Pet Milk Co. v. Boland, No. 13815.
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | GARDNER, , and RIDDICK and COLLET, Circuit |
Citation | 175 F.2d 151 |
Parties | PET MILK CO. v. BOLAND. |
Docket Number | No. 13815. |
Decision Date | 17 June 1949 |
175 F.2d 151 (1949)
PET MILK CO.
v.
BOLAND.
No. 13815.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
May 24, 1949.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1949.
Roland F. O'Bryen, St. Louis, Mo. (Fred L. Williams, Robert F. Schlafly and Charles S. Baumgarten, St. Louis, Mo., were with him on the brief), for appellant.
Roberts P. Elam, St. Louis, Mo. (John S. Leahy, St. Louis, Mo., and Joseph L. Badaracco, University City, Mo., were with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and RIDDICK and COLLET, Circuit Judges.
COLLET, Circuit Judge.
This action is to recover on quantum meruit for a balance alleged to be due appellee plaintiff for the construction of a sewer line for appellant defendant at the latter's Siloam Springs, Arkansas, plant. The controversy in the trial court and about which this appeal is concerned revolves around the question of whether a certain written "Purchase Order" submitted to plaintiff and signed by his representative, his son, represented the agreement between the parties or whether an oral agreement, varying in one important respect from the written purchase order, constituted the contract. There was a jury verdict for the plaintiff for $30,023.78 and interest for which judgment was given. After unsuccessful motions for judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, this appeal followed. Generalizing the defendant's contentions, it asserts that (a) the written purchase order constituted the contract between the parties and that parol evidence of conversations and understandings had prior to and contemporaneously with its execution, which were admitted as evidence, violated the parol evidence rule, (b) that the parol agreement asserted by plaintiff constituted a modification of the alleged written contract for which modification there was no consideration, and (c) that the court's charge was erroneous. The facts necessary to an understanding of these issues follow.
Plaintiff, a contractor, was engaged in the performance of another contract for defendant at Siloam Springs, Arkansas, in the fall and winter of 1943. Early in January, 1944, defendant's construction superintendent at Siloam Springs suggested to plaintiff that he bid on the construction of a fifteen-inch sewer line which was to constitute a part of defendant's Siloam Springs plant. Under date of January 18, 1944,
"The cubic yards of all excavation for the 15-inch tile sewer line is to be figured on the basis of a trench 33 inches wide multiplied by the average depth and by the length of the trench through the cut."
It is clear from all the evidence that such a method of calculating the yardage removed, referred to as the "pay line width" method, contemplated the assumption of an arbitrary width of 33 inches regardless of whether the actual width of the trench was more narrow or wider than 33 inches. Plaintiff objected to that method of computation, and on March 10 and 11, 1944, wrote defendant two letters, the substance of which was that the assumption of a trench 33 inches in width for all "earth excavated trenches" was satisfactory, but that the amount of excavation to be compensated for should be the amount necessarily excavated in the construction of the trench, to be "determined from the final profile by a cross sectioning method."1 On April 5, 1944, plaintiff wrote
An estimate of work done was submitted April 30, 1944, and another on May 31, 1944. These estimates contained, among others which are not in dispute, items for earth excavated trenches computed by the
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