Peter v. Peter

• Decision Date: 23 April 1931
• Docket Number: No. 20598.,20598.
• Citation: 175 N.E. 846,343 Ill. 493
• Parties: PETER et al. v. PETER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

343 Ill. 493

175 N.E. 846

PETER et al.

v.PETER et al.

No. 20598.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 23, 1931.

Suit by John Peter and others against William H. Peter and others. From a decree for complainants, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.Appeal from City Court of East St. Louis; Silas Cook, Judge.

Joyce & Zerweck, McHale & McHale, and John E. Hamlin, all of East St. Louis, for appellants.

Louis Beasley and Edward C. Zulley, both of East St. Louis, for appellees.

STONE, J.

This appeal is to reverse the decree of the city court of East St. Louis granting the prayer of appellees' bill for partition of certain lots in said city. The bill alleges that John Peter, Sr., died September 24, 1914, seized in fee simple of the lots in question and leaving him surviving Mary Peter, his widow, John Peter, Joseph Peter, Della Houston, and Louisa Robb, appellees, and William H. Peter, one of the appellants, as his only heirs at law; that on September 22, 1911, John Peter Sr., was in the probate court of said county declared a drunkard and spendthrift, and a conservator was appointed for him, qualified and acted as such; that on October 13, 1911, John Peter, Sr., executed warranty deeds to the aforesaid lots conveying the same to his wife, Mary Peter; that on the same day he executed his last will and testament, in and by which he devised and bequeathed all of his estate to his wife, Mary Peter, and appointed her executrix; and that the will was by Mary Peter filed in the office of the clerk of the probate court of said county, together with a petition that it be admitted to probate. The bill then alleges that Mary Peter accepted title under said deeds and refused to accept the testamentary disposition mentioned in the will of her husband, because she filed an affidavit in the probate court which set forth what she was the widow of John Peter, Sr., deceased, who left no property, effects, nor money because he had on October 13, 1911, conveyed by warranty deed all the property he then possessed to her. She then asked that the petition for administration be withdrawn. The bill further alleges that the probate court entered an order removing the estate from the docket; that on December 6, 1924, Mary Peter borrowed $1,800 from appellant Southern Illinois Trust Company and gave a mortgage on said premises to secure the same; that on September 5, 1925, Mary Peter borrowed $1,500 from appellant Union Trust Company and executed a mortgage on said premises to secure the same; that Mary Peter died March 6, 1928, testate; and that said mortgages are null, void, and of no effect except as clouds on the title of said premises. It is alleged that the children of John Peter, Sr., own the lots described in the bill as tenants in common, and the bill prays for the removal of the mortgages as clouds and for partition. Appellants' demurrer to the bill was overruled, and by their answer they denied that Mary Peter refused to accept the testamentary disposition of the premises mentioned in the will, and alleged that the will of John Peter, Sr., was duly probated and admitted to record in the probate court on June 20, 1928, and is now in full force and effect, and by the probate thereof Mary Peter became vested in fee simple of the premises described therein. The answer further avers that the will of Mary Peter was admitted to probate in said probate court, and by it appellants William H. Peter and Idella Sullivan became the owners of said real estate.

Replications were filed, and the cause was referred to the master. Before the master the facts concerning the ownership of the premises by John Peter, Sr., his death, the name and death of the widow, the names of the children of John Peter, Sr., the appointment of a conservator, the deeds to Mary Peter, the recording thereof after the death of John Peter, Sr., the filing of the will and petition for probate thereof, and the filing of a verified petition by the widow requesting that the petition for administration be withdrawn, were stipulated. It was also stipulated that the probate court, on the petition of the widow to withdraw administration, entered an order removing the cause from the docket, ‘with leave to re-instate if assets are discovered.’ The execution of the notes and mortgages was also stipulated, as was the fact that the widow, from the time of her husband's death until her death, had possession of all the property covered by the deeds and will, managed and controlled same, said taxes, and made repairs. The parties also stipulated that the appeal of John Peter, Jr., from the order of the probate court admitting the will of John Peter, Sr., to probate, was dismissed and procedendo filed in probate court.

