Peter Bay Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Stillman

Decision Date22 August 2001
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 97-0036,CIV. A. 97-0036.,No. CIV. A. 97-0036.
Citation163 F.Supp.2d 537
PartiesPETER BAY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. Plaintiff, v. Andrew R. STILLMAN, Joy H. Stillman, John G. Catts, and Sheila J. Roebuck, Defendants. Antonio Godinez, Bonnie Godinez, Paul Dué, Genevieve Dué, and Ethlyn Hall, Intervening Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. James Henry, Carol Henry, L.D. Kirk, Suzanne Kirk, Scott F. Meese, Donna G. Meese, Arie Liebeskind, Doreen Liebeskind Jim R. Hayes, Zaquin S. Hayes, Jeffrey Price, Steven Paul, Jann Paul, St. John Land Investment L.P., and Andrews St. John Trust, Intervening Counterclaim Defendants.
CourtVirgin Islands Supreme Court

JAMES M. DERR, ESQ., St. Thomas, VI, Attorney for Plaintiff Peter Bay Owners Association, Inc.

J. DARYL DODSON, ESQ., Law Offices of Moore & Dodson, St. Thomas, VI, Attorney for Defendants Andrew R. Stillman, Joy H. Stillman, John G. Catts, and Sheila J. Roebuck.

JOHN H. BENHAM, ESQ., Watts & Benham, P.C., St. Thomas, VI, Attorney for Defendants Andrew R. Stillman and Joy H. Stillman.

HENRY C. SMOCK, ESQ., St. Thomas, VI, Attorney for Intervening Counterclaim Plaintiffs Antonio Godinez, Bonnie Godinez, Paul Dué, and Genevieve Dué, and substituted party Michael Burgamy.

SAMUEL H. HALL, ESQ., Birch, DeJongh, Hindels & Hall, St. Thomas, VI, Attorney for Intervening Counterclaim Plaintiff Ethlyn Hall.

GREGORY H. HODGES, ESQ., CHAD C. MESSIER, ESQ., St. Thomas, VI, Attorneys for Intervening Counterclaim Defendants James Henry, Carol Henry, L.D. Kirk, Suzanne Kirk, Scott F. Meese, Donna B. Meese, Arie Liebeskind, Doreen Liebeskind, Jim R. Hayes, Zaquynn S. Hayes, Jeffrey Price, Steven Paul, JANN Paul, St. John Land Investment L.P., and The Andrews St. John Trust.

W.T. JEROME, ESQ., St. John, VI, Attorney for Intervenors Ned Lemkemeier, Sally Lemkemeier, and David Mugar.

OPINION ON MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION BY DEFENDANTS STILLMANS AND INTERVENING PLAINTIFFS, GODINEZES AND DUÉS

STANLEY S. BROTMAN, District Judge.

On July 12, 2000, this Court granted the motion of the Stillmans, Godinezes, and Dués for reconsideration of the Court's July 15, 1999, Opinion and Order, which established the boundaries of the beach easements burdening the movants' properties at Peter Bay, St. John. Having heard oral argument and considered three rounds of briefs over the past year, the Court today enters its revised decision. For the reasons stated below, the Court vacates its earlier opinion and order and declares that the beach easement burdening movants' parcels extends inland only to the vegetation berm line.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this protracted land dispute are fully described in several published opinions, see Peter Bay Owners Ass'n v. Stillman, 58 F. Supp. 2d 640 (D.V.I. 1999); Peter Bay Owners Ass'n v. Stillman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.V.I. 1999); Peter Bay Owners Ass'n v. Stillman, 1999 WL 93538 (D.V.I. Feb. 16, 1999); Peter Bay Owners Ass'n v. Stillman, 1998 WL 779038 (D.V.I. Oct. 26, 1998), and are set forth only as relevant here.

