Pete v. Dunn
| Decision Date | 19 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-CV-546 |
| Parties | DAVID RANDY PETE, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT C. DUNN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, United States District Judge Michael J. Truncale referred this matter to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for entry of findings and recommendation on case-dispositive motions and determinations of non-dispositive matters. Pending before the court is Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. #20.) After review, the court recommends granting the motion to dismiss.
On November 1, 2021, Plaintiff David Randy Pete, proceeding pro se, filed his initial complaint against Defendants Robert C. Dunn and Dennis W. Spooner, members of Beaumont Independent School District School Board of Trustees. (Doc. #1.) According to the Original Complaint, the events giving rise to the claim took place on August 19 2021, during an emergency BISD school board meeting conducted via Zoom at which the Board implemented a mask mandate. (Doc. #1, p. 4.) This meeting, according to the Plaintiff, “caused great harm and damages to the right to choose as well as the right to voice concern.” (Doc. #1, p. 4.) Plaintiff also complained that the alleged mask mandate violated the Texas Governor's order prohibiting mask mandates. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $100, 000, 000. (Id.)
After reviewing Plaintiff's Original Complaint and granting Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis, the court directed the Plaintiff to answer the following specific questions:
In response, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint but ignored the court's order to specifically identify the basis for federal jurisdiction or to identify himself as a student, teacher, parent, or visitor. In his Amended Complaint, he stated that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated and the actions have “prevented him from attending Board Meeting of which I have attended in the past.” (Doc. #6, p. 3.) He then claims that “the ultimate injury I have substain [sic] has been mential [sic] affecting my sleep, body, because of all the emotional strain from this covid pandamic [sic].” (Doc. #6, p. 4.)
On December 27, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. #14.) Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. #16.) The court then determined that a page of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint had not been scanned. The error was corrected, and the full Amended Complaint was filed. Defendants were then directed to file an amended motion to dismiss based on the complete complaint, which they did on February 10, 2022. (Doc. #20.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on February 24, 2022. (Doc. #21.)
The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation on March 8, 2022, recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted in part, and denied in part. (Doc. #22.) Objections were filed by both parties and the undersigned withdrew the original Report and Recommendation on May 10, 2022. (Doc. # 30.) The motion to dismiss is now ripe for review.
Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, “[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). The vehicle for challenging a federal court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); see Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac V.O.F., 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001).
Logically, a court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge first, before considering any attack on the merits. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). Considering the 12(b)(1) motion first “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id. at 287 (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). In deciding the motion, a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As, 241 F.3d at 424. The burden of proof is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161; see also Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008). If the court decides at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
A federal court has jurisdiction only when a “case” or “controversy” is presented. Deutsch v. Annis Enterprises, Inc.> 881 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2018); Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997). To establish a case or controversy, a plaintiff must first prove standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Standing means that the plaintiff (1) has suffered an injury in fact, i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Deutsch, 881 F.3d at 173. Proper grounds for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss include a plaintiff's lack of standing to bring suit. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
A motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive dismissal under 12(b)(6) the complaint must contain sufficient facts, which accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To be plausible, the complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Supreme Court has confirmed that Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in tandem with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
To decide whether the complaint states a valid claim for relief, the court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Lakes Dredge, 624 F.3d at 210. However, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007). “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The inquiry focuses on the allegations in the pleadings and not on whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to succeed on the merits. Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir. 2009).
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff's pleadings are necessarily held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ” and are liberally construed by the court. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United States., 312 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2002). Attempting to give Plaintiff's complaints their most liberal construction is challenging. He appears to be complaining about the mask mandate initiated by the Board members and that the mandate itself violates the First Amendment. He also makes a claim under the Texas Open Meeting Act alleging that the meeting conducted remotely on August 19th or August 23rd[1] violated state law.
In his response to the Amended Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff now appears to claim that the Board meeting conducted by videoconference on August 19th or 23rd violated his First Amendment right. Specifically, he asserts that by conducting the meeting remotely, he was “personally deprived of my right to freely exercise by right to free speech.” (Doc. #21, p. 4.)
As set forth above, to assert an actual case or controversy for which this court would have jurisdiction, the plaintiff must articulate an injury-in-fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or...
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