Peterangelo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

Decision Date17 April 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 3:12-cv-381
PartiesCYNTHIA L. PETERANGELO, et al, Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

DECISION AND ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 15). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20), Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum and Motion (Doc. No. 22), and Plaintiffs a Reply (Doc. No. 23).

The parties have unanimously consented to plenary magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the case was referred on that basis. (Rule 26(f) Report, Doc. No. 5); (Order Referring Case, Doc. No. 6).

Statement of Law

As of October 15, 2012, the time of the filing of the Complaint in the Greene County Common Pleas Court, Plaintiffs were residents of the State of Ohio. Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company is a corporation organized under the insurance laws of the State of Illinois and maintains its principal place of business in Bloomington, Illinois. (Notice ofRemoval, Doc. No. 1, PageID 2.) Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and on the basis that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (b) and 1332; Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7.

A federal court exercising diversity subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims must apply state substantive law to those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In applying state law, the Sixth Circuit follows the law of the State as announced by that State's supreme court. Savedoff v. Access Group, Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2008); Ray Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 1992); Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assocs., 917 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 1990). "Where the state supreme court has not spoken, our task is to discern, from all available sources, how that court would respond if confronted with the issue." Id.; In re Akron-Cleveland Auto Rental, Inc., 921 F.2d 659, 662 (6th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. V & O Press Co., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985); Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Corp., 820 F.2d 806 (1987). The available sources to be considered if the highest court has not spoken include relevant dicta from the state supreme court, decisional law of appellate courts, restatements of law, law review commentaries, and the "majority rule" among other States. Bailey, 770 F.2d at 604. "Where a state's highest court has not spoken on a precise issue, a federal court may not disregard a decision of the state appellate court on point, unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1485 (6th Cir. 1989); accord Northland Ins. Co. v. Guardsman Products, Inc., 141 F.3d 612, 617 (6th Cir. 1998); Melson v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 429 F.3d 633, 636 (6th Cir. 2005). This rule applies regardless of whether the appellate court decision is published or unpublished. See Talley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,223 F.3d 323, 328 (6th Cir. 2000); Puckett, 889 F.2d at 1485; Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, 249 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2001).

Defendant's Motion is made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 15, PageID 165.) Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) ("On summary judgment," moreover, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.") "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (emphasis in original).

The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Alexander v. Caresource, 576 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2009), citing Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n., 968 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1992).

A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). "Materiality is determined by the substantive law claim." Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is genuine if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., Ltd., 543 F.3d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 2008); Randall v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994), quoting Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 248. Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Thus, a factual dispute which is merely colorable or is not significantly probative will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 510 U.S. 976 (1993); see also, Int'l Union United Auto., Aerospace & Agriculture Implement Workers of America v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1076 (2000).

The party opposing the motion may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford and Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. If, aftersufficient opportunity for discovery, the non-moving party is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

Factual Background

It is uncontested that State Farm issued a Homeowner's Policy to the Plaintiffs collectively, insuring the residence located at 138 E. Routzong Drive, Fairborn, Ohio 45324, effective from July 25, 2011 through July 25, 2012. (Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1, Exh. A); (Motion For Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 15, PageID 167.) The home was jointly owned by Cynthia Peterangelo, John Owsiany, and Angela Owsiany, though only Angela Owsiany resided at the home. (Motion For Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 15, PageID 167.)

On November 18, 2011, the property was damaged by fire. The fire was either an accidental result of Plaintiff Angela Owsiany falling asleep in bed while smoking a cigarette or purposely caused in a suicide attempt. The facts clearly show, however, that Ms. Owsiany attempted suicide by means of a prescription pill overdose at a time simultaneous to the fire and that the fire originated from the mattress.

The insurance policy provided for coverage for "accidental direct physical loss" to the property. These terms however were conditioned on a lack of concealment or fraud on the part of the insured. "This policy is void as to you and any other insured, if you or any other insured under this policy has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to this insurance, whether before or after the loss." (Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 15, PageID 168), quoting Doc. No. 1-2, Policy, Section I and Section II, CONDITIONS, 2. Concealment or Fraud, PageID 44.

In her initial recorded statement with an adjuster from State Farm, Ms. Owsiany denied that she had attempted suicide on November 18, 2011. Additionally, she misrepresented the type and quantity of pills she took on the day in question. However, her medical records, later released to State Farm, indicated a diagnosis of a suicide attempt on the date of the fire, as well various prescription pills taken in that attempt. State Farm again examined Ms. Owsiany and she admitted that she had in fact intended to kill herself and that she had underrepresented the amount of drugs she consumed in the attempt because she was embarrassed.

On February 24, 2012, Ms. Owsiany was indicted in Greene County on one count of arson under Ohio Revised Code 2929.02(A)(2) and on one count of aggravated arson under Ohio Revised Code 2929.02(A)(1). The charge of aggravated arson was eventually dismissed and the arson charge was amended to attempted aggravated arson, to which Ms. Owsiany entered a plea of no contest and the court found her guilty.

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