On March 11, 1997, Plaintiff Peter Bay Owners Association ("Peter Bay") filed a Complaint against Andrew and Joy Stillman, John G. Catts, and Sheila J. Roebuck ("Defendants") seeking owners' association fees and a declaratory judgment concerning the applicability of certain covenants to Defendants' property. On April 24, 1997, the Stillmans filed an Answer and Counterclaim, requesting recoupment of payments to Peter Bay and various forms of declaratory relief. It is the Court's understanding that all claims in the Complaint and Counterclaim, apart from count four of the Counterclaim,1 have been adjudicated or otherwise resolved.2

Counterclaim count four, the matter at issue here, sought clarification of the extent of the beach easement created by the August 21, 1975, Partitioning Decree, which the late Judge Young issued in the case of Harthman v. Harthman, 12 V.I. 142 (D.V.I. 1975). Between December 1997 and June 1998, the intervening counterclaim plaintiffs—the Godinezes, the Dués, and Ethlyn Hall—filed motions for summary judgment on the extent of the beach easement. Peter Bay and the long list of intervening counterclaim defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which were ultimately resolved against the movants.3

In an opinion dated July 15, 1999, the Court determined that the easement created by the Harthman decree extended from the 1975 low-water mark to the vegetation berm line. Peter Bay, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 645. The Stillmans, Godinezes, and Dués, however as well as the Andrews St. John Trust, which did not join in the motion for reconsideration—were not parties to the Partitioning Decree.4 They took title to their parcels by deeds from Harthman heirs, or as successors in interest to parcels deeded by Harthman heirs. Those deeds incorporate survey maps that depict an easement extending inland a flat fifty feet from the 1975 low-water mark. Id. at 645-46. The Court concluded that the four parcels were subject to the fifty-foot easement, relying on a Vermont Supreme Court case and general principles in American Jurisprudence (Second Edition) for the proposition that a grantee takes title in accordance with boundaries defined by a survey or map, albeit erroneous, where the deed incorporates the survey or map. See id. at 645 & n.3 (citing Hull v. Fuller, 1835 WL 996 (Vt. 1835) (finding that when an error is made by a government-appointed surveyor and the affected property is subsequently conveyed by a deed incorporating the erroneous survey, the survey controls); 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 5 (1997) (stating that a deed which describes property by reference to a map or survey is considered as having adopted the map or survey, so that the grantee takes title in accordance with the boundaries identified in the map or survey); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 135 (1973) ("[I]f in recording a deed, the boundaries are incorrectly described, so that it would appear to convey only a part of the land conveyed in the original deed, the record would be good . . . only of a conveyance of so much as appeared on the record to be conveyed.")).

The Stillmans, Godinezes, and Dués ("the movants") filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the Court overlooked controlling law—viz., the Restatement of the Law of Property. See L. Civ. R. 7.4 ("A motion to reconsider shall be based on: (1) intervening change in controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence, or; (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice."). In the absence of local law to the contrary, "[t]he rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute" are the law of the Virgin Islands. 1 V.I.C. § 4. Where the common law rules cannot be found in the Restatements, common law "as generally understood and applied in the United States" governs. Id. Movants contend that the law as reflected in the Restatement—mandates that the Court declare all the beachfront parcels to be subject to an easement running inland to the berm line, rather than the flat fifty feet. Peter Bay has argued that the Court should uphold its summary judgment decision.

On July 17, 2000, the Court granted the motions for reconsideration and ordered all parties to submit supplemental briefs on the application of the Restatement, and to the extent that the Restatement did not control, other sources of common law. The Court subsequently held oral argument on August 4, 2000, in which it directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following a status hearing on June 13, 2001, the Court allowed the parties to submit additional supplemental briefs on any issues not previously raised.5

Finally, by separate order issued today, the Court has granted the motion of Michael Burgamy to substitute for Paul and Genevieve Dué as an intervening counterclaim plaintiff. Although the Dués are among the movants, they sold their Peter Farm parcel to Mr. Burgamy some time after the motions for reconsideration had been granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because the July 15, 1999 Opinion decided a motion for summary judgment, the Court must apply the summary judgment standard in reconsidering that opinion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted only when materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Serbin v. Bora Corp., 96 F.3d 66, 69 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, a court must grant all reasonable inferences from the evidence to the non-moving party. The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

Supreme Court decisions mandate that a summary judgment motion must be granted unless the party opposing the motion "provides evidence 'such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510). Once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Serbin, 96 F.3d at 69 n.2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,...

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