Peter v. Wright

• Decision Date: 29 May 1855
• Parties: Peter v. Wright and Others
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

6 Ind. 147

Peter v. Wright and Others

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 29, 1855

ERROR to the Tippecanoe Court of Common Pleas.

D. Mace and W. C. Wilson, for plaintiffs.

J Pettit, S. A. Huff, Z. Baird, G. S. Orth and E. H. Brackett for defendants.

OPINION

Stuart J.

Bill in chancery by Matilda Peter against Wright, Brandt and others, to set aside certain conveyances as fraudulent. The Court denied the relief sought, and dismissed the bill at the costs of the complainant. She prosecutes this writ of error.

Both in the pleadings and the argument of counsel, it is to be regretted that such unwonted asperity has been indulged. There is nothing to distinguish this case from many others in which fraud is charged on the one side and denied on the other.

Divested of extraneous matter, the facts legitimately presented for our consideration are, as briefly as may be, these:

Joseph Peter was one of eleven heirs of William Peter, deceased, who died some time in 1837, intestate, leaving a large estate, consisting chiefly of lands. Shortly after his death, the heirs made an amicable partition. By this partition Joseph was allotted a larger share than the others, because on him was devolved the support of his mother, Julia Ann Peter. That share consisted of two hundred and fifty-four acres of land, including the homestead of the late William Peter. Under this partition, the heirs executed deeds, and took possession of their respective shares.

It appears that Julia Ann Peter released her dower to her son Joseph, and took from him a bond dated May 29, 1844, whereby he agreed to deliver to Julia Ann one-third of the products of the farm for six years, and afterwards to support her, &c.

In May, 1846, Joseph Peter died intestate, leaving the complainant Matilda his widow, and Irvin Peter his only child and heir at law.

At the time of the partition some of the heirs were minors. others femes covert. To quiet title and confirm what had been done, a bill in chancery was filed, in which all the heirs were parties, either plaintiffs or defendants. The result of this amicable proceeding was a confirmation of the partition already made, and deeds ordered by the Court to the heirs respectively. Under this proceeding, the title of the father, Joseph P., was confirmed in the son Irvin, by commissioner's deed.

This amicable suit was terminated in 1848. In March, 1849, Irvin Peter died intestate, leaving his mother Matilda, the complainant, his sole heir at law. She thus inherited the share of Joseph, her husband, subject to his obligation for the support of Julia Ann Peter.

Consisting, as that portion did, of the Peter homestead, and now in the hands of one connected with the family only by marriage, it seems to have become an object with the heirs, to place it, if possible, in the hands of some of the family. They, therefore, in April, soon after the death of Irvin, took measures to buy out Matilda, or, if that failed, to test her title by law. In this negotiation, Wright was employed as their agent, at a contingent fee of 500 dollars.

In May, 1849, Wright took with him Burkhalter, the husband of one of the heirs, and Snoddy, a friend of the family, and by their joint influence and persuasion, succeeded in purchasing, for the other heirs, from Matilda, for 1,500 dollars. At that time, the value of the land so purchased was variously estimated at from 4,000 to 5,000 dollars. Matilda gave the heirs a title-bond, to convey upon the payment of the money.

Three weeks after the date of the bond, Matilda filed her bill in chancery to set it aside, as having been obtained by fraud. Wright and the Peter heirs, obligees of the bond, were defendants.

In September, 1849, the case was compromised, and the suit dismissed at Matilda's costs. In pursuance of this compromise, she deeded to Wright for 2,375 dollars cash, and divers other alleged items of consideration, which will be noticed hereafter. The deed was delivered to Orth, as an escrow, to be delivered to Wright upon the payment of the money above named.

That very day Wright and the defendant Brandt were negotiating about the homestead, and the next day Brandt purchased a part of the land for 3,500 dollars. Without any order from Matilda, but on the assurance of Brandt simply, Orth took Brandt's note for 1,750 dollars, in lieu of cash; and the deed which he held as an escrow was delivered to Wright.

In January, 1850, Matilda filed her present bill to set aside the compromise, alleging that she was induced to make it by fraud. Wright and his vendee, Brandt, the Peter heirs, and two of her former solicitors, are made parties to the bill. The answers are required to be without oath.

