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Theodoro v. Dep't of Liquor Control , 527 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. banc 1975) ).
“One of the accepted canons of statutory construction permits and often requires an examination of the historical development of the legislation, including changes therein and related statutes.” State ex rel. Smith v. Atterbury , 364 Mo. 963, 270 S.W.2d 399, 405 (Mo. banc 1954). The legislative history of Article III, section 32 is instructive in resolving the issue presented here.
Article III, section 32, as adopted in the Missouri Constitution of 1945, provided:
Every bill presented to the governor and returned with his objections shall stand as reconsidered in the house to which it is returned. The objections of the governor shall be entered upon the journal and the house shall proceed at its convenience to consider the question pending, which shall be in this form: ‘Shall the bill pass, the objections of the governor thereto notwithstanding?’ The vote upon this question shall be taken by yeas and nays and if two-thirds of the elected members of the house vote in the affirmative the presiding officer of that house shall certify that fact on the roll, attesting the same by his signature, and send the bill with the objections of the governor to the other house, in which like proceedings shall be had in relation thereto. The bill thus certified shall be deposited in the office of the secretary of state as an authentic act and shall become a law.
When the 1945 constitution was adopted, any bill vetoed by the governor at any time could be reconsidered by the legislature at its convenience. Hence, the legislature was not restricted temporally in how it could proceed regarding any bill vetoed by the governor.
After the general election in November 1970, Missouri citizens voted to amend article III, section 32 to enact different veto procedures depending on when the bill was vetoed and the year in which the governor's veto occurred. The amended language stated in pertinent part:
If the governor returns any bill with his objections after the adjournment of the general assembly ... in odd-numbered years, the bill shall be placed at the top of the calendar of the house to which it is returned for consideration when the general assembly reconvenes the following year. If the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Patterson v. State
...that the public would have ascribed to the amended language when it entered the Constitution. Other courts agree. See Pestka v. State , 493 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Mo. 2016) (discussing that in interpreting Constitutional amendments, courts should "give effect to the intent of the people in adopti......
-
Barrett v. Greitens
...the constitution must be read as a whole, considering other sections that may shed light on the provision in question.’ " Pestka v. State , 493 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting State ex rel. Mathewson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of St. Louis Co. , 841 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. banc 1992) ......
-
Hill v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation
...rule of constitutional construction is that courts must give effect to the intent of the people adopting the amendment." Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Mo. banc 2016). "The meaning conveyed to the voters is presumptively equated with the ordinary and usual meaning given thereto." Boo......
-
Gall v. Steele
...Court must assume that every word contained in a constitutional provision has effect, meaning, and is not mere surplusage." Pestka v. State , 493 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting State v. Honeycutt , 421 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Mo. banc 2013) ). Hence, "superintending control" and "supervi......