The evidence showed that when the loans were made the abstracts and certificates of title showed only the deeds of John Peter, Sr., and not his will. Appellants put in evidence certified copies of the wills of John Peter, Sr., and Mary Peter, together with certified copies of the orders admitting both to probate.

The master found there was not sufficient proof of renunciation by the widow; that the deeds to Mary Peter and her mistaken belief that they were valid had no effect on the will of John Peter; that the Dower Act furnishes a complete method of renouncing a will by surviving husband or wife; that on the probate of John Peter's will after the death of Mary Peter the real estate in question passed to Mary in fee and by her death and will to appellants William H. Peter and Idella Sullivan, and that the mortgages are valid existing liens on the property. He recommended dismissal of the bill for want of equity. The chancellor sustained exceptions to this report and entered a decree finding the wills of John Peter, Sr., and Mary Peter void, removing them and the mortgages as clouds on the title, and ordering partition in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

Appellants urge as grounds for reversal (1) Mary Peter did not abandon, renounce, or refuse to take the property given her by the will of John Peter, Sr.; (2) the will of John Peter became effective from the time of his death and vested title in Mary Peter upon its admission to probate and record even though such probate was after the death of Mary Peter; (3) the city court had no jurisdiction to declare the wills of John Peter, Sr., and Mary Peter void.

It is elementary that to support a decree in equity the proof must sustain the allegations of the bill. Rolinitis v. Rolinitis, 335 Ill. 260, 167 N. E. 68;Lewis v. Lewis, 316 Ill. 447, 147 N. E. 411;Fisher v. Burks, 274 Ill. 363, 113 N. E. 711;Houlihan v. Morrissey, 270 Ill. 66, 110 N. E. 341, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 364;Leahy v. Nolan, 261 Ill. 219, 103 N. E. 546. By their bill appellees alleged that the widow refused to accept the property willed to her by her deceased husband. Appellants took issue on this question of fact. Unless her petition filed in the probate court requesting withdrawal of the administration of her husband's estate can be considered evidence of refusal on her part to accept the property devised by the will there is no evidence in the record to support that allegation. The law does not compel a devisee to accept a devise against his consent. People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N. E. 848, 60 A. L. R 305. However, the law will presume, in the absence of evidence, that a beneficial devise has been accepted. Unless there is a specific disclaimer or renunciation of such devise by some unequivocal act or a renunciation as provided by statute the devise vests according to the terms of the will. People v. Flanagin, supra; Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N. Y. 93, 64 Am. Dec. 530; 4 Kent's Con. 533. It is not claimed that the widow specifically disclaimed or rejected the property devised to her or that she filed a renunciation in the form and manner provided by the statute. She, on the contrary, took the property devised though she thought she was taking the same by deed. The deeds, admitted to be invalid, and the will, covered the same property. Her request to withdraw the administration of the estate cannot be construed as a refusal to accept the property devised, for she took and enjoyed that property. The will remained on file in the probate court. The administration only was withdrawn, ‘with leave to re-instate if assets are discovered.’ Nor can such request be construed as a renunciation under the statute, since that statute was not complied with. The statute provides a complete method for renunciation under it. Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 103 Ill. 262. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence does not support the allegation of the bill that the widow refused to accept the property devised.

Counsel for appellees argue that, though the widow was mistaken in believing that the deeds from her husband vested the property in her, her mistake was one of law, and that equity will not relieve against a mistake of law. While it has been stated as a general rule that a mistake of law pure and simple is not adequate ground for relief in equity, yet, even when the mistake is one of law, equity sometimes intervenes. Moore v. Shook, 276 Ill. 47, 114 N. E. 592. Courts of equity have aided mistaken parties because of the demands of justice. Private legal rights, interests, duties, or liabilities are always more or less complex, particularly to the layman. They depend upon conditions of fact as well as rules of law, and a concrete notion of a private legal right, interest, or liability is not readily separated from the facts on which it depends. Such mistakes may therefore be, and frequently are, properly considered as mistakes of fact. There is no fact relating to private rights, interests, estates, or liabilities that does not more or less involve rules of law, as where A proves that he is the owner of certain real estate. Such is proved as a fact; yet this fact rests upon the law relating to the sufficiency of the conveyance, the competency...