The Peter heirs are defaulted. Wright, Brandt and the other defendants answer, denying the several charges in the bill, and denying all fraud, &c.

The whole controversy, therefore, resolves itself into a question of fact, on the weight of evidence.

The Peter heirs are charged as confederates. It has been seen that they had severally received their full share of the paternal estate. They had no further claim on the homestead--no shadow of right to Joseph's share, as inherited by Matilda. Their position, therefore, in employing Wright to procure for them Matilda's inheritance, either by compromise at an inadequate price, or by law, was aggressive; and in that aggression they were united. They directed Wright to use "whatever means he might deem proper and fitting;" to compromise for 1,500 dollars, if he could, if not, to involve her in litigation. He was to have 500 dollars if he succeeded; if he failed, nothing, and to pay all costs. If this is not champerty, it has some such similitude.

The contract to this effect is appended in a note for further reference. ^[1]

On the other hand, Matilda was on the defensive. She was endeavoring to hold what the law had given her. Alone against a number, with even less than the ordinary capacity and shrewdness of her sex in business matters, she is artfully led from one blunder to another, till her property is gone for a very inadequate consideration. Thus situated, she appeals to the Courts to relieve her from contracts into which she alleges she has been induced to enter by fraud.

All the parties to the bill in chancery to set aside the title-bond, are also parties to this bill to set aside the deed to Wright. The material parts of the former bill are embraced in this; and the special prayer is for relief against the bond as well as against the deed. The bond and deed are treated as parts of a whole, and the evidence addressed to both accordingly.

To determine accurately the respective rights of the parties, it will be necessary to examine--

1. The validity of the title-bond to the Peter heirs.

2. The validity of the deed to Wright.

Incidental to these, there are several other questions which will be noticed as they arise.

First, then, the title-bond executed by Matilda Peter to the Peter heirs in May, 1849.

It has been seen that Irvin Peter died in March, 1849. The very next month, April, 1849, Wright was employed. He immediately took with him Burkhalter and Snoddy, to second his overtures of purchase with Matilda. This part of the transaction is best told by the witness; premising, as it appears in evidence, that Wright, Snoddy and Matilda were all members of the same communion, and that she, therefore, placed the most implicit confidence in these advisers, who had generously come, as they said, to prevent a family difficulty. Snoddy, in substance, says: "Dr. Wright and Henry Burkhalter called on me and wished me to go with them to Mrs. Peter's. We talked about her title. I became convinced that Matilda's title was that of Joseph Peter; but I always supposed his title defective. I told Matilda in the presence of Wright and Burkhalter, that I thought her title was not good, and that she had better take the 1,500 dollars, and escape the litigation threatened her by the Peter heirs. I was in utter ignorance, then, that there had been judicial proceedings to supply the deficiency of Joseph's deed. Neither Wright nor Burkhalter informed me that I was in error, though Wright had then papers which I afterwards understood to be copies of the records.

"Had I known of the proceedings in Court, I should not have advised her to take 1,500 dollars."

There was policy, at least, in the selection of Snoddy, who, ignorant of the facts, was eager to enact the peacemaker; and in whose integrity and friendship Matilda had the most undoubting confidence. Advice from such a man might well have misled a stronger mind. He was backed by Wright, another brother in the church, and Burkhalter, her brother-in-law. Thus beset, and with such advisers, Matilda signed the bond in controversy. Having thus sold her property for one-third its value, to avert threatened litigation, the object of the confederacy was accomplished.

In what light the law views such transactions, remains to be seen. In Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26, it is, says Judge Barbour, an ancient and well-established principle that whenever suppressio veri occurs, it is sufficient to set aside a conveyance. Judge Story expresses the same thing thus: "Where a party designedly produces a false impression in order to mislead, entrap, or obtain undue advantage over another--in every such case there is fraud;--an evil act with an evil intent." 1 Story Eq. Jurisp. 201. Thus, what Snoddy ignorantly stated as to the defect of Matilda's title, was knowingly and wrongfully adopted by Wright, and, as the evidence shows, artfully urged upon her as an inducement to accept the 1,500 dollars. She placed a known trust and confidence in her advisers, in a mixed question of law and fact, and they misled her. 1 